Climate Displacement: An Impending Crisis and the Search for Safe Routes

-Edited by Declan Browne

Introduction

Climate displacement (the forcible displacement of individuals and communities because of climate-induced sudden or slow on-set weather related events) is a multifaceted phenomenon, encompassing issues of international law, cultural rights, meteorological factors, conflict drivers as well as adaptation and mitigation. This analysis will focus on international migration dynamics, and cross-border displacement through investigating mobility pathways and safe routes (or lack thereof) for environmental migrants and protection issues of climate refugees from a global governance perspective. As such, this analysis will argue for international legal frameworks to protect people displaced in the context of climate change and accelerated international cooperation on establishing safe routes for environmental migration. This analysis will incorporate two definitions and categories of people to describe climate displacement. First is that of a climate refugee – someone who has been forcibly displaced due to a sudden on-set weather-related event (e.g., natural disaster). The second is of an environmental migrant – a person whose livelihood is due to be lost because of climate change through slow on-set weather related events (i.e., rising sea levels). Compounding on the tragedy of losing one’s home, persons forcibly displaced in the context of climate change have no legal recourse to claim international protection under international law. Under the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention (the 1951 Convention), and its 1967 Protocol, a refugee remains as someone who has a well-founded fear of persecution. Consequently, climate refugees are not entitled to international humanitarian protection under the Convention. Resultantly, they are legally classified as environmental migrants. This is a distinct failure in global governance which this analysis aims to highlight. Thus, this analysis will further argue that a distinction should be made within international legal frameworks for protection reasons to allow climate refugees to claim asylum. This paper will first provide context to the issue, before explaining how securitisation theory is a useful lens to view both the failures and necessary direction of travel in addressing climate displacement. Followingly, by investigating the situation of climate displacement in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in Asia-Pacific, it will identify the present protection gap in international refugee law and the impending crisis for populations in the region resulting from a lack of action. Finally, it will make recommendations to address the problems that this analysis highlights. 

The Problem

Climate change and cross-border migration and displacement are two distinctly global challenges, in turn requiring both global cooperation and solutions. However, climate displacement is a unique intersection which has received little deserved attention on the world stage. By 2050, 1.2 billion people could be displaced due to climate change (Institute for Economics and Peace 2020). This global situation urgently needs addressing – it is not a future problem nor a new risk. The first IPCC report in 1990 recognised that the single greatest impact of climate change will be on human migration. Nevertheless, it took negotiators over twenty years to include displacement in climate documents (Atapattu 2020, 86). However, addressing this gap in global governance has become even more urgent as more people lose their homes to environmental shocks. Slow on-set weather related events have also seen a rise in global migration because of climate change. These two types of displacement are deeply interconnected as both climate refugees and environmental migrants have been forcibly displaced due to climate change. The distinction is how quickly. 

The lack of recognition of climate refugees adds an additional challenge to this problem. Millions of people every day go out without vital international protection since the international community fails to recognise climate change as a cause of displacement. In 2021 alone, 22.3 million people were displaced due to ‘weather-related’ events (IDMC 2022, 16). As a result, it is extremely difficult to invoke refugee status when the drivers of displacement cannot be associated with persecution or war (Hassine 2019, 67). This issue elucidates a gap in the protection regime of forcibly displaced people. Moreover, due to the lack of recognition, climate refugees who flee due to protracted crises such as devastating earthquakes are treated as irregular migrants under international law and are denied necessary legal remedies as a result (Kent and Behrman 2018, 9). However, it would be wrong to say that climate refugees are devoid of governance as no circumstance exists within a lacuna, yet the frameworks under which they are governed do not adequately address their needs and circumstances. If 1.2 billion people are going to become climate refugees by 2050, there is a pressing need to address this issue. Since 1951, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has provided support and services to refugees under the Refugee Convention. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has done the same for migration. However, neither of these agencies have formally been endowed with the authority to provide protection and support to climate refugees or environmental migrants. The term ‘climate refugee’ is not one endorsed by the UNHCR since climate change has become a hot-button topic in international political discourse. The international community has created and endorsed initiatives which focus on this issue, such as the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) (preceded by the Nansen Initiative), and the United Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Taskforce on Displacement. Nevertheless, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Climate Change notes that these platforms ‘perpetuate the unfair burden placed on affected States’ such as SIDS (Fry 2023, 15). Thus, these spaces have yet to yield significant action for climate refugees. 

