From Knights to Muskets: The Evolution of Military Tactics and Technology in Early Modern Europe

The Middle Age’s casus belli were typified by disagreements over inheritance and claims to throne. Not only these, but the defensive advantage of castles incentivized weaker armies, like that of Edward III’s, to resort to ‘burning and plundering the countryside in an effort to provoke… battle.’ [1] This conduct seems so backwards and alien to contemporary minds, because modern militaries behave nothing like this. Even more significant is the fact that warfare during the early modern period of European history had already undergone drastic changes.

Michael Robert’s work on the “Military Revolution” in 1955, proposed the idea that a profound change in military conduct occurred thanks to the ‘result of a revolution in strategy, made possible by the revolution in tactics, and made necessary by the circumstances of the Thirty Years War.’  [2] In other words, he presents a means-based argument [3] that bases the escalation found in the Thirty Years’ War as a direct and clear result of technology.

As for the efficacy of this theory, there is some evidence that technology did, in fact, alter warfare. However, Robert’s thesis is not without weaknesses. The roots of the revolution in military affairs are far too complex to be whittled down to technology. Strength of government, political context, and weapons technology were incredibly intertwined, and each played their own part in early modern Europe’s military revolution. Therein lies another fault within the groundwork of this idea. The inclination to view the military revolution as having occurred during the Thirty Years’ War is highly contentious, for there were many groundbreaking military advancements made during both during and after the famous conflict. This amalgamation of contradictions means that the validity of the military revolution in early modern Europe, is mired in misconceptions about technology unlocking revolution, therefore making its true origin nebulous.

Thanks to the integral role of the Thirty Years War in the concept of military revolution in early modern Europe, it’s important to analyze and understand why the conflict began. According to the military revolution theory, it was an evolution of battle tactics that altered war and empowered the states to conduct warfare on a scale completely new to Europe. But what of the origin of these tactics? States and the warfare they participate in don’t escalate simply occur because technology and more efficient battle tactics allow them to do so. In the context of the Thirty Years’ War, religion and the stability of the Holy Roman Empire are the crux of this conflict’s escalation. On October 31, 1517, when Martin Luther’s nailed his 95 Theses on the Wittenberg church in the heart of the Holy Roman Empire, a protestant reformation had been launched. Luther was subject to much criticism and even personal attacks from catholic speakers who warned that “the majority of people living today think, by the crudest of errors, that Luther was a good man and his gospel was a holy one.”  [4] Reactions like these planted the seeds that would serve to widen the schism and begin the decay of the Holy Roman Empire.

The purpose of this foray into the religious complexities of the region is to outline both the stakes which the parties involved faced and the reasons for this conflict’s escalation. If there was a threat posed to the church, then the government, who so closely embraced it, was also at risk. ‘Emperor Charles the V, who, due to his ideal of a universal empire, was determined to preserve the unity of the church.’  [5] Yet, through failed non-violent and subsequent violent means, the emperor settled with the Augsburg Peace of 1555, giving up his dreams of a unified Christian kingdom. The settlement gave Protestantism full reign over each territory whose respective prince adhered to its teachings. This was not a clean fix, ‘it just silenced the problem on an imperial level in order to turn it into a virulent matter for the territories.’ [6] The divisions within the church and the populace were swept under the rug and grew over the next 50 years. The escalation in 1618 launched by Protestants against Catholics known as the Bohemian ‘revolt became linked to discontent in the Empire.’ [7] Although it’s contentious as to whether religion was the sole cause of this conflict, it certainly helped galvanize power disputes within Europe’s kingdoms. Religion and influence incentivized a greater utilization of available technology and an evolution of battle tactics because the outcome of the war had the power to decide the boundaries of faith and rule within Europe. Pivoting to a new point of view, there’s also substantial evidence that this escalation was a result of stronger central authority developed within Europe.

