The Importance of East Asia as a Region for Foreign Policy Decisions in Northeast and Southeast Asia

Possessing the world’s most populated countries and some of the oldest civilizations, Eastern Asia, Northeast, and Southeast Asia have been significant for cultural influence, political changes, and consequent economic influences.[1] Sharing a dynamic economic and political growth history, this region still tends to be indirectly and directly transformed by global geopolitical forces. In addition to various influential powers in these regions, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) appear to be the major actors having mutual and international foreign policy influence which has been comprehensively demonstrated over time. Adopting a regionalist perspective, this essay will seek to critically argue that East Asia is important for foreign policy decisions in Northeast and Southeast Asia specifically on the aspects of political security and economic policy, conceptualizing East Asia with a realist lens, however, there lie valid counterarguments against this assertion. To convey the argument well, this essay’s empirical and major focus will be on Southeast Asia, specifically, ASEAN, and China for East Asia while briefly contextualizing Northeast Asia. Discoursing relevant historical context, this essay will first briefly conceptualize the international (security) system through the lenses of liberalism, realism, and constructivism. Secondly, drawing upon the theories, it will provide a general overview of East Asia's cultural, political, and economic impacts on Southeast and Northeast Asia, including the concepts of soft and hard power being used actively or passively, analytically. Thirdly, a detailed analysis of the realist perspective using the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as proposed by Buzan and Wæver, on the influence of China on the foreign policies of certain nations in ASEAN will be critically discussed.[2] Additionally, the essay will evaluate a thorough case study on Vietnam’s foreign policy reaction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) policy. This will finally be followed by a counterargument that will be provided discussing the antithesis; how East Asia is alternatively not important for foreign policy decisions in Southeast Asia before the concluding highlights. 

Before attempting to establish the main argument, it is necessary to understand the theoretical conception of the international security system. Although officially the three main theoretical perspectives for the analysis of the international security structure are neorealist, globalist, and regionalist, it is wise to initially consider the foundational theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The Waltzian definition of a ‘structure’, states “the principles of arrangement of the parts in a system, and how the parts are differentiated from each other”.[3] While the essay looks at the international structure systematically, it is to be noted that a regional perspective is taken as the principal feature of analysis. Being the most dominant thread of International Relations theory, introduced by notable theorists like Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Thucydides, Realism proposes a rational perception of the international system and the ‘state of nature’ as modeled by the structures of polarity, anarchy, and a state of disruption, where states prioritize self-interest and state survival while seeking power and security.[4]  Realism focuses on states and their actions in the international system, therefore subtly disregarding the idea of international organizations being substantially influential.[5] As its antithesis, liberalism has a rather, as the name states, ‘liberal’ outlook on the international security system. Stressing regional collaboration through international cooperative institutions, liberalism promotes shared prosperity, dispute resolution, and respect for international standards for long-term regional stability.[6] Fukuyama, Mill, and Locke are some theorists who advocated for it. To provide a third perspective, associated with the end of the Cold War, constructivism perceives the world as socially constructed. It highlights constructed threats, identities, cultures, and relationships in international relations formed through interactions. This is projected well by theorists such as Wendt who exemplifies the social construction of reality by stating that “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States of America than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons.”[7] These theories enabled the perception of the dynamic international security system in a complex investigative manner, specifically playing a huge role in understanding the relationship between East Asia and North and Southeast Asia. The insertion of realism, specifically, the key Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) on the influence of East Asia (China) over Southeast Asia (ASEAN) will be analyzed comprehensively further in the essay. 

Having explained the theoretical conception of the international system, it is prudent to discuss the importance of East Asia as a region for impact on foreign policies in North and Southeast Asian regions which has manifested in the diverse forms of culture, economy, and political influences. As the world paves its way from hard power approaches to soft power ones, Asia has depicted numerous examples of both types of powers being put into use. According to most respondents from several ASEAN nations, China is the most significant political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia, as illustrated in a 2024 study.[8] With the largest population, economy, and military in Asia, China demonstrates significant influence on both short-term and long-term trends pertaining to prosperity, international security, and sustainability, internationally as well as regionally. As part of soft power tactics, apart from student exchanges, and think tank partnerships, East Asia has notable cultural influence in South and Northeast Asian regions in the form of philosophies, migration, and traditions. To elucidate, Confucianism, family values and Buddhism have profoundly affected North and Southeast Asian societies and traditions respectively, stirred further by migration and regional merges.[9] Similarly, economic influence and interactions shape most foreign policies and economic activities in these regions which has been painted over time. Historically, seen during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), trade routes from East Asia to South Asia and the Middle East relied heavily on Southeast Asia where both areas benefited economically from the interchange of products and ideas made possible by the tributary trade system with China.[10] Currently, East Asian nations like China, Japan, and South Korea have grown to be considerable trading partners and investors in Southeast Asia, further supporting the region's industrial and infrastructure growth.[11] To exemplify hard power, Japan has promoted its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision by leveraging its defense and marine capabilities, entailing collaborations with countries in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam and the Philippines.[12] Moreover, Japan and South Korea's security plans, have been impacted by North Korea's missile launches and nuclear aspirations in Northeast Asia, which are partially fueled by China's resistance to strict sanctions.​[13] The texts clearly demonstrate an ongoing pattern of multi-dimensional influence that East Asia has on North and Southeast Asian regions’ foreign policy decisions which have emerged via the utilization of hard and soft power, actively as well as passively.  