Additionally, countless frameworks and policy documents have shown the link between climate change and migration, such as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM 2018) in Paragraph 18 which identifies climate change as a factor compelling people to leave their country of origin. It must be noted nonetheless that the GCM is not a legally binding document creating obligations for States (Varaki 2022, 79). Therefore, States are not required to aid environmental migrants despite recognising a very clear causal link to forced migration. As such, safe and legal pathways for human mobility remain modest at best ‘despite all the rhetorical support given to the notion’ (Crisp 2022). Attempting to relocate becomes an extremely difficult task for environmental migrants as a result. Increasingly negative public narratives towards migration, especially in the Global North and developed countries, compound on the dehumanising experience faced by migrants around the world. Environmental migrants unable to move also increase their risk of becoming climate refugees affected by extreme sudden weather-related events (i.e., severe flooding) and resource conflicts. This demonstrates a deficiency in State-led responses to the human impacts of climate change, and too-large a focus in State-centric measures to combat climate change. As the next section will explain, there is a need to decentralise the State as the referent object in climate and displacement discourse to yield positive action for the communities most in need. Human security, therefore, provides a useful theoretical perspective to address climate displacement.  

Securitisation Theory

Both climate change and migration have been of increasing focus within security discourses, and resultantly, have become topics of significant interest in national political debates. As Wæver (2011, 468) contends, to securitise something is a ‘speech act’ which constructs something as a threat. Thus, the realm of securitisation extends beyond politics and covers every aspect of life so long as there is a perceived risk or threat to life and well-being (Ratuva 2019, 18). In securitising something, there is a sense of urgency necessitating action. This is not in itself a negative impact; however, damage can be caused when the wrong referent object of securitisation is chosen for a phenomenon, such as in the cases of climate and migration. In conventional security discourses the State is the referent object (conventional securitisation), hence the term national security, in turn meaning it is a threat to both the citizens, institutions, and way of life of that sovereign jurisdiction. Climate change has rightly been framed in such a way especially by SIDS, which view climate change as a threat to their very existence (Boas 2015; McDonald 2013, 42). Climate change conclusively is a negative danger. There has also been a rise in the number of States viewing migrants and refugees as a threat to State security (Caballero-Anthony 2018, 121). However, viewing migrants and refugees from this perspective strips them of their humanity, and sees them as objects to be feared. Additionally, Jakulowski argues that the securitisation of migration has led to migrants being divided between desirable ones and undesirable ones ‘depending on their education, skills, place of origin and cultural background’ (Jakulowski 2018, 711). This comes despite States such as the United Kingdom (2008, 22) recognising the necessity of migrants to societies and warning against such practices. The State remaining the referent object of securitisation in both discourses has two implications. Firstly, it treats migration and displacement, and climate change, as two distinct thematic areas which do not relate to each other in national security policy. Secondly, State-centric security policy does not account for the human impact or viewpoints of policy decisions. Consequently, conventional securitisation fails to consider the ‘significance of the morality of securitisation’ (Ratuva 2019, 26). Thus, other referent objects of securitisation have been marginalised or understudied as conventional securitisation theory in relation to climate change and migration have become hegemonic to some degree (McDonald 2013, 43). 

