Not Just a Proxy Playground: The Middle East's Defiance of Superpower Control

Introduction:

What has often been recognised as one of the geopolitical theatres of the Cold War, the Middle East (ME) has been vulnerable to the United States’ (US) and the Soviet Union’s (USSR) ideological and politically strategic influence after Europe.[1] However, the degree to which the superpowers shaped the Middle East’s trajectory remains contested by scholars. Here, the impact of the superpowers refers to their power to determine political outcomes such as wars, alliances, regime statuses, and ideological alignments. This essay argues that while the US and USSR exerted significant impact on the events in the ME, the influence was substantially limited. For simplification, the superpowers shaped incidents in the region did not fully control or give birth to them, as it all came down to the indigenous will of the regions, and the pre-existence of some events before the Cold War. This idea is also adopted by Karsh, who claims that the superpowers will not decide the result of an Israeli-Palestinian deal or lead a comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace, but can support the peace process through mediation, narrowing political gaps, providing economic aid, and confidence-building.[2] The essay will firstly provide an overview of the relationship between the Cold War and the Middle East using relevant scholarship, followed by two major case studies analysing the Arab-Israeli conflict (1948-1973) and the Iranian Revolution (1979) to strengthen the main argument. The case studies will be analysed with a “for and against” approach, where the argument for states that the superpowers had a limited impact on the events in the Middle East during the Cold War, and the argument against says that the superpowers had a significant/meaningful impact on the same. Next, a synthetic evaluation of both contradicting perspectives will be conducted, incorporating relevant theories, to produce the most convincing argument. The essay will conclude with a summary of the argument.

Historical Context:

From the late 1940s to the 1970s, the ME’s oil reserves were vital for Western economies, while its geography made it significant for the superpowers to strategically counter each other’s expansion.[3] The Cold War era saw a multitude of conflicts in the ME, like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, demonstrating how the intersection between the two different conflicts coexists. The US had three main objectives in the ME: Oil, Israel, and Anti-Communism, and by intervening in the region for mainly these reasons, the US often has control over some Middle Eastern decisions, drafting economic policies for the area, and enjoying military access to North Africa and the Gulf.[4] This US hegemony has, however, wounded the ME, displayed by unfortunate events like the death of Iraqi children due to US-led United Nations (UN) Sanctions, US warships shooting Iranian civilian airliners, supporting Israel’s humanitarian crimes, arming the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and demonising Islam.[5] This has resulted in a certain tendency of resistance in that region, which is further fueled by persistent domestic instabilities. The political order that emerged after colonial rule was unstable and fluctuating in the ME. Following World War II, Britain and France’s withdrawal left a vacuum in the region, leaving it an open invitation for external predators.[6] Scholars like Dawisha argue that this vacuum was then filled by the superpowers, leading to a re-colonisation of the region.[7] Conversely, the Middle Eastern states also actively leveraged the superpower rivalry for national interests, as described well by Wolfers’ statement, “the tail wags the dog”.[8] 

There also exists a vast theoretical debate over whether ME politics was driven by the Cold War or merely shaped by it. Initially, the structural or externalist perspective, underlined by geopolitical realism, Gaddis urges that events like the 1956 Suez Crisis or US involvement in Iran had the aims of containment and deterrence between the lines.[9] Consequently, the region serves as a proxy zone for bipolar rivalry. Equally, internalist scholars like Keddie perceive that anti-colonial nationalism and religious political mobilisation were the true drivers of change, referring to the 1979 Iranian Revolution as not just a failure of US strategy but a victory of domestic indigenous efforts over a superior entity.[10] Subsequently, the superpowers were like force multipliers than primary drivers of regional change.

