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How well was Sea Power Integrated into the Strategic Interests of the United States in the Twentieth Century?

  • Writer: Augustine Acuña III (Staff Writer)
    Augustine Acuña III (Staff Writer)
  • Nov 11
  • 9 min read

Updated: Nov 19

When Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote Influence of Sea Power Upon History in 1890, he argued for a ‘theory of security’ that provided a grand strategic initiative and ‘greater wealth through global engagement.’ [1] Embraced by the U.S. Navy and the White House, there’s no question that the Influence of Sea Power Upon History shaped US strategic thinking in the 20th century. Yet, as President Eisenhower said, ‘farming looks mighty easy when your plow is a pencil, and you're a thousand miles from the corn field.’ [2]


This reveals a critical question: How well did the United States integrate seapower into its strategic interests during the 20th century? To begin, an accurate assessment of this question can’t focus purely on one case study, as no power always follows its strategic philosophy perfectly, especially through the course of 100 years. Due to this, periods of peace and conflict throughout the century will be examined. It’s this essay’s belief that the US loosely followed Mahan’s ideals, adapting them to strategic contexts. This strengthened seapower’s integration into strategic interests by avoiding inflexible commitment. Before exploring historical examples, US strategic interests and the key tenets of Mahanian thinking must be clearly defined.


The overarching objective of ‘strategic interest’ revolved around security. This constituted expansion, intervention, and defense. Manifest destiny did not stop in California, it pivoted to Spanish possessions in the Caribbean and Pacific. The Roosevelt Corollary framed intervention ‘in the interest of humanity at large’, [3] suggesting no limitations to American reach.


Strategic imperatives also involved economic stability. Though abundant in natural resources, US markets focused on the globe, later doing so to reinforce capitalism’s efficacy against communism. Finally, the dissemination of liberal American values can also form strategic interest. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points advocated for transparent diplomacy, freedom of navigation, and disarmament. [4] Another example includes, NSC-68, which valued objectives like containment, capitalism, and anti-communism. [5]


These strategic interests were different from maritime states, they concerned projection, not trade protection. Mahan defined ‘seapower’ as requisites stemming from ‘geographical position’, maritime working population, and government support. [6] His attention to command of the sea, a ‘barren acquisition, except as leading to something more” [7] was not blind faith, but an understanding that seapower influenced outcomes on land. The U.S. can’t be defined as a maritime state because its main function for seapower wasn’t to protect trade. As a continental superpower, the US used seapower to advance strategic interests via power projection and flexibility.


From 1900 to 1914, the U.S. applied Mahanian concepts of seapower not out of necessity, but to exert increased global influence. The ‘Great White Fleet’ embodied Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘big stick’ policy. In his 1913 autobiography, Roosevelt notes Mahan’s influence on himself, declaring his objectives in sending the fleet around the world was to ‘impress the American people’ and ‘stimulate popular interest’ in the navy. [8] Aligned with Mahan’s insistence that ‘the effect of national character and aptitudes upon the development of sea power’ was crucial, this clearly displays an integration of seapower into U.S. strategy. However, Roosevelt’s ‘big stick’ policy was a means for power projection gilded by Mahanian thought, it was ultimately employed to counter growing threats from Europe and Asia.


Entering World War I, seapower was tested, revealing its limitations in securing American strategic interests. Initial U.S. strategies foresaw a critical fleet engagement with Germany, compiling plans to ‘compel decisive engagement with Black [German Navy] near entrance to Caribbean.’ [9] This was clearly misguided because the German fleet never reached U.S. coasts. Conversely, German U-boats fundamentally changed maritime strategy. Exchanging ‘Mahan for logistics’, convoys ‘carried 6 million tons of cargo’ ‘1.5 million tons of coal, and 0.7 million tons of fuel oil and gasoline’ 10 neutralizing the U-Boats’ paralyzing effect. This marked a shift from Mahan’s thinking to Corbett’s, rebuffing the ‘crude Mahanism’ 11 of decisive fleet battles. Though Mahan’s seapower tactics were disproved, his insistence on its strategic value was not. This began a legacy of flexible U.S. naval conduct not tied solely to Mahan’s seapower doctrine.