This analysis, therefore, decentres the State as the referent object of securitisation for climate displacement. Human security, a rights-based multilevel security arrangement targeted at individuals and communities (Chinkin and Kaldor 2017, 480), provides a more useful theoretical perspective in this regard. A human security approach, as outlined in the 1993 Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), stresses the security of people and not just nations and necessitates effective multilateralism and a bottom-up approach to policy making. Reframing climate change and migration discourses in this way recognises the significant intersection between the two fields by recognising climate change as a driver of displacement and the intersection between climate change and global migration movements. Furthermore, it sees people displaced due to climate change as people who require security, rather than a threat (McDonald 2013, 46). A human security perspective to climate displacement allows for the ‘major political bottleneck’ (Ratuva 2019, 33) in the governance and protection of climate refugees to be overcome as national interests would be superseded by a global security environment which privileges the rights of individuals. Through this lens, the lack of safe and legal routes for environmental migrants is vital as part of national climate change mitigation strategies. Human security embodies the principle that no state can assert their national sovereignty, and thereby take unilateral decisions when it comes to securing their population against transnational security threats (Nathini and Nair 2021, 3). This is reflected in discussions at the United Nations where there is growing consensus that climate change is an international human security problem (Security Council Report 2022; United Nations 2019), requiring stronger international cooperation. In applying the human security approach to migration, a large emphasis for action is placed on the international community of States, and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations, or African Union on a regional level, to effectively mitigate and tackle climate displacement. International agencies such as the IOM and the UNHCR, following agreement amongst States, can then aid the implementation and facilitate the protection of climate refugees and environmental migrants. The next section will examine the case of climate displacement in the Asia-Pacific region, notably amongst small island developing states, which will prove why action to protect climate refugees and pathways for environmental migrants is not only indispensable but also practical and implementable. 

Case Study: Climate Displacement amongst SIDS in the Asia-Pacific region

SIDS in Asia-Pacific are at the frontline of climate change and its impacts. They are most susceptible to sudden on-set weather related events, and between 2008 and 2017 more than 198.1 million people were displaced in the region (IOM 2022a, 1). Countries like Fiji, Vanuatu and the Cook Islands are also low-lying States which are at risk from slow on-set weather related events, such as rising sea levels. Tuvalu’s Minister of Foreign Affairs demonstrated the prevalence of the sinking nature of his country by giving his speech to COP26 standing in sea. Consequently, SIDS in Asia-Pacific face an impending reality of mass climate displacement. Martin (2010, 397) notes a distinct lack of comprehensive regional or global governance surrounding climate change and forcible displacement. Moreover, there is limited scholarly focus on this issue resulting from its absence from global policy exchanges surrounding climate change, migration, and displacement since, as aforementioned, it is a contentious political issue. Developed nations are unwilling to accept irregular migrants (encompassing both climate refugees and environmental migrants who do not arrive through a safe and legal route). As Larking (2017, 86) highlights, Australia implemented The Pacific Solution which involved ‘intercepting people who attempt to reach Australia by boat without prior authorisation and turning their boats back or towing them into international waters’ between 2001-2007 and was revived again under Prime Minister Gillard in 2012. Australia’s actions in relation to climate change and migration are critical in the region as it is a developed country on the receiving end of environmental migrants and climate refugees (who are not recognised by the Australian Government). Bakshi (2020) rightly argues that The Pacific Solution neglects the human dignity of those displaced. Political discourse New Zealand, which is the other destination country in the region, shows the prevalence of conventional securitisation theory as displacement is prominently seen as a threat to its national security (Zaman and Das 2020, 102). Comparatively, media discourse in Fiji comments that ‘Australia and New Zealand have been sluggish in action and irresponsible in behaviour’ (Zaman and Das 2020, 102) when it came to addressing the needs and protection of people displaced due to climate change. 