The Arab-Israeli Conflicts:

During the 1950s to early 1970s, superpower influence over the Middle East was seen significantly, in the newly independent and politically unstable nations that needed military and economic support. The first Arab Israeli war (1948), beginning after the UN Partition Plan for Palestine, was fueled by the rejection of the plan by the Arabs, despite Jewish acceptance.[11] Furthermore, following British withdrawal from Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi and Lebanon sent troops to invade Palestine, while later in 1948, the State of Israel emerged, opposing this.[12] The conflict ended with the signing of several agreements in 1949 between Israel and its neighbours, formalising Israeli control of the region, while the Gaza Strip was occupied by Egypt and the West Bank by Jordan.[13] 

The US legitimised Israel, while the USSR provided military support, hinting that in the early stages of the Cold War, the superpowers significantly shaped the survival of the region. In 1956, Israeli and British French operations took place, and Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula with British-French forces at the port of Suez, aiming to protect investments in the countries that were affected by Nasser’s decision to nationalise the canal.[14] During this time, the US and USSR, worried about the area’s stability, pressured for withdrawal, threatening intervention, leading to the establishment of the UN Emergency Forces. This exhibited the superpower’s ability to dictate international events during the early stages of the Cold War, making the strategic future of the ME increasingly determined by them.

However, by the mid-Cold War, the picture changed. Following the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel launched an attack without US approval against the Egyptian forces.[15] Although American weaponry proved useful for Israel’s victory, Washington had not given consent for the war. This means that the USSR, despite arming Egypt and Syria, could not prevent their defeat; additionally, international diplomatic efforts broke down. The resulting Israel’s occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, Sinai, and the Golan Heights was a domestic military choice rather than a superpower-influenced decision.[16] 

Additionally, the Yom Kippur War in 1973 saw a repetition of the former. When Egypt and Syria attacked Israel to regain the lost territories, despite Soviet restrictions, the US armed Israel further.[17] However, the initiation of the conflict here was indigenous, irrespective of Kissinger’s diplomatic efforts to disengage the tension. Karsh says “successful intervention was largely due to its convergence with indigenous dynamics that had made the local players more receptive to external influence”.[18] The war demonstrated that the superpowers shaped the limits and outcome of the ME conflicts, but failed in preventing or controlling the outbreak of the events.

The Iranian Revolution:

Just as in the case of the Yom Kippur War, where the superpowers had a limited influence, the Iranian Revolution is a strong case to demonstrate the limited superpower impact. The Cold War often compelled states to align with either the American or the Soviet bloc, being characterised as a bipolar order. Shah Pahlavi of Iran was a US ally, receiving massive military support, acting as a bulwark against soviet expansion, and providing access to oil to the West.[19] However, the fall of the Shah in 1979 identified the fall as a failure of US containment strategies and a weakening of the USSR’s regional influence.

The late 1970s saw the emergence of the Iranian Revolution, which was fueled by internal frustrations that the support of superpowers was unable to anticipate and quell. The Shah's "White Revolution" measures of the 1960s, which were meant to modernise Iran, saw heavy criticism.[20]  Large-scale radicalised demonstrations by 1977, and by 1978, emerged opposing the regime's brutal repression and the Shah's legitimacy was damaged. This marked the September 1978 "Black Friday" massacre.[21] Washington was unable to stabilise the situation despite heavy investment in military and diplomacy in Iran. Notwithstanding being geographically proximate, the Soviet Union had minimal influence since local factors, rather than Cold War competition, drove the revolution, and in 1979, with the Shah fleeing, the monarchy had fallen.[22] The fact that neither Washington nor Moscow could stop this result highlights how they were unable to “order” actions around. With the new supreme leader, Khomeini's "Neither East nor West" philosophy signifying Iran's rejection of Cold War alliances, the nascent Islamic Republic remained non-aligned.[23] Its foreign policy was shaped by hostility against the US and mistrust of the USSR, demonstrating that the revolution was essentially internally governed.

Additionally, even though the superpowers had less influence, the impact was significantly meaningful, nevertheless. Following Prime Minister Mossadegh's plan to nationalise Iran's oil industry, the United States and Britain staged a coup against him in 1953.[24] The Shah regained power because of this intervention, which also solidified Iran's ties to the West. Iran became a customer of the US after that, depending on it for government stability. Following the US's continuous military and modernisation support to the Shah, Iran became one of the most militarised regimes in the ME.[25]  Superpower engagement continued to be crucial in determining the course of events even after the Shah was toppled and Iran became a revisionist Islamic Republic after the revolution, having previously been a dependent client state.