Moving on, a realist lens incorporating RSCT allows for an efficient analysis of the argument at hand, engaging with a dominating perspective in detail, keeping in mind the regionalist background. It is necessary to understand the context behind the application of RSCT to conceptualize East Asia and Southeast Asia for a comprehensive critical analysis. Initiated by Buzan and Wæver in 2003, RSCT is a theoretical approach to foreign policy analysis, describing a set of states bound together in a regional security complex (RSC) owing to the inter-connected nature of the security problems they face, making it reasonably unfeasible to resolve their problems apart from each other.[14] Regional Security Complexes (RSC) are formed from the interaction between one, “the anarchic structure and balance-of-power consequences”, and second, “the pressures of local geographical proximity”.[15]

The RSCT incorporates what Southeast Asian nations concurrently "balance, hedge, and bandwagon" as needed, according to former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan who called it an innate reaction "honed by centuries of hard experience" and is now "embedded in our foreign policy DNA."[16] These three types of foreign policy decisions will now be comprehensively analyzed using concrete examples. 

Regional powers play a pivotal role in shaping the balance of power complex in the region, and the smaller states react to their behavior. Great powers like China establish a delicate regional equilibrium in which external players like the US with adjacent Southeast Asian governments work together to exert dominance or maintain stability. A good example of balancing by a Southeast Asian nation; the Philippines, is China’s South China Sea activities. A judicial decision in 2026 invalidated China's "nine-dash line" when the Philippines used the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for arbitration to contest China's territorial claims.[17] Despite the decision, China remained assertive, to which the Philippines concurrently requested assistance from the United States, an ally, to balance off China's economic and military power.[18] Another example is, that to improve its naval capabilities and balance against Chinese political action aggressions, Vietnam purchased frigates, submarines, and cutting-edge missile systems from Russia.[19]

In regional complexes, smaller states often align with the major regional power to avoid conflict or gain benefits, which is important for their examination of hierarchical linkages within security complexes. This implies the opting of bandwagoning along with balancing as policy decisions smaller nations take, which in this case are Southeast Asian states when facing China. Going back to the example of the Philippines, during the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines embraced a more accommodating approach, aiming to secure economic advantages from Beijing.[20] This reflects a strategic pivot towards bandwagoning while simultaneously preserving its relationships with the United States for balance. To illustrate more, as a developing nation, Cambodia finds the ascent of China offering a potential avenue for development assistance, allowing it to engage in this process without the hindrance of external scrutiny concerning its authoritarian governance.[21] Therefore, Cambodia seeks to take advantage of China’s economic rise by employing a bandwagoning policy. 

Turning to the third type of foreign policy decision; hedging is a post-cold-war strategy, seen frequently in the Asia-Pacific region, appearing as an alternative to the cold-war originating concepts of balancing and bandwagoning. The questions that theories of balancing and bandwagoning could not answer, hedging was what scholars found to be doing so post-Cold War. Consisting of cooperative and confrontational elements, hedging refers to an "insurance policy," wherein states concurrently engage in contradictory strategies, such as enhancing economic relations with a prospective adversary while establishing defense alliances to mitigate that threat, as understood by Kuik Cheng-Chwee.[22] This policy approach has been seen often in history, for example, by pursuing a hedging strategy, Brunei maintains good relations with China and also supports ASEAN's collective stance on the South China Sea dispute, and has increased defense cooperation with the US and Australia.[23] Brunei's foreign policy focuses on avoiding direct conflict with China while striving to maintain its sovereignty via multilateral cooperation. Additionally, Singapore has intense economic links with China, engaging in trade, investment, and cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and politically, Singapore maintains close security ties with the United States, chiefly in defense and regional security collaboration.[24] Singapore engages with both countries, China and the US, while maintaining an independent position, safeguarding its own security and economic advancement without being involved in the confrontation between the two superpowers. 

