Pridi, the Monarchy, and his Enlightenment Values

            Pridi Banomyong’s relationship with the Thai monarchy is an interesting one as he originally headed the 1932 Siamese Revolution that ended absolutism and yet later came to represent the monarch as Regent. This essay will provide an overview of this relationship focused on three key stages of Pridi’s political career, represented by his three personas: the Revolutionary, the Regent, and the Prime Minister. As will be demonstrated, Pridi’s relationship with the monarchy was one of pragmatism. He was primarily concerned with achieving democracy and equality, among other Enlightenment values, hence why, although having led a ‘revolution’ against the monarchy, he eventually turned the institution into a tool against military dictatorship once that had become an obstacle to his Enlightenment goals.

            Pridi Banomyong was unique amongst Thai intellectuals of his time since he was part of the few who had been educated in France instead of England, and this French influence permeates throughout his political life. As Nakharin Mektrairat highlights, Pridi believed there were three natural ‘rights and duties’ all people have: Freedom, Equality, and Mutual Assistance; this undoubtably mirrors the French notion of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.[1] Furthermore, Nakharin demonstrates how Pridi’s emphasis on ‘rights’ and ‘freedom’ placed him at odds with the traditional political establishment that placed emphasis on ‘duty’.[2] More evidence of this can be found the lectures he gave later in life, particularly his 1973 lecture What should the future of Thailand be like?, in which he expressed that ‘society was upheld by the people’ and that ‘[it] will progress in towards any form, depending on the actions of people.’[3] This arguably is reflective of French Enlightenment ideas revolving around notions of ‘people power’. Although certainly, there is room to argue that he was also influenced by Chinese and Russian revolutionaries, evident in the wording of his provisional constitution,[4] Pridi was most influenced by and driven by French Enlightenment values.

            Viewing it idealistically, it was these Enlightenment values that drove Pridi’s role as the Revolutionary and it was in this role that he was hostile towards the monarchy since it was the primary obstacle to realizing his Enlightenment goals. The most drastic example of this hostility is evident in the Announcement of the People’s Party which was largely authored by Pridi. In it, not only does he denounce the monarchy for ‘sucking blood’ from the people and King Prajadhipok directly for ‘[governing] without principle’, Pridi threatens to turn Siam into a republic if Prajadhipok did not accept the demands for a constitutional monarchy.[5] Although this certainly displays Pridi’s hostilities towards the monarchy, the fact that it was a threat instead of the goal is interesting, the fact that he was willing to keep the monarchy if it conceded to a constitution arguably demonstrates that Pridi was primarily concerned with realising his Enlightenment values instead of attacking the monarchy. He was not hostile to the monarchy for the sake of it, but hostile because its absolutism was an obstacle to achieving liberty and equality for all.

            Pridi’s provisional constitution, of course, is another display of his hostility towards the monarchy during this period. It stripped the monarchy of much of its power, practically crippling the institution into submission to the People’s Committee and the National Assembly since almost all of the King’s abilities required the advice or permission of the two bodies. Section 5 allows the People’s Committee to ‘exercise act in his stead’ in the event that the King is unable, in effect turning the committee into the Regency;[6] Section 6 gives the power to prosecute the King to the National Assembly;[7] and Section 7 outright states ‘any action of the King must be signed by a member of the People’s Committee. It is only with the consent of the People’s Committee will it be valid, otherwise it is void.’[8] Even the private matter of succession now had to seek Assembly approval.[9] Regarding legislation, the King had the right to send back legislation to the Assembly for ‘reconsideration’, however, if it voted to pass it again, the legislation would come into law regardless; this practically meant the King had no real power in effecting legislation.[10] As has been highlighted before, all of the King’s powers were counterbalanced by government approval;[11] it is this counterbalancing and stripping of independence from the monarchy that also demonstrates Pridi’s hostilities towards the monarchy. However, again, although these counterbalances to the King’s power is hostile, it is arguable that it was influenced more by Pridi’s desire to achieve Enlightenment-style equality than a personal hatred towards the monarchy, after all, all of the King’s powers were now handed to bodies that were meant to represent the people.

            However, this submissive structure did not last as by December, Pridi’s radical constitution was replaced by a much more conservative one, written up by a majority English-educated drafting committee, which gave the monarch much of its power back; watering down some of Pridi’s Enlightenment ideals. Some of these powers included, but were not limited to: Section 10 which allowed the king to, once again, appoint a regent himself (unless unable to in which one would be elected by Parliament);[12] Section 55 gave back the king’s ability to grant pardons;[13] and Section 53 which allowed the king to declare martial law.[14] Most representative of the change in power dynamic between the king and representatives, however, was Section 3 which held the king ‘in a revered position’ which could not be ‘violated’,[15] hence the assembly no longer had the right to prosecute the king. Evidently, the king was now on equal grounds, if not at an advantage, with the representatives. On top of this, even though he was on the drafting committee, Pridi’s Enlightenment values were further neutered by the framing of the constitution. As Eugenie Mérieau argues, the December constitution, being a ‘“copy-and-paste” version of the Japanese imperial constitution’, highlighted at length the fact that the King had granted the people this constitution which in turn emphasised the continuity of monarchic power and completely erased the 1932 ‘Revolution’.[16] Mérieau further argues that in contrast to Pridi’s provisional constitution, which gave both the ownership and the exercise of sovereignty to the people, the December constitution only gave, in full, the exercise of sovereignty meanwhile its ownership was still majority owned by the monarchy.[17] The fact that such rights were now granted by the monarch, who occupied as ‘revered’ and inviolable position, is clearly contradictory to the Enlightenment idea of natural rights that Pridi subscribed to.