With power and religion serving as powder for escalation, ignition couldn’t be achieved without stronger central authority. This idea furthers the concept that the military revolution isn’t some simple phenomenon that can be boiled down to technological advancements, for these new technologies and their tactics could never be harnessed and organized effectively without proper authority and discipline. ‘By setting the decisive changes, in terms of size and, though to a lesser extent, organization and weaponry, in the post 1660 period it can be argued that it was the more stable domestic political circumstances of most states in that period, which contrasted notably with the civil disorder of so many countries in … the mid-seventeenth-century crisis that made these changes possible.’ [8] This statement argues that Robert’s original placement of the military revolution within the span of the Thirty Years’ War is incorrect. It also counters the concept of the military revolution’s inception being owed to technology by proposing that stronger government was responsible for the transformation. This dramatic increase in army size, thanks to political stability and central authority, resulted in greater importance being placed on food procurement and logistics.

A cyclical effect that required ever-greater control from the state began to take place. Leading his army through the upper Rhine region in 1697, Marshal Choiseul explained that ‘he was not able to achieve decisive success because he could not find sufficient food in the region, and this paralyzed his operations.’ [9] The increase in central authority unlocked potential for larger standing armies, but these armies required ever growing logistical and organizational support, resulting in a continuous need for stable government and control. The argument that military revolution was achieved thanks to enhanced political stability serves as just another example of the concept’s multifaceted origins. Another period which may be overlooked by those studying the development of the military revolution is the Hundred Year’s War.

After 20 years Michael Robert’s military revolution thesis was finally met with some critique when Geoffrey Parker proposed the idea that ‘the focus on the centuries after 1500 obscures the importance of the period in which the most dramatic, most truly revolutionary changes in European military affairs took place: the period, roughly, of the Hundred Year’s War (1337-1453).’ [10] This bold statement that pulls the concept back to the late Middle Ages warrants a look at the changes which Parker notes and how they fare against the military revolution thesis. The Middle Age’s trademark soldier was that of the elite and chivalrous knight who rode atop a warhorse, both clad in chain mail and heavy armor. Of course, the overwhelming force of shock cavalry was met by innovation and change in tactics like a phalanx of pikemen. ‘Such tactics were well suited to the war in France where numerical inferiority usually necessitated a defensive posture.’ [11] Due to the high cost of the equipment for a heavy mounted soldier and/or the continuance of battlefield defeats inflicted by swarms of pikes, the infantry revolution began to take hold. Looking at cases like the Battle of Agincourt, where mounted horsemen suffered horrific losses, demonstrates the growing ineffectiveness of heavy cavalry. While the slow transformation to infantry armies is blamed much on aristocratic stubbornness, it should be noted that it was the very same elites who were massacred by the hands of these new developments.

Pikemen and archers, two principal counters to cavalry, were not drawn from the aristocratic class. With armies that relied more on commoners, the sizes of armies began to grow. ‘Thanks to the triumph of the pikemen, therefore, it became possible for governments to recruit, arm, and train an unlimited number of men. The road to unrestrained military increase lay wide open.’ [12] The Hundred Years’ War military revolution thesis doesn’t claim that dramatic changes occurred because they had the means available. Instead, it suggests that, through trial and error, tactical innovations were made that would lay the groundwork for new technologies to be utilized and army sizes to exponentially increase. Only with an identity crisis such as that found in the Thirty Years’ War could this late medieval military revolution be ignited and unleashed. For revolution doesn’t simply take place because it has the means to accomplish it. First, revolution needs a catalyst.

A second, more systematic point raised by Parker is the importance of the trace italienne, which garnered resounding revolutionary effects during the Renaissance. Thanks to medieval conflicts being owed to dynastic squabble, castles were developed to protect the important persons of interest within them. Whether due to the nobility’s high ransom price or their title being contested, castles were widely adopted throughout Europe as an effective means of ensuring the safety of their inhabitants. With their high spires and thick walls, an invading army’s only feasible path to victory was to starve out the defenders, hence the predominance of siege warfare in the Middle Ages. ‘Guns were used merely for antipersonnel purposes, or to burn wooden structures. But the Siege of Odruik of 1377 marked a new era. Europe’s guns had gotten big enough to destroy walls.’  [13] This completely changed the landscape of warfare throughout Europe by giving the offensive forces an absolute and explosive advantage. One early victim of the new and powerful cannon, the Italian States, began to work on a new form of fortress. This new structure ‘rejected the circular towers of medieval times in favor of a four-sided angular construction called the ‘bastion’, which consisted of two sideways-facing ‘flanks’, and two outward-facing faces.’ [14] Through architectural adjustments and a different perspective, the castle had been refashioned into a sturdy geometric fortress that could provide its own cannon-fire. With the creation of bastions following the style like that of the trace italienne, equilibrium between offensive and defensive forces in battle was finally restored.