These examples demonstrate the realist perception, comprising of hedging, bandwagoning, and balancing, intertwined with RSCT, of policy decisions as seen empirically in Southeast Asian nations in response to China’s actions in the region. 

Considering some empirical theoretical aspects, the essay will now consider a case study of Vietnam reacting to BRI to further understand how East Asia (China) is important for foreign policy decisions in Southeast Asia (ASEAN). Vietnam and China have had a history of resentment and efforts for reconciliation considering the economic and geographic conditions of Vietnam. Essentially, Vietnam’s foreign policy has taken balancing positions regarding China.[25] Vietnam is the second largest receiver in ASEAN of capital for infrastructure development of roads, bridges, railways, and roads from China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[26] Vietnam and China worked for a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in 2008, resulting in improving bilateral relations through the efficacious resolution of borderland disputes, demarcation of the Tonkin Gulf, and efforts for political and economic relations firming.[27] This increased economic cooperation raised worries about dependence, requiring Vietnam to strike a balance between reaping the advantages of Chinese investments and maintaining control over its national interests.[28]

While Vietnam recognizes the BRI's potential economic advantages, notably for infrastructure development, it has been cautious to fully embrace the project also due to worries about China's growing regional influence, particularly in connection to the South China Sea issue.[29] Moreover, Vietnam, possessing a huge infrastructure investment deficit, has looked to the BRI as a potential source of funds.[30] However, the government has been cautious about growing too reliant on China, which was evident in 2017, when Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China to improve connectivity but did not completely commit to the BRI's wider purpose.[31] Furthermore, Vietnam's response to the BRI has also been influenced by the availability of alternative financing sources, such as Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is perceived as more reliable and less politically binding than Chinese assistance.[32] This emphasizes Vietnam's strategy of hedging its position by interacting with China economically while ensuring it does not become overly reliant on Chinese influence in its foreign policy. 

Vietnam, moreover, abides by a “multi-directional” foreign policy doctrine ingrained in the principles of “no military alliances, no foreign troops stationed on Vietnamese soil, and no partnering with a foreign power to combat another”.[33] Besides this, Vietnam also gained membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and entered a free trade agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU) in 2019 and 2020 respectively.[34] However, Vietnam continues to be challenged by the management of its complex relationship with China. 

The empirical texts mentioned attest that Vietnam would continue to opt for the strategies of hedging and balancing against China keeping in mind its economic and political state interests, regional stability, and national sovereignty. This case study also highlights that Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam adopt numerous strategies and maintain the behavior of yet still engaging with Beijing, owing to its importance in a calculated manner, and other potential ally nations in a self-serving manner and due to the increasingly competitive nature of the Asian super complex. 

Finally, it is also necessary to consider a counterargument discussing how East Asia, occasionally is not important for foreign policy decisions in South and Northeast Asia, however, as seen throughout the essay, focusing on East Asia and Southeast Asia only. As indicated earlier, Southeast Asian states utilized different foreign policy strategies with nations other than China like the US and Russia, nonetheless, there exist limitations to the argument of this essay. Following this, the strategy of bandwagoning can be accepted as a supporter of the main argument, on the other hand, hedging and balancing are somewhat counters and supporters of the argument. This is due to the characteristic of the Southeast Asian nations resorting to other nations than China, by hedging and balancing, depicting how different nations can also be important to their foreign policy development processes. Nations like the Philippines and Cambodia adopted bandwagoning perceiving benefits from China whereas Brunei and Vietnam as touched upon earlier, hedged and balanced against China, identifying other nations as beneficial for their foreign policies and avoiding over-dependence (Dependency theory) on China.[35] Furthermore, the US has exerted substantial influence as an ally in Southeast Asia since World War II, its Cold War policies were instrumental in strengthening the region’s economic conditions.[36] However, Chinese influence often meets limitations in Southeast Asia in the form of debt dependence, strategic autonomy, and sovereignty risks.[37] To instantiate, the BRI projects raised attention about long-term debt traps in Laos and Cambodia.[38] ASEAN also possesses structural limitations like structural institutional weakness, division in consensus opinions on decisions like the South China Sea, and differences in alignment decisions with China.[39] This limits China’s ability to “dictate” ASEAN’s foreign policies. This growth in counter-direction has led to incidents like intra-ASEAN trade growing with 25% of its trade being within the region, the emergence of global partnerships like CPTPP, and bilateral trade with the EU and Australia.[40] Additionally, non-east Asian blocs such as the Quad are gaining momentum and importance for the Southeast Asian region for maritime security and infrastructural developments, along with the singing of FTAs by Vietnam and Singapore with European nations.[41] The concept of complex interdependence as introduced by Keohane and Nye also comes into play supporting the counterargument.[42] The given assertions indicate that East Asia (China), despite being influential, is not the sole luminary for Southeast Asian foreign policy, rather, factors such as dynamic global alliances, and fear of over-dependency, play a huge role in determining foreign policy decisions in Southeast Asia (ASEAN).  