            Although the watering-down of Pridi’s ideals in the December constitution likely fuelled the continuation of his hostility towards the monarchy, it is interesting to consider his attitude towards the issue of a royal oath. As Mérieau also discuss, there was a debate over if the King should be constitutionally required to swear an oath to uphold the constitution, and interestingly Pridi believed it unnecessarily since he had considered it a ‘constitutional convention.’[18] It is certainly strange that Pridi, a lawyer himself and a someone who believed all were under the rule of law, did not wish to have the oath codified and instead trusting the convention, however, the fact that he did trust the monarch to uphold the constitution on convention perhaps points to an easing of hostilities even at this early stage.

            Following Prajadhipok’s abdication and the succession of King Ananda in 1935 up to the end of the Second World War, the monarchy faded into the political background simply because it was situated in Switzerland, however, that is not to say Pridi’s relationship with the monarchy did not continue to develop. It is during this time, when he became the Regent in 1941, that Pridi’s relationship with the monarch took a practical turn as he began to use his role as representative of the throne against F.M. Phibunsongkram which he saw as the new obstacle to his Enlightenment goals. By the early 1940s, Pridi and Phibun’s relationship soured as the latter became increasingly dictatorial and allied his government with Imperial Japan; the latter act was particularly impactful as Pridi saw it as a violation of the independence and liberty of the Thai people,[19] and although Phibun had moved Pridi to the position of regent to pacify him, it arguably enhanced his ability to undermine him.

            The first example of this is demonstrated by his actions in February 1943 where, in efforts to test the loyalty of his political peers as Peera Charoenvattananukul argues,[20] Phibun sent a feigned letter of resignation to the Regency which was then signed by Pridi since it was ‘correct according to the constitution.’[21] Furious that his resignation was not only accepted but also announced, Phibun ordered both regents, the other being Phraongchao Athit, to meet him, however, Pridi refused to go. As Pridi explained later,

            I refused to go on grounds that I held the position of representative of the king who was the commander in chief (chom thap) according to the constitution. If I reported myself in submission to the supreme commander, it would be equivalent to reducing the royal authority of the king below that of the supreme commander.[22]

Clearly, Pridi was willing to use the monarchy as a tool to undermine Phibun through his position as representative of the throne.

            A more direct use of the monarchy appears at the end of the war in October 1945 after Phibun had been ousted from power. Pridi sent a telegram requesting Ananda to return as it was ‘highly desirable’ that the King return to personally participate in tackling ‘questions of fundamental importance’ regarding the constitution.[23] In 1941, prior to Thailand’s entry in to the war, Phibun had extended the 10-year period of ‘guided democracy’ indefinitely which has been widely viewed as a means of maintaining his power; Pridi, being driven by Enlightenment notions of liberty and equality, naturally sought to reverse this.[24] It is interesting that Pridi wished to call back the King despite his position as, by now sole regent, which arguably afforded him the authority of the King even if he was not present; it can perhaps be argued that Pridi still saw the traditional practicality of having the King himself and hoped to use it to change the constitution as a means of reaching his vision of an Enlightened Thailand.

            Evidently, these two examples clearly demonstrate that Pridi’s relationship with the monarchy was not as hostile as some may believe. The fact that he was willing to use the monarchy as a practical tool to undermine the increasingly dictatorial Phibun clearly demonstrates that his earlier hostilities towards the monarch was not driven by a personal distain for the institution but because, like Phibun during the Second World War, it was obstructing Pridi’s vision of an Enlightened nation. Since by the war ends the monarchy had arguably been pacified politically, it is arguable that Pridi was more natural towards the institution because was not only no longer an obstacle but also a practical tool.

            Pridi entered his final role as the Prime Minister following the return of Ananda in 1946, this marks the last stage of development in his relationship with the monarchy which took a turn for the worse. On paper, Pridi and the monarchy’s relationship seemed to continue positively since, as Bruce Lockhart has highlighted, Pridi’s 1946 constitution ‘[gave] the ruler the power to “issue Royal Decrees not conflicting with the law” (Section 78), which would in theory enable him to promulgate some kinds of legislation without requiring the government’s countersignature… [and] did not contain a ban on princes’ involvement in politics’ meanwhile also establishing a bicameral parliament in accordance to Pridi’s 1932 provisional constitution.[25] Furthermore, the constitution’s preamble states that ‘His Majesty the King [Prajadhipok] graciously granted a temporary constitution on June 13^th 1932’[26], seemingly suggesting that Pridi has come to accept the royalist framing of constitutional power; that said, the preamble also highlights the wisdom of the people which had finally been recognized by the King, stating ‘After his majesty carefully considered the process, his majesty saw that his people were endowed with wisdom in governing the country and were able to promote their country to progress towards universal civilization safely.’[27] This evidently aligns with Pridi’s Enlightenment notions of people’s power and them being the force that dictates society. Seemingly, according to the constitution, Pridi was willing to hand some power back to the monarchy following the establishment of a representative body and even accepted, partially, the royalist narrative of constitutional power; this arguably demonstrates that his hostilities towards the monarchy continued to lift, if not yet completely gone.