Though globally active throughout the interwar years, seapower’s integration followed that of interventionism rather than Mahanian thinking. Seapower isn’t gunboat diplomacy or interventionism, it’s command of the sea. Increased naval presence in the Caribbean didn’t reflect Mahan’s doctrine. Calvin Coolidge, rejecting anxieties over Haiti, said Marine presence was ‘there for the purpose of maintaining peace and order and protecting American interests.’ [12] In the absence of seaborne threats, intervention and economic influence became top priorities, moving US naval policy away from its previous vigor and leaving American fleets vulnerable to decisive naval engagements. Navy Secretary Wilbur expressed that global fleet presence was ‘seriously affecting the efficiency of operations.’ [13] In response to this degradation, the Naval Expansion Act of 1938 [14] represented a late response to threats of war that had been sidelined by peacetime distractions. Presence wouldn’t bring about command of the seas, nor would gunboat diplomacy deter the Japanese. Seapower enjoyed relevance once again, as the US returned to largescale naval development.


The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor conveyed just how much importance the Japanese placed on seapower. Command of the seas was clearly never in doubt. Bills passed before Pearl Harbor, such as the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940, laid out largely successful plans to expand the US Navy by 1,325,000 tons. [15] This example conveys just how much support US maritime development could draw from, even before its entrance into WWII. This expansion would prove crucial to the Battle of Midway, for naval construction placed an emphasis on aircraft carriers


rather than battleships. The super battleship Yamamoto waited ‘to engage in the great Mahanian shootout’ ‘Nimitz, however, went for attrition at Midway’ because ‘common sense dictates we can’t slug it out.’ [16] The Battle of Midway, like the Battle of the Coral Sea, ‘was a contest of air power.’ [17] Fleets no longer orbited battleships, but rather aircraft carriers. Technological advancement had outpaced Mahanian thought. His advocacy for capital ships, still influencing the Japanese, led to their defeat. The US still followed Mahan’s belief in the importance of neutralizing the enemy fleet, 18 but it’s adaptation from battleship to carrier in decisive fleet engagements proved most significant.


Following WWII, the US navy struggled to define its value against a foe without a navy, especially in a world with nuclear weapons. However, interpretations of seapower were adapted to advance communist containment. The amphibious Inchon landing decisively reversed operational trends in Korea. ‘The Navy and Marine Corps had never fully accepted the plan, yet they carried it out to perfection.’ [19] This demonstrated that command of the seas was still a means to an end. [20] Kennedy’s ‘flexible response’ strategy breathed life to seapower by insisting on non- nuclear military options. Nuclear annihilation during the Cuban Missile Crisis was partly averted via employment of a selective naval blockade and presence of US submarines in Newfoundland. [21] Seapower took on a new identity as deterrence. Since nuclear warfare was self-defeating, the Navy’s ability to conduct non-nuclear warfare meant that seapower could still defend strategic interests in the atomic age.


From the Korean to Vietnam wars, excessive US defense spending limited expectations of American ability to maintain advantageous levels of development over the USSR. By 1969, Kissinger described the Soviet Union as having ‘achieved a position of virtual parity with the U.S.’ [22] Without funds, it seemed seapower would cease to advance US strategic interests. In response, President Reagan’s hardline stance on the USSR proposed a ‘600-ship navy’ and a ‘Maritime Strategy’ that struck ‘at the Soviet Union’s flanks,’ diverted ‘Soviet forces away from Central Europe,’ and neutralized ‘their ballistic missile submarines.’ [23] By 1987 the US enjoyed a force of 594 ships [24] and its naval superiority meant that ‘all other missions, on Mahanian principles, would follow as consequences of command of the sea.’ [25] A deadly combination of extensive military spending, internal unrest, and a sluggish economy would spell the dissolution of the USSR. Mahan’s principal emphasis on command of the seas evolved from decisive battle to deterrence. Offensive naval strategies crippled the USSR, leaving the U.S. Navy uncontested.


Throughout the 20th century the United States avoided strict adherence to Mahan’s prescription for seapower, often altering his theories to better fit strategic contexts. However, inconsistencies do not constitute a failure to integrate seapower into strategy. They reflect a trend of flexibility in naval doctrine that the US owes to its success. In the face of oceanic threats, adaptation and emphasis on command of the seas was followed effectively. Most importantly however, is that in the absence of direct military threats, US integration of seapower became nebulous and its principles questioned, inducing policies that led the US navy astray. This will become an issue of utmost importance for the US Navy to confront in the 21st century. Again, the US Navy’s legacy is not derived from its commitment to Mahan’s theories, but rather its willingness to adapt his ideas in pursuit of deterrence, power projection, and the advancement of strategic interests.