Analysis:

A considerable number of scholars, like Karsh, Slugett, and Mamadi, in their literature attribute the regional disturbances in the ME to the internal disturbances that prevailed before, during, and after the Cold War in the states, placing the superpowers in secondary, but not insignificant roles. The given case studies and the contrasting argumentative stances taken for both demonstrate that, despite the superpowers having a meaningful impact on the events in the Middle East during the Cold War, the said “impact” was inadequate in the sense that the ultimate authority was left in the hands of the local will. Consequently, the case studies reveal a structural paradox of the Cold War’s engagement with the ME. As observed, the US and USSR were deemed useful in a geopolitical landscape under military variables; however, their influence was constrained. It was evident from the Arab-Israeli conflicts that none of the eastern conflicts that took place in the Middle East owed their birth to the Cold War. It was also revealed that, unlike in Europe, where a clear division between liberal democracy and communism existed, the Middle Eastern states had no intention of adopting either ideology, highlighting a shortcoming of superpower influence.[26]  Regional reconciliation depended on the domestic actors. This is also evidenced by the American mediation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, which was possible only when the Egyptian and Israeli leaders themselves wanted peace.[27] The superpowers intensified conflicts and expanded their international ramifications, but the drivers of change remained the regional actors. Additionally, superpower interests in the ME were also globally-oriented, driven by their bipolar rivalry and lucrative oil and arms trade. This continued before, during, and after the Cold War, motivating continuous external intervention for influence.

Conclusion:

To conclude, the US and USSR’s impact on the ME still resurfaces today, but the main reason for the region’s misfortunes lies with the local players. Discussing the relationship between the Cold War and the ME, taking a historiographical lens, this essay has adopted two case studies: the Arab-Israeli War and the Iranian Revolution. These case studies solidify the main argument by understanding both sides of the coin of superpower influence. Next, it has provided an analytical perspective of how they provide arguments for and against the question, sieving the most influential result from the study. The essay emphasises that while the superpowers demonstrated meaningful influence, it was, however, limited. As Karsh puts it well, “To local actors, regional developments are an absolute; to the great power, they are one of many problems competing for attention and resources.” The ME has been an independently acting agent pursuing its self-interests, often disregarding the superpower's will, which evidently did not change before, during, and after the Cold War significantly. This essay promotes that regional conflicts and peace in the ME were dependent on the domestic will, which no external actor could enforce in its absence. Fukuyama portrayed liberal democracy as a universal "end of history," yet events in the ME during the Cold War show how nationalism and local legitimacy thwarted such universalism, restricting attempts by superpowers to export their political model to them.

Bibliography:

·       Arnold Wolfers, and Universal Digital Library. Discord and Collaboration Essays on International Politics. Internet Archive. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. https://archive.org/details/discordandcollab012923mbp.

·       Byrne, Malcolm. “Iran and the United States in the Cold War | Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History.” Gilderlehrman.org, 2025. https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/essays/iran-and-united-states-cold-war.

·       Citino, Nathan J. “The Middle East and the Cold War.” Cold War History 19, no. 3 (April 8, 2019): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2019.1576677.

·       Dawisha, Karen . “Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt.” Google Books, 2016. https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Soviet_Foreign_Policy_Towards_Egypt.html?id=SLhpAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y.

·       Explaining History Podcast. “The Iranian Revolution and the Cold War: The Unraveling of a Client State and the Birth of a Revisionist Power,” September 5, 2025. https://explaininghistory.org/2025/09/05/the-iranian-revolution-and-the-cold-war-the-unraveling-of-a-client-state-and-the-birth-of-a-revisionist-power/.

·       Fawcett, Louise. “Introduction: The Middle East and International Relations.” Oxford University Press EBooks, March 8, 2019, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198809425.003.0019.

·       Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16, no. 16 (1989): 3–18. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184.

·       Gaddis, John Lewis. “The Cold War: A New History.” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 187. https://doi.org/10.2307/20031922.

·       Halliday, Fred. “The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology.” Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, March 1, 2014, 167–72. https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.553378.

·       Hudson, Michael C. “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East.” ; Washington 50, no. 3 (1996): 329. https://www.proquest.com/docview/218490709/BDFD13AA237147BAPQ/1?accountid=11862&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals.

·       Justin. D. “Arab-Israeli Conflict | EBSCO.” EBSCO Information Services, Inc. | www.ebsco.com, 2025. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/military-history-and-science/arab-israeli-conflict.

·       KARSH, EFRAIM. “Cold War, Post-Cold War: Does It Make a Difference for the Middle East?” Review of International Studies 23, no. 3 (July 1997): 271–91. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210597002714.