However, Australia under Prime Minister Albanese has positively shifted its focus to improving mobility of environmental migrants to avoid mass displacement. This reflects what Price has observed as renewed attention on procedural and substantive State-led legal and governance frameworks in the midst of anticipated climate displacement (Price 2019, 191). The Falepili Union Treaty recognises Tuvalu as a State whose existence is threatened by sea level rise, and commits Australia to recognition the statehood, sovereignty and rights of Tuvalu and its people. Moreover, Article 3 of the Treaty establishes a ‘special human mobility pathway’ to allow for increased migration from Tuvalu to Australia to live, study and work, albeit with a 280 person cap. The Falepili Union therefore prioritises migration routes of vulnerable people from low-lying nations in the Pacific Ocean, and points to an encouraging implementation of GCM Paragraph 18 (Raman and Pakpahan 2024). In addition, the mobility pathway is a voluntary scheme which upholds the right of communities to stay in the land they call home, but also helps to destigmatise those who wish to relocate in the receiving country as they are often perceived as desirable migrants who wish to integrate into host communities (Bakewell 2021). Nevertheless, the Treaty does not diminish from the ‘legal limbo’ (Kälin 2009) of climate refugees, nor does it recognise or make provision for people displaced due to sudden on-set weather related events in Tuvalu, which has a high vulnerability to cyclones (World Bank 2021). 

Other SIDS in Asia-Pacific have prepared adaptation strategies to mitigate against the risk of internal climate displacement, such as the Solomon Islands’ National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) which forward plans for community resettlement of coastal communities in land to prevent sudden displacement and loss of life (Price 2019, 201). Likewise, in Fiji, the residents of Vunidogola relocated in 2012 as a result of sea level rises which have led to significant seawater intrusion and coastal erosion (Singh 2022). These actions demonstrate how climate change is in itself a driver of displacement. Moreover, they also highlight the lack of mobility pathways between countries in the region, leading to more people having to irregularly migrate across borders (IOM 2022a, 2). As a result, Fiji’s National Adaptation Plan ‘calls for mainstreaming mobility into climate change adaptation planning’ (IOM 2022b, 2). These plans across the region also require funding, and whilst adaptation funding is received from UNFCCC, there is little funding for mitigation to reduce the risk of forcible displacement (IOM 2022b, 3). Wilkinson et al. (2023) have recently found that SIDS receive seven times less climate finance than developed countries, highlighting a prevalent inequality between developed and developing countries in financing for development and climate mitigation. 

The Asia-Pacific region, unfortunately, provides no positive steps towards addressing the gap in global governance frameworks for the provision of protection of climate refugees. The nearest regional agreement on such a framework is rooted in the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) 1969 Refugee Convention which expands upon the 1951 Convention’s definition of a refugee to include a person who has fled because of events that seriously disturb public order. Kent and Behrman (2018, 25) argue that there has been a trend towards soft law solutions to address sudden forcible climate-related displacement, such as through the GCM or its sister compact, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). Yet, these compacts remain non-binding and do not make legal provision for allowing climate refugees to enter and remain into another State as a result of their displacement. Thus, examining the situation of climate displacement in the Asia-Pacific region highlights the reality of the complex difficulties communities and individuals specifically from SIDS face when it comes to climate-related cross-border movement. There has been progress in establishing human mobility pathways between vulnerable and developed States, such as the Falepili Union, yet other countries are having to plan their own adaptation due to capped and a lack of safe and legal routes for environmental migrants. These plans are often underfunded and provide no provision for mitigation strategies. Moreover, no global or regional governance frameworks have been established to recognise or protect climate refugees. Even though populations from low-lying atolls in the Pacific Ocean are most vulnerable to, and have a high risk of, climate-induced disaster which has already displaced over a hundred million people in recent years. The next section, therefore, will outline recommendations to address these identified problems. 

Recommendation(s)

As this analysis has shown, migration, displacement and climate change are international phenomena, requiring global cooperation and an international response. Various global frameworks on both migration and or climate change, such as the GCM, GCR and UNFCCC, overlap and therefore have an influence on environmental migration and disaster displacement. Thus, climate displacement is to a small degree regulated by global instruments, yet none sufficiently so to deal with the scale of the issue. However, the majority are non-binding and State-centric, rather than focusing on the needs of the people they intend to serve. Consequently, the following recommendations are made to the international community in order to address this gap in global governance to allow for a rights-based cooperative approach to addressing the needs of climate refugees and environmental migrants, by adopting a human security lens to assess the problem. 