Footnotes

  1. Kevin D. McCranie, Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 14.

  2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Address at Bradley University,"; Peoria, IL, September 25, 1956, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, vol. 17 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 891, https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/eisenhowers/quotes

  3. National Archives, “Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1905),” National Archives, September 15, 2021, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/roosevelt-corollary.

  4. National Archives, “President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points (1918),” National Archives, February 8, 2022, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-woodrow-wilsons-14-points.

  5. Executive Secretary (Lay), "A Report to the National Security Council (NSC 68),"; April 14, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, eds. David H. Stauffer, William Slany, and Rogers P. Churchill (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), Document 85, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85.

  6. A T Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (anboco, 2016), 31,

    https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/reader.action?docID=4663504.

  7. Kevin D. McCranie, Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 108.

  8. Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), Project Gutenberg, accessed 11 March 2025,

    https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3335/pg3335-images.html

  9. Naval History and Heritage Command, Admiral of the Navy, October 22, 1915, accessed 12 March 2025, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/wwi/1915/admiral-of-the-navy.html

  10. Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: the U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998, 78. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb31560.0001.001. PDF.

  11. Kevin D. McCranie, Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 113.

  12. Schmidt, Hans. The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995, 134. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb04590.0001.001. PDF.

  13. Benjamin Armstrong, Naval Presence and the Interwar US Navy and Marine Corps (Taylor & Francis, 2023), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/reader/read-online/c37fe39c-4b45-4509-a792-daddc3d96311/book/epub?context=ubx.

  14. Ibid.

  15. Naval History and Heritage Command, Naval Expansion Act (19 July 1940), accessed 12 March 2025,

    https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1941/prelude/naval-expansion-act-19-july-1940.html

  16. Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: the U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998 213. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb31560.0001.001. PDF.

  17. Naval History and Heritage Command, “Battle of Midway: 3-6 June 1942 Combat Narrative,” Navy.mil,2019, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/battle-of-midway-3-6-june-1942-combat-narrative.html.

  18. Kevin D. McCranie, Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 111.

  19. Robert O Brunson and Army, The Inchon Landing: An Example of Brilliant Generalship (Normanby Press, 2003), 28, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=4808683.

  20. Kevin D. McCranie, Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 108

  21. Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: the U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998, 383. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb31560.0001.001. PDF.

  22. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 41. Accessed 12 March 2025.

    https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d41

  23. Anand Toprani, “Was the 600-Ship Navy a Chimera? Budgets, Force Structure, and the Political Realities behind Reagan-Era Naval Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 48, no. 1 (June 24, 2024): 213–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2024.2362768.

  24. Naval History and Heritage Command. U.S. Ship Force Levels, 1886-Present. Accessed [insert date].

    https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html.

  25. Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: the U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998, 430. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb31560.0001.001. PDF.


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4b45-4509-a792-daddc3d96311/book/epub?context=ubx.

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Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998, 383.

 Brunson, Robert O, and Army. The Inchon Landing: An Example of Brilliant

Generalship. Normanby Press, 2003.

 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Address at Bradley University," Peoria, IL, September 25, 1956, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, vol. 17 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 891,

 Executive Secretary (Lay), "A Report to the National Security Council (NSC 68)," April

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wilsons-14-points.

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 Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "1961–1968: The Presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson," in Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, accessed 12 March 2025, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/foreword.

 Schmidt, Hans. The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995, 134. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb04590.0001.001.PDF.

 ———. “Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1905).” National

 Naval History and Heritage Command. “Battle of Midway: 3-6 June 1942 Combat Narrative.” Navy.mil, 2019. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-

room/title-list-alphabetically/b/battle-of-midway-3-6-june-1942-combat-narrative.html.

 Paret, Peter, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert. Makers of Modern Strategy : From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.

 Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), Project Gutenberg, accessed 11 March 2025, https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3335/pg3335-images.html

 Toprani, Anand. “Was the 600-Ship Navy a Chimera? Budgets, Force Structure, and the Political Realities behind Reagan-Era Naval Strategy.” Journal of Strategic Studies 48, no. 1 (June 24, 2024): 213–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2024.2362768.

 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 41. Accessed 12 March 2025. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d41

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