Solidarist and Pluralist Tensions: Defining Human Rights in the English School of International Relations
- Samuel Lee (Staff Writer)
- Dec 3, 2024
- 6 min read
Updated: Feb 19
Before we delve into what is at stake between solidarist and pluralist thinkers in the English School of international relations, one must first explain the English school of international Relations.
The English school of international relations posits that the world can be understood through three main definitions. These being the international system, international society and world society. For Hedley Bull, the international system is born into existence “when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions to cause them to behave as parts of a whole.” (Bull 1977, 9-10) According to this characterization, the international system is based on how the nation-states interact with each other in a state of international anarchy during a period of time where “might makes right” is the general international practice. The second part of the English school of international relations bases itself on the idea that international society starts to exist when states with similar cultures, rules and ideas “conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 1977, 13). Thus, international society transcends the international system as states start to persistently preserve institutions and shared values through continued state interaction or through organizations that help facilitate a dialogue regarding these shared values. Finally, world society pushes a concept which is bigger than the international society because ‘the ultimate units of the great society of all mankind are not states … but individual human beings’ (Bull 1977, 21). Here, we can see that a world society takes on a Kantian character and states cease to exist and only the people as individual units operate within this new paradigm.
With these in mind, we now define the main debate between the Solidarist and Pluralist schools of international relations. As explained above, we can see three different conceptions or stages of international relations in which international institutions take place. However, for Bull, he contends that the practices between member states oscillate between these three stages and refers to Martin Wight’s three traditions to compare against his own theories (Wheeler 1992, 463). For example, he says that in the realist tradition, or the tradition that most resemble the very basic international system, the world operates in a “might is right” mentality (Wheeler 1992, 464). Meanwhile, on the end of this spectrum, lies the Kantian tradition which compares well against the conception of world society. In this case, he claims that in this state of international relations, the state system no longer exists or will cease to exist and non-state actors will operate by common morality (Wheeler 1992, 464-465). However, where the solidarist and pluralist debate lies, is within these two traditions based in the concept of international society in its rejection of both the Kantian and realist conceptions of international relations. (Wheeler 1992, 465).
According to Buzan, the pluralist school of thought claims that international society exists in a “thin” form of international society where shared norms and values extend only to “mutual recognition of sovereignty and non-intervention”. (Buzan 2004, 141-42) while a Solidarist conception of international relations relies on a “high degree of ideological uniformity”. (Buzan 2004, 142) In order to further explore this, one can look to specific examples such as the issue of colonialism and human rights. For example, the pluralist view argues that due to this “thin form” of international society of shared norms and values, there will be no agreement of any form of universal conception of what “human rights” are (Wheeler 1992, 467). However, what distinguishes this claim from a realist viewpoint is the idea that the sovereignty of states in the Westphalian perception is still accepted. Thus, pluralists state that having this “universal agreement” on what constitutes as “human rights” would “threaten the non-intervention norm in international society” (Wheeler 1992, 468). This view certainly holds merit as one can note the disastrous effects of pushing an invasion of a society based on the preconceived notion that a specific society is not adhering to a “universal agreement” of “human rights”. In this case, one can apply the pluralist view when analyzing European colonialism in the 19th century. For example, Gerrit Gong points out that colonial powers during the 19th century invented a standard for what “Civilized Society” was based on what they perceived as barbaric practices in countries such as China where collectivist punishments were frowned upon by the west (Gong, 1984). Thus, this gave credence to their colonial cause as it enabled them to pursue colonialism under an underlying moral cause. As seen, if we are to apply a pluralist view, the European states had formed a solidarist understanding of the world where their “thick” international society’s values did not contend with Asian or African states and thus, their right to sovereignty and self-determination was deemed null and void. To the pluralist, if carried out too far, would further upset the already anarchic state of nature. For the pluralist, the society of states created by this thick form of international society, led to the violation of the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and to a much larger extent, for the pluralist, the society of states may collapse and transition towards that of a Kantian interpretation of the world where a society of states no longer exists and instead a world society emerges where, as mentioned before, “the state system no longer exists or will cease to exist and non-state actors will operate by common morality.” (Wheeler 1992, 464-465). Thus, pluralists reject the solidarist’s idea of human intervention in the case of human rights as it would violate the non-intervention principle and sovereignty of a state. Nonetheless, one must also contend with the ideas of the solidarist school of thought.
As discussed by Wheeler, the solidarist school, in contention with the pluralist school of thought presents the idea that member states of an international society have a moral-bound duty to intervene in cases of human rights violations (Wheeler 1992, 464-465). However, as Wheeler points out Bull felt that “Since individual states would only promote human rights issues if it suited their interests … these could be only enforced by individual states or a society of states.” (Wheeler 1992, 470). Thus, for the solidarist position, the pressure of being part of an international organization which member states are bound by laws where it is incentivized to promote a common framework with regard to civil rights would be ideal. As seen, the solidarist view rejects the Kantian idealism of creating a world society as it still believes in the existence of states which are motivated by some incentive be it economic or political for human rights to be upheld rather than a moral imperative which is born out of a strong sense of justice. A good example of solidarist beliefs in practice is in the Cambodian civil war which the UN intervened in the year 1991-93. According to Trevor Findlay, writing for the Stockholm Institute Peace Research Institute, the UN peacekeeping mission in the nation was able to “de-internationalize the conflict, isolate the Khmer Rouge, begin the tortuous process of national reconciliation and permit the Cambodian people for the first time in almost 40 years to choose their government in a comparatively free, fair and democratic manner.” (Findlay 1995, 155) Moreover, the report claimed the UN peacekeeping force “freed the press, alleviated conditions in Cambodia's prisons, started the gargantuan task of mine clearance, imparted new skills to thousands of Cambodians, fostered the rapid growth of human rights consciousness and other civic values.” (Findlay 1995,155). As seen, the Solidarists would claim that due to a concerted effort by members states through a global organization, it was able to bring into the fold, a state which was not in practice with the “thick” liberal international order while saving lives and promoting democratic values.
In conclusion, the Solidarist vs Pluralist debate gives English school theorists a lot to think about with regard to the degree of human intervention in member states as the Solidarist faction of this school would contend that human intervention would infringe upon well-established norms of Westphalian Sovereignty and cause a collapse in the international system as it does not take into account the type of international society which may emerge from shared norms and values. Meanwhile, Pluralists argue that while states should be morally bound to act in the best interests of the individual and that this could be encouraged through an international organization such as the UN which would incentivize member states to act accordingly with liberal values and uphold human rights through possible human intervention when civil rights are violated. As seen, the core of this debate would continue to shape whether or not nation-states will uphold civil rights based on the values they hold.
References:
Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Columbia University Press pp 9,10,13,21
Buzan, Barry (2004) From International to World Society?. Cambridge University Press pp 141,142
Findlay, Trevor (1995) Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/004711789501200507 pp 155
Gong, Gerrit W (1984) The standard of "Civilization" in International Society Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press
Wheeler, Nicholas J (1992) Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298920210030201 pp 463,464,465,468,470
