Youth and the Far Right: The AfD's kthrough in Germany

The values and political orientations of younger citizens are widely regarded as key indicators of a country’s future political trajectory [1]. In Germany, trends indicate a significant shift to the right among young German voters with a drastic increase in support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-wing populist party (RWPP). In the 2025 federal elections, AfD placed second nationwide with 20 percent of the vote [2]. Current polling data further indicate that, if parliamentary elections were held today, the AfD would secure approximately 26 percent of the vote, placing it in direct competition with the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and potentially positioning it as the country’s strongest party [3]. This shift is especially pronounced among younger voters. Within the 18–24 age group, AfD support nearly tripled, rising from about 7 percent in the 2021 federal elections to approximately 21 percent in 2025 [4]. This represents a historic development: for the first time since the fall of the Nazi regime, a right-wing populist party has achieved such widespread support among young voters, signaling a profound breach of long-standing political taboos and reflecting the growing normalization of far-right ideas in German society over the past decade [5].

While many European countries saw the resurgence of right-wing populist (RWP) movements starting in the 1980s, Germany's political landscape remained largely resistant to such trends. The absence of mainstream RWP movements was largely driven by an unwavering government commitment to the remembrance of the National Socialist atrocities, which permeated an ingrained sense of guilt in the German collective memory and identity, known as “Erinnerungskultur” or simply memory culture[6]. This collective memory landscape has been cultivated by physical landscapes of monuments, museums, and archives across Germany, along with history lessons in school that facilitated encounters with Holocaust survivors dedicated to the remembrance of the tragic events. It has long functioned as a barrier to the resurgence and mainstream support for RWPP sentiments, organizations, and parties [7]. While parties to the right of the conservative CDU/CSU occasionally found support in subnational elections, up until 2017 no party other than the AfD managed to achieve such widespread success at a national level [8].

Especially among young voters under 30, support for right-wing parties was uncommon. In the post-World War II era, the majority of young voters favored stability and economic recovery, supporting parties like the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Since the 1980s, young voters have become increasingly concerned with issues of social justice and climate change. Consequently, voters under 35 predominantly voted for center-left parties such as the SPD and the Green Party, which promote progressive policies on environmental protection and social welfare [9]. In the past, the ensuing solidification of collective guilt and shame not only discouraged support for right-wing parties but also shaped political decision-making across multiple policy areas. A prominent example was Chancellor Angela Merkel's 2015 decision to temporarily suspend the Dublin Regulation and allow over one million refugees to enter Germany, a policy widely interpreted as being rooted in a sense of historical responsibility and democratic obligation shaped by Germany’s past [10].

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) directly challenges the political norms produced by Germany’s memory culture, particularly in relation to immigration and national responsibility. In its early phase, the party was dominated by academics and technocrats, primarily united by opposition to the financial bailouts of Southern European countries during the eurozone crisis. This orientation changed fundamentally in 2015, when the national-conservative faction gained control and redirected the party’s focus toward immigration, identity, and large-scale migration, framing these issues through a nationalist-populist narrative that significantly transformed the AfD’s ideological profile and public appeal [11].

This shift led to a rapid increase in electoral support. By the 2017 federal elections, the AfD had secured 12.6 percent of the vote and became the third-largest party in the Bundestag marking the f irst time since reunification that a right-wing populist party had entered the German parliament [12]. Initially, party support was concentrated in eastern Germany, particularly in rural and economically disadvantaged areas of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). However, in the past years, the AfD has transcended regional boundaries and become a nationwide phenomenon [13].

The AfD entered the German Bundestag with a provocative tone intended to polarize the political discussion. Leading party members intentionally pushed the boundaries of acceptable speech and shattered established taboos. They justified this strategy by claiming to amplify the concerns of common people. However, the party advocates for economic liberalization, deregulation, and tax reductions for the rich. At the same time, many candidates openly advocated for extreme measures regarding immigration and make no effort to conceal their association with right-wing extremists, both domestically and internationally. AfD members cultivate a close association with other right-wing populist parties. Among those were the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) [14].

However, the AfD's current manifestation is argued to be significantly more right-wing than that of other RWPPs across Europe. In May 2025, the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) formally classified the party as a right-wing extremist organization, deeming its ideology and organizational structures incompatible with Germany’s free democratic constitutional order [15]. Prominent party members remain in close contact with PEGIDA, the NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany), and the Identitarian Movement, right-wing extremist groups known for their ethno-nationalist, neo-Nazi, and anti-Semitic positions. While trying to appeal to mainstream voters, the party adopts strategies and tactics of the “New Right” that frame arguments in terms of identity, heritage, and cultural preservation. This demonstrates the alarming trend of how ideas, concepts, and terminology originating from far-right circles increasingly permeate the AfD and subsequently gain access to state parliaments and the Bundestag. For its extreme right positions, the AfD currently remains isolated in the Bundestag, with all other parties refusing to form coalition partnerships with it. This isolation serves as an important barrier to its political power. However, with the party gaining further traction, concerns are mounting about the longevity of this political firewall [17].