Naturally, the only viable means of success was the tried-and-true siege of starvation. A major increase in manpower needed for an effective army was ‘necessitated by the vast number of men required to starve out a town defended by the trace italienne.’ [15] From pikemen, to artillery, and finally bastions, evolution instigated tactical innovation resulting in an incessant need to adapt technology. However, Parker’s examples contribute towards the same ulterior idea as those of Robert, all while being placed in completely different time periods. Both military revolution theses revolve around the idea that technology influenced all aspects of the bodies who wielded them. It’s dubious as to whether these technologies would have been sought out if rulers like Louis XII didn’t have pretext to lay claims to foreign crowns.

The original military revolution thesis presented by Michael Robert underscores so many of the points that are used as fodder against it. His concept acknowledges that the technological innovations were only pursued given the moral and political context of the Thirty Years’ War. It also claims that technology was the deciding factor in applying a lasting influence on society, much like that of Geoffrey Parker and the transition from reliance on armies of aristocratic men-at-arms to commoner based infantry. There are many notable military revolutions that occurred throughout the Thirty Years’ War, hence the necessity to stop dancing around Robert’s work and address a great point of his. Parker postulates the idea that technology exerted influence on military tactics because of attempts to maximize the efficiency of devices like rifles and cannons. ‘The solution offered by the reforms of Maurice of Orange and Gustav Adolf was a return, under the inspiration of Vegetius, Aelian, and Leo the Isaurian, to linear formations. In place of the massive, deep, unwieldy squares of the Spanish tercio, …they relied upon a multiplicity of small units ranged in two or three lines and so disposed and armed as to permit the full exploitation of all types of weapons.’ [16] These innovations would display the potential of not only rifles, but discipline and organization. Henceforth, a new revolution was set forward, that of drilling. In response to news of an imminent Spanish invasion, Maurice of Orange is recounted as having “placed his trust, after God, in the perpetual drilling of his troops….’ [17] Maurice would later win this battle on the outskirts of Nieuwpoort thanks to having correctly placed his faith in drill. Through displays of prowess during battles such as this and the later victory by Swedish forces at the Battle of Breitenfeld, drilling in line formations was destined to become a universal practice throughout Europe. It’s natural to extrapolate the cause of these revolutions as having been a result of technology, especially if done so by retracing the steps along the evolution of military conduct. But Roberts’ theory only orbits around innovations made by the Swedish and Dutch in a conflict involving a plethora of other principalities and kingdoms. The innovations made by the Swedish and the Dutch were no less revolutionary than those of the Middle Ages, Renaissance, or late 17th.

These critiques of the military revolution concept are not to discount the idea that a profound change has occurred. Rather, they attempt to outline the convoluted origins that led to this change. The change from English longbows to an arquebus is a transformation that is visible and unignorable. This makes it very easy to use technology as a frame of reference for the changes that occurred throughout all aspects of society. The innovations that occurred in surrounding periods aren’t used to suggest that there was no military revolution during the Thirty Years’ War. Rather, this departure from the mid-17th century is used to convey the idea that the concept’s title is flawed. ‘War’s character, its conduct, constantly evolves under the influence of technology, moral forces, culture, and military culture, which also change across time and place.’ [18] Constant change isn’t revolutionary, it’s evolutionary. The ‘military evolution’ owes its’ existence to many different aspects of humanity, not just technology.