Firstly, this analysis joins with Fry (2023) to recommend a new protocol under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to protect climate refugees and allow them to claim asylum. Fry (2023, 18) argues that adopting such a protocol would be logical since the protections under the Convention ‘come close’ to those that are needed for climate refugees and close the gap in normative frameworks by providing a necessary legal regime. Moreover, a new protocol would deservedly recognise climate refugees and provide a distinction between them and environmental migrants, allowing the UNHCR to make provision for humanitarian assistance to those displaced due in the event of a sudden on-set weather related disaster – something they are currently unable to do as this resides outside of the mandate of the High Commissioner. Draper (2023, 178) argues that this would ‘undoubtedly require significant transformations in the international order’. Whilst achieving this recommendation may be politically challenging, the human security approach (which Draper advocates for) requires effective multilateral efforts to address the needs of forcibly displaced people. Moreover, future models predict climate displacement to be a significant global issue for States in coming years, and therefore, action must be taken. Additionally, following a 2021 resolution by the Human Rights Council, access to a healthy and sustainable environment is a universal right, thereby providing a human rights basis for the protection of climate refugees (Zamfir 2021). 

Secondly, this analysis recommends more human mobility pathways for environmental migrants coming from climatically vulnerable States. The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty provides a practical example for the implementation of such schemes. Effective tackling of climate change requires mitigation as well as adaptation, which the expansion of safe and legal routes for migrants is part of. Therefore, all steps should be taken to avoid someone becoming a climate refugee. Furthermore, scholarly analysis and government statements have recognised the benefits of migration to the economy and cultural enrichment of society. However, mitigation strategies and pathways should be adequately funded, and therefore, the international community needs to work together to overcome the inequality of climate financing that Wilkinson et al. (2023) have found. The Loss and Damage Fund agreed at COP28 provides an opportunity to do this (Jaynes 2023), and SIDS should be encouraged to make provision to use any received funding toward implementing and operationalising the GCM’s paragraphs related to climate mobility. Cumulatively, these two key recommendations for the international community contribute to addressing and preventing climate displacement, as well as upholding the rights of people on the move. 

Conclusion

Climate displacement has already forced millions of people to leave their homes, communities, and livelihoods behind, and it will continue to do so for years to come. Nevertheless, the rights of climate refugees and environmental migrants have been eroded due to a lack of global and regional cooperation in making provision for their safe passage and protection. Many international initiatives have been founded to deal with the problem, however, they have to-date yielded little-to-no meaningful action. The hegemonic nature of conventional securitisation theory, with the State as its referent object, has led to a separation of climate change and migration in policy debates. In this discourse, migrants are a threat to States rather than people who need securing. Therefore, climate action has overlooked the situation of climate-induced displacement. However, by viewing the problem through a human security lens highlights a deep intersection between climate change and migration. The very real situation of populations in Asia-Pacific SIDS shows the scale and complexities of climate displacement, and reveals a gap in international protection regimes, a lack of safe and legal routes and an inequality of funding to combat climate change. Although, the Asia-Pacific region has also seen positive and practical steps to mitigating the impending crisis of mass climate displacement which models predict. Consequently, this analysis has recommended to; establish a protocol under the 1951 Convention to protect and recognise climate refugees, expand legal pathways for environmental migrants and use the COP28 Loss and Damage Fund to finance rights-based climate action and mobility. Scholars such as Draper (2023) argue that would be a significant political feat, yet it is nonetheless necessary for a cleaner and more sustainable planet. International humanitarian agencies, such as the IOM and the UNHCR, can also aid the implementation of this approach to climate displacement, providing a crucial form of global support and solidarity for this issue. However, action by the international community is required in the first instance to make this possible. This analysis has also emphasised the need for further research of climate displacement, resulting from a shortage of academic investigation, notably on how to achieve a human-rights based approach to cross-border displacement amidst strongly entrenched conventional security rhetoric in policy debates. 

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