            However, this positive development did not last as the relationship was soon to be shaken by Thailand’s most mysterious tragedy, the death of Ananda. That said, the royalist scholar Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian has argued that tensions between the monarchy and Pridi arose before Ananda’s death in 1946 over the issue of regency which allegedly involved Pridi ‘pressuring’ the King into appointed a regency ‘subservient’ to Pridi’s factions.[28] True or not, Pridi’s relationship with the monarchy was to terminate anyway following Ananda’s death as, although there were many theories over the event, the royalists accused Pridi of being the mastermind, if not perpetrator, behind the death.[29] If this were true then clearly Pridi’s relationship with the monarchy was indeed one of personal hostility, however, it was unlikely that Pridi had any involvement in the death considering he had little motive. As Lockhart argues, there was no ideological or factional difference between Ananda and his brother Bhumibol;[30] arguably, Bhumibol actually proved to reject Pridi’s Enlightenment values as evident in his later disillusionment with liberal democracy and preference for ‘Thai-style’ democracy. Combine this with the fact that Pridi ‘was in noticeable haste to move on with the royal succession’, which some saw as a means of moving attention away from the death,[31] arguably lends further credence to the argument that he was trying to help the monarchy, either genuinely or practically. If the former is true then it is evidence that Pridi had come to respect the monarchy; if the latter is true (which is more likely) then it is evidence that Pridi continued to see the practical side of working with the monarchy. Either way, it is evident that Pridi wished to repair his relationship with the institution.

            Despite his efforts, Pridi Banomyong’s relationship with the monarchy never recovered after Ananda’s death and it marked an end to the relationship. He resigned as Prime Minister two months after the tragedy, before having to go into exile after Phibun returned to power in a coup. As this essay has demonstrated, Pridi’s relationship with the monarchy was not one of personal distain, but instead one of practicality. Pridi was first and foremost concerned with achieving his vision of a democratic and equal Thailand, which were inspired by French Enlightenment values which he was likely exposed to during his time in France. Early on during his role as the Revolutionary, Pridi was hostile towards the monarchy not because he had a personal distain for the institution but because it was the primary obstacle in reaching Pridi’s desired vision of the country. This becomes more apparent when analysing Pridi’s time as the Regent where the monarchy became a tool for him to undermine Phibun whom he saw as the new obstacle to his Enlightenment values. It is unclear how Pridi’s relationship with the monarchy developed during his time as the Prime Minister as not only are there contradicting reports, but King Ananda’s death derailed it completely. On paper, the relationship seemed to develop positively, however, as conservative scholars tend to argue, there are allegations of tensions between Pridi and Ananda. In spite of these contradictions, it is for certain that Ananda’s death completely ruined any form of relationship Pridi had with the monarchy, genuine or practical.

Footnotes

[1] Nakharin Mektrairat, The Siamese Revolution 1932 [การปฏิวัติสยาม พ.ศ. ๒๔๗๕] (Social Science and Humanities Textbook Project, 1992), 144.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Pridi Banomyong, ‘What should the future of Thailand be like?’ [‘อนาคตของประเทศไทยควรดำเนินไปรูปใด’], in Pridi Banomyong and Thai Society [ปรีดี พนมยงด์ กับสังคมไทย] (The Pridi Banomyong Foundation [hereafter.  PBF], 1983), 73

[4] Eugenie Mérieau, ‘The 1932 Compromise Constitution: Matrix of Thailand’s Permanent Constitutional Instability’, in Constitutional Foundings in Southeast Asia, (eds) Kevin Y.L. Tan & Ngoc Son Bui (Bloomsbury, 2020), 308.

[5] Pridi Banomyong, ‘Announcement of the People’s Party No.1’ in Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, (eds.) Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit (PBF, 2000), 70-72. [Trans. Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit]

[6] The Provisional Constitution of Siam (1932) [พระราชบัญญัติธรรมนูญการปกครองแผ่นดินสยามชั่วคราว พุทธศักราช ๒๔๗๕], Art. 2, Sect. 5, Cl. 3. [Trans. Author]

[7] Ibid, Sect. 6.

[8] Ibid, Sect. 7. [Trans. Author]

[9] Ibid, Sect. 4.

[10] Ibid, Art. 3, Sect. 8, Cl. 4. [Trans. Author]

[11] Bruce M. Lockhart, Monarchy in