Despite a post-war culture in which national shame and historical responsibility have been deeply embedded in the identities of German citizens, the party has achieved remarkable electoral success, especially among young voters. But what explains these developments? The f indings presented in the following sections are drawn from a research project conducted in the summer of 2024, which investigated why young Germans are increasingly shifting toward the right, despite Germany’s historical rejection of RWPPs. The study focused on AfD supporters aged 25–35, including both men and women from a diverse range of urban and rural areas across East and West Germany. Using qualitative interviews analyzed through Thematic Content Analysis (TCA), the research aimed to uncover the primary motivations, attitudes, and experiences that shape their voting behavior. This study identifies two core drivers of young voters’ support for the AfD: the desire to prioritize the needs of young Germans and the wish to reclaim a stronger national identity. Economic and structural insecurity intensified both anti-immigrant and anti-establishment sentiments, with many participants feeling that established parties neglected young Germans while disproportionately supporting immigrants. Experiences of political alienation, especially during COVID-19, deepened anti-elite attitudes and undermined trust in the political system and democracy in Germany.

On the one hand, similar to other RWPPs across Europe, the AfD’s success among young voters is closely linked to its influential position on social media [17]. Out of all German political parties, it has the strongest social media support across different platforms, particularly on TikTok. The AfD has adopted a clear strategy based on radical, blunt messaging that simplifies complex social and political challenges into emotionally appealing narratives [18]. By offering easy answers, the party presents itself as decisive, accessible, and responsive to young audiences. This content is further amplified by online communities, including far-right forums and conspiracy theory networks, which create echo chambers in which populist and nativist ideas become entrenched. These spaces make it increasingly difficult for voters to escape the “lock-in effect” associated with right-wing populist parties (RWPPs). As young supporters experience social rejection and ostracism in their offline environments, their primary sense of belonging often shifts toward like-minded online communities, deepening political entrenchment and increasing the risk of radicalization. Previous research shows that the AfD strategically exploits these vulnerabilities by offering recognition, belonging, and validation that are often denied elsewhere, particularly within right-wing online spaces [19]. Many participants reported exclusively following the AfD and other right-wing networks on social media. Although social media is not the sole source of the party’s appeal, it functions as a key driver of its success.

General dissatisfaction with the political establishment has emerged as the main driver of support for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) among young voters. Many participants reported a deep sense of political betrayal and strong anti-establishment sentiment, particularly in response to mainstream parties’ decision to admit large numbers of refugees, a policy widely perceived as prioritizing “non-citizens” over the needs of young Germans. Established parties were often viewed as a “single corrupt entity,” detached from the economic and social realities facing young people. Participants described experiences of economic insecurity, limited opportunities, and declining prospects, leaving them feeling politically and socially disenfranchised.

These dynamics are especially pronounced in the states of the former GDR, where persistent structural economic challenges remain largely neglected by mainstream parties. In this context, the AfD has gained a stronghold by offering seemingly simple solutions to complex problems. The party reinforces these grievances through xenophobic and nativist rhetoric that casts asylum seekers as responsible for ordinary Germans’ economic hardships, portraying them as a burden on the welfare system, a cause of housing shortages, while also spreading misleading narratives that link immigration to rising crime. These messages cultivate populist and nativist attitudes and play a central role in shaping youth support for the party. Beyond economics, immigrants’ religion and culture, particularly Islam, were perceived as threats to Germany's national identity and society, reflecting classic Islamophobic and xenophobic stereotypes common in right-wing populist party (RWPP) discourse. In this context, some participants supported the AfD’s policy of “remigration,” a euphemistic term used to justify the deportation of immigrants, to create a more culturally homogeneous national population, a rhetoric that echoes Germany’s darkest historical periods.