·       KEDDIE, NIKKI R. “The End of the Cold War and the Middle East.” Diplomatic History 16, no. 1 (1992): 95–103. https://doi.org/10.2307/24912179.

·       Keddie, Nikki. R. “Modern Iran.” Google Books, 2025. https://books.google.com/books/about/Modern_Iran.html?id=DgHhdALiAxIC.

·       Mamadi, Emmanuel. “The Impact of the Cold War on the Middle East.” Arcadia, May 24, 2022. https://www.byarcadia.org/post/the-impact-of-the-cold-war-on-the-middle-east.

·       Rashid Khalidi. “The Superpowers and the Cold War in the Middle East.” Routledge EBooks, October 3, 2018, 157–74. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429492778-11.

·       Slater, Jerome. “The Superpowers and an Arab-Israeli Political Settlement: The Cold War Years.” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 4 (1990): 557. https://doi.org/10.2307/2150935.

·       The Economist. “A Short History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” October 18, 2023. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/10/18/a-short-history-of-the-arab-israeli-conflict.

·       Wolfe, Lisa Reynolds. “The Middle East in Context: A Cold War Timeline | Cold War.” Cold War | Events, Entertainment, and Espionage, March 28, 2024. https://coldwarstudies.com/2024/03/28/the-middle-east-in-context-a-cold-war-timeline/.

·       Yazīd Ṣāyigh, and Avi Shlaim. The Cold War and the Middle East. Oxford University Press, 1997.

Footnotes:

[1] NIKKI R KEDDIE, “The End of the Cold War and the Middle East,” Diplomatic History 16, no. 1 (1992): 95–103, https://doi.org/10.2307/24912179.

[2] EFRAIM KARSH, “Cold War, Post-Cold War: Does It Make a Difference for the Middle East?,” Review of International Studies 23, no. 3 (July 1997): p291, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210597002714.

[3] Fred Halliday, “The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology,” Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, March 1, 2014, 167–72, https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.553378.

[4] Michael C Hudson, “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East,” ; Washington 50, no. 3 (1996): 329, https://www.proquest.com/docview/218490709/BDFD13AA237147BAPQ/1?accountid=11862&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Karen Dawisha, “Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt,” Google Books, 2016, https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Soviet_Foreign_Policy_Towards_Egypt.html?id=SLhpAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Arnold Wolfers and Universal Digital Library, Discord and Collaboration Essays on International Politics, Internet Archive (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), https://archive.org/details/discordandcollab012923mbp.

[9] John Lewis Gaddis, “The Cold War: A New History,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 187, https://doi.org/10.2307/20031922.

[10] Nikki. R Keddie, “Modern Iran,” Google Books, 2025, https://books.google.com/books/about/Modern_Iran.html?id=DgHhdALiAxIC.

[11] “A Short History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” The Economist, October 18, 2023, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/10/18/a-short-history-of-the-arab-israeli-conflict.

[12] Justin. D, “Arab-Israeli Conflict | EBSCO,” EBSCO Information Services, Inc. | www.ebsco.com, 2025, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/military-history-and-science/arab-israeli-conflict.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] KARSH, “Cold War, Post-Cold War: Does It Make a Difference for the Middle East?,” 1997: 271–91

[17] Justin, , “Arab-Israeli Conflict | EBSCO,” 2025

[18] KARSH, “Cold War, Post-Cold War: Does It Make a Difference for the Middle East?,” 1997: 274

[19] “The Iranian Revolution and the Cold War: The Unraveling of a Client State and the Birth of a Revisionist Power,” Explaining History Podcast, September 5, 2025, https://explaininghistory.org/2025/09/05/the-iranian-revolution-and-the-cold-war-the-unraveling-of-a-client-state-and-the-birth-of-a-revisionist-power/.

[20] Malcolm Byrne, “Iran and the United States in the Cold War | Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History,” Gilderlehrman.org, 2025, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/essays/iran-and-united-states-cold-war.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] “The Iranian Revolution and the Cold War: The Unraveling of a Client State and the Birth of a Revisionist Power,” 2025

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] KARSH, “Cold War, Post-Cold War: Does It Make a Difference for the Middle East?,” 1997: 271–91

[27] Ibid.