To conclude, this essay has provided two sides of a coin, regarding the main argument. It has elucidated that China is important for foreign policy decisions in ASEAN, assessed with a realist lens, however, there lie valid counterarguments against this assertion, highlighting the multi-dimensional nature of Southeast Asian strategic primacies. The essay first conceptualized the international security system through the lenses of major international relations theories of liberalism, realism, and constructivism, before using a historical approach to understand the general cultural, economic, and political indirect and direct impact of East Asia on Southeast and Northeast Asia using hard and soft power. Next, a detailed exploration of the first part of the main argument using the RSCT was discussed using substantial relevant examples. This was followed by a case study demonstrating Vietnam’s foreign policy’s reaction to China’s BRI policy with a critical angle connecting to the aforementioned contentions. Finally, the second part of the main argument, discussing the counterargument using the relevant theories, strategies, and examples, was acknowledged. Overall, it is identified that East Asia is crucial to Northeast and Southeast Asian foreign policy due to its importance in regional security, geopolitics, and economic interdependence. To maintain tactical autonomy and counter overdependence, Southeast Asian countries oppose Chinese domination by forming alliances with superpowers like the US, Japan, and India. This oxymoronic interaction of opposition and reliance stresses how crucial but complex East Asia is in determining Southeast Asian foreign policy. 

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Footnotes:

1. Caitlin Finlayson, “East and Southeast Asia,” Pressbooks.pub, June 14, 2019, https://pressbooks.pub/worldgeo/chapter/east-and-southeast-asia/.

   
   

2. Buzan B. and Wæver O., “Regions and Powers,” 2003, http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/14126/frontmatter/9780521814126_frontmatter.pdf.

3. Ibid. pg6

   
   

4. Isabel Camisão and Sandrina Antunes, “Introducing Realism in International Relations Theory,” E-International Relations, February 27, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/27/introducing-realism-in-international-relations-theory/.

   
   

5. Ibid.

6. Bea Kylene Jumarang, “Realism and Liberalism in International Relations,” E-International Relations, July 2, 2011, https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/02/realism-and-liberalism-in-modern-international-relations/.

7. Sarina Theys, “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” E-International Relations, February 23, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/.

8. Statista Research Department, “ASEAN: Most Influential Political Powers 2024 by Country | Statista,” Statista, 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1481787/asean-most-influential-political-powers-by-country/.

9. Caitlin Finlayson, “East and Southeast Asia,” Pressbooks.pub, June 14, 2019, https://pressbooks.pub/worldgeo/chapter/east-and-southeast-asia/.

10. John Meyer, “Rising Tensions in East and Southeast Asia,” Parliament.uk, 2015, https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/key-issues-parliament-2015/foreign-affairs/east-and-southeast-asia/.

11. Caitlin Finlayson, “East and Southeast Asia,” Pressbooks.pub, June 14, 2019, https://pressbooks.pub/worldgeo/chapter/east-and-southeast-asia/.

12. Jonathan Stromseth, “China’s Rising Influence in Southeast Asia and Regional Responses Jonathan Stromseth,” Docslib, 2019, https://docslib.org/doc/5851081/chinas-rising-influence-in-southeast-asia-and-regional-responses-jonathan-stromseth.

13. Ibid

14. Buzan B. and Wæver O., “Regions and Powers,” 2003, http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/14126/frontmatter/9780521814126_frontmatter.pdf.

15. Ibid, pg45

16. Stromseth, “China’s Rising Influence in Southeast Asia and Regional Responses Jonathan Stromseth,” Docslib, 2019, https://docslib.org/doc/5851081/chinas-rising-influence-in-southeast-asia-and-regional-responses-jonathan-stromseth.

17. Selina Ho and Chin-Hao Huang, “Unpacking the Drivers of Southeast Asia’s Policy towards China,” ChinaPower Project, July 8, 2024, https://chinapower.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asias-policy-china/.