At the same time, many young participants expressed a desire to reclaim a sense of national pride and patriotism, rather than remain defined by historical guilt and shame. While acknowledging World War II and the Holocaust, they rejected the idea that they should be personally or collectively held responsible for these events. This aligns with Miller-Idriss’s f indings, which indicate a new understanding of national belonging emerging among young Germans [20]. While nationalist pride is resurging across Europe, Germany’s historical responsibility for World War II and the Holocaust makes questions of national identity particularly sensitive. The AfD exploits this tension strategically, using historical revisionism and selective negation of Nazi atrocities to advance its political agenda. Through coded language and references drawn from the Nazi era, the party gradually normalizes exclusionary and xenophobic discourse, eroding the boundaries of acceptable public dialogue. By doing so, it weakens the moral and cultural norms that traditionally guided German political behavior, fostering support for its German-centric and xenophobic policies while breaking long-standing social and political taboos.

The AfD presents a clear threat to the democratic principles of pluralism and tolerance. Germany has a historic responsibility to “never again” let past atrocities occur on German ground and elsewhere. Thus, it must not only acknowledge the victims of the Nazi regime but also uphold historical responsibility through the protection of collective memory culture.

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Footnotes

[1] Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Blood and Culture: Youth, Right-Wing Extremism, and National Belonging in Contemporary Germany (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822391142.

[2] Deutschlandfunk, “Analyse Bundestagswahl 2025: Die Gewinner sind CDU/CSU und AfD, SPD historisch schlecht, FDP & BSW wohl raus,” February 24, 2025, https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/bundestagswahl-2025-wahlanalyse-afd-cdu-spd-gruene-linke-bs w-fdp-100.html.

[3] Statista, “Aktuelle Parteipräferenz bei Bundestagswahl,” 2025, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/953/umfrage/aktuelle-parteipraeferenz-bei-bundestag swahl/.

[4] Al Jazeera, “Far-Right AfD and Socialist Left Win over Young Germans, Election Reveals,” February 25, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/25/how-afd-the-left-won-the-german-youth-vote.

[5] Laura Gabler, “Rechtsruck bei jungen Wählern: Was jetzt zu tun ist,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 29, 2024, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/rechtsruck-bei-jungen-waehlern-was-jetzt-zu-tun-ist-19686 692.html

[6] Jeffrey K. Olick and Daniel Levy, “Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth and Rationality in German Politics,” American Sociological Review 62, no. 6 (1997): 921–936, https://www.academia.edu/10511399/Collective_Memory_and_Cultural_Constraint_Holocaust_ Myth_and_Rationality_in_German_Politics; Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique, no. 65 (Spring–Summer 1995): 125–133, https://www.jstor.org/stable/488538.

[7] Kai Arzheimer, Jocelyn Evans, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, eds., The SAGE Handbook of Electoral Behaviour (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2017), https://sk.sagepub.com/hnbk/edvol/the-sage-handbook-of-electoral-behaviour/toc#.

[8] N. D. Steiner, “Generational Change in Party Support in Germany: The Decline of the Volksparteien, the Rise of the Greens, and the Transformation of the Education Divide,” Electoral Studies 86 (2023), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379423001282.

[9] Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, “The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the Electorate’: Between Single-Issue and Right-Wing Populist Party,” German Politics 26, no. 1 (2016): 124–148.

[10] Michael Koß, “Weisskircher, Manès (Hrsg.) (2023): Contemporary Germany and the Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics. From the Streets to Parliament,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 65 (2024): 824, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11615-024-00546-x.

[11] Hans-Georg Betz and Fabian Habersack, “Regional Nativism in East Germany: The Case of the AfD,” in The People and the Nation: Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe, ed. Reinhard Heinisch, Emanuele Massetti, and Oscar Mazzoleni (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 120, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351265560-6.

[12] Robert Lüdecke, “AfD als ‘gesichert rechtsextremistisch’ eingestuft: Welche Folgen hat das?,” Amadeu-Antonio-Stiftung, May 6, 2025, https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/afd-als-gesichert-rechtsextremistisch-eingestuft-welche folgen-hat-das-135873/.

[13] Ralf Havertz, Radical Right Populism in Germany: AfD, Pegida, and the Identitarian Movement (London: Routledge, 2021).

[14] Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037.

[15] Kalkidan Classen, Anna Kollmer, Malte Schlage, Alicia Schöpflin, Jessica Winkler, and Hannes Witerspan, “Right-Wing Populist Communication of the Party AfD on TikTok: To What Extent Does the AfD Use TikTok as Part of Its Communication to Win over Young Voters?,” in The Dynamics of Digital Influence: Communication Trends in Business, Politics and Activism (Leipzig: University of Leipzig, 2024), 100–122, https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-94713-2.

[16] Marcus Bösch, Von Reichweite und Algorithmen: Analyse des Europawahlkampfs ausgewählter Parteien auf TikTok (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, September 2024), https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/a-p-b/21462.pdf.