---

[1] Maurice Keen, Medieval Warfare : A History (OUP Oxford, 1999), 146.

[2] Clifford J Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate (Routledge, 2018), 18.

[3] James, A. (2023) ‘The Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648, and the Military Revolution thesis’ [Recorded lecture], 4SSW1005: The History of Modern War. King’s College London. 9 October. Available at: https://echo360.org.uk/lesson/G_c3eea080-3f6d-4c59-896d-479656f3cd60_d4896edf-aa7c-435c-bcf3-c0bc47e7730c_2023-10-09T10:03:00.000_2023-10-09T11:00:00.000/classroom (Accessed 10 December 2023).

[4] Ralph Keen, “Johannes Cochlaeus: An Introduction to His Life and Work,” Manchester University Press EBooks, December 25, 2003, 41–53, https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719061042.003.0004.

[5] Please see details below

[6] Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder, The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years’ War (Routledge, 2016), 193–97.

[7]  P. H. Wilson, “The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-48,” The English Historical Review CXXIII, no. 502 (May 30, 2008): 554–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cen160.

[8] Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? (Bloomsbury Publishing, 1991), 67.

[9] G. Perjés, “Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century,” Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 16, no. 1/2 (1970): 38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42555013?seq=3.

[10] Clifford J Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate (Routledge, 2018), 55.

[11] Maurice Keen, Medieval Warfare : A History (OUP Oxford, 1999), 205.

[12] Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560-1660--a Myth?,” The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 2 (1976): 196–214, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1879826?seq=14.

[13] Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age : China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West World History (Princenton: Princenton University Press, 2016), 90.

[14] Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare (Routledge, 2013), 25.

[15] Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560-1660--a Myth?,” The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 2 (1976): 208, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1879826?seq=14.

[16] Clifford J Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate (Routledge, 2018), 14.

[17]  Geoffrey Parker, “The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy,” The Journal of Military History 71, no. 2 (2007): 351, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/213516.

[18] F. G. Hoffman, “Will War’s Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 47, no. 4 (November 1, 2017): 23, https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3101.

References

1. Maurice Keen, Medieval Warfare : A History (OUP Oxford, 1999), 146.

2. Clifford J Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate (Routledge, 2018), 18.

3. James, A. (2023) ‘The Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648, and the Military Revolution thesis’ [Recorded lecture], 4SSW1005: The History of Modern War. King’s College London. 9 October. Available at: https://echo360.org.uk/lesson/G_c3eea080-3f6d-4c59-896d-479656f3cd60_d4896edf-aa7c-435c-bcf3-c0bc47e7730c_2023-10-09T10:03:00.000_2023-10-09T11:00:00.000/classroom  (Accessed 10 December 2023).

4. Ralph Keen, “Johannes Cochlaeus: An Introduction to His Life and Work,” Manchester University Press EBooks, December 25, 2003, 41–53, https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719061042.003.0004.

5. Please see details below

6. Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder, The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years’ War (Routledge, 2016), 193–97.

7. P. H. Wilson, “The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-48,” The English Historical Review CXXIII, no. 502 (May 30, 2008): 554–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cen160.

8. Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? (Bloomsbury Publishing, 1991), 67.

9. G. Perjés, “Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century,” Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 16, no. 1/2 (1970): 38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42555013?seq=3.

10. Clifford J Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate (Routledge, 2018), 55.

11. Maurice Keen, Medieval Warfare : A History (OUP Oxford, 1999), 205.

12. Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560-1660--a Myth?,” The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 2 (1976): 196–214, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1879826?seq=14.

13. Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age : China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West World History (Princenton: Princenton University Press, 2016), 90.

14. Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare (Routledge, 2013), 25.

15. Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560-1660--a Myth?,” The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 2 (1976): 208, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1879826?seq=14.

16. Clifford J Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate (Routledge, 2018), 14.

17. Geoffrey Parker, “The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy,” The Journal of Military History 71, no. 2 (2007): 351, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/213516.

18. F. G. Hoffman, “Will War’s Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters  47, no. 4 (November 1, 2017): 23, https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3101.