18. Ibid.

19. Daniel Kliman, “Addressing China’s Influence in Southeast Asia: America’s Approach and the Role of Congress,” www.cnas.org, May 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/addressing-chinas-influence-in-southeast-asia-americas-approach-and-the-role-of-congress.

20. Ibid.

21. SAMATH Chan Somanith, “AVI PERSPECTIVE ISSUE: 2020, No. 02,” Asian Vision institute, 2020, https://www.asianvision.org/archives/publications/avi-perspective-issue-2020-no-03.

22. David Martin Jones, Nicole Jenne, Hedging and grand strategy in Southeast Asian foreign policy, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 22, Issue 2, May 2022, Pages 205–235, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcab003

23. Nishta Borua, “Brunei: SCS Dispute and Economic Diplomacy with China - Defence Research and Studies,” Defence Research and Studies, September 13, 2024, https://dras.in/brunei-scs-dispute-and-economic-diplomacy-with-china/.

24. Jun Yan Chang, Not between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Singapore's Hedging, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 66, Issue 3, September 2022, sqac034, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqac034

25. Jonathan Stromseth, “China’s Rising Influence in Southeast Asia and Regional Responses Jonathan Stromseth,” Docslib, 2019, https://docslib.org/doc/5851081/chinas-rising-influence-in-southeast-asia-and-regional-responses-jonathan-stromseth.

26. Hong Le and Hiep, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam,” n.d., https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series17/pdf/chapter04.pdf.

27. Web Mechanix, “China, Vietnam, and the Rich Resources of the Gulf of Tonkin • Stimson Center,” Stimson Center, January 29, 2008, https://www.stimson.org/2008/china-vietnam-and-rich-resources-gulf-tonkin/.

28. Ngo Di Lan, “Vietnam’s Great Power Balancing Act | East Asia Forum,” February 9, 2024, https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/02/10/vietnams-great-power-balancing-act/.

29. Hong Le and Hiep, “The Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam,” n.d., https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series17/pdf/chapter04.pdf.

30. The ASEAN Post Team, “Challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam,” The ASEAN Post, December 29, 2016, https://theaseanpost.com/article/challenges-belt-and-road-initiative-vietnam.

31. Ibid.

32. Le Nguyen, “Vietnam’s Upgraded Ties with Japan ‘Do Not Bode Well’ for China,” Voice of America, December 6, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/vietnam-s-upgraded-ties-with-japan-do-not-bode-well-for-china/7386936.html.

33. Jonathan Stromseth, “China’s Rising Influence in Southeast Asia and Regional Responses Jonathan Stromseth,” Docslib, 2019, https://docslib.org/doc/5851081/chinas-rising-influence-in-southeast-asia-and-regional-responses-jonathan-stromseth.

34. Ibid.

35. Andre Gunder Frank, “Andre Gunder Frank the BIG Thinkers Leaving Certificate Politics and Society” (National Council for Curriculum and Assessment, n.d.), https://ncca.ie/media/2831/andre-gunder-frank.pdf.

36. Mark Beeson, “U.S. Hegemony and Southeast Asia,” Critical Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (September 2004): 445–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/1467271042000241621.

37. Joanne Lin, “Navigating China’s Influence: Insights from the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey,” FULCRUM, April 3, 2024, https://fulcrum.sg/navigating-chinas-influence-insights-from-the-state-of-southeast-asia-2024-survey/.

38. Ibid.

39.  Evelyn Goh, “ASEAN-Led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,” The Asan Forum, May 23, 2014, https://theasanforum.org/asean-led-multilateralism-and-regional-order-the-great-power-bargain-deficit/.

40. Lurong Chen, Philippe De Lombaerde, and Ludo Cuyvers, “Markets Matter: The Potential of Intra-Regional Trade in ASEAN and Its Implications for Asian Regionalism,” Asian Economic Papers 16, no. 2 (June 2017): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1162/asep_a_00510.

41. Manjari Chatterjee Miller, “The Quad and ASEAN Must Learn to Work Together,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/quad-and-asean-must-learn-work-together.

42. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” International Organization 41, no. 4 (1987): 725–53.

    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    

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24. Statista Research Department. “ASEAN: Most Influential Political Powers 2024 by Country | Statista.” Statista, 2024. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1481787/asean-most-influential-political-powers-by-country/.

25. Stromseth, Jonathan . “China’s Rising Influence in Southeast Asia and Regional Responses Jonathan Stromseth.” Docslib, 2019. https://docslib.org/doc/5851081/chinas-rising-influence-in-southeast-asia-and-regional-responses-jonathan-stromseth.

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27. Theys, Sarina. “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” E-International Relations, February 23, 2018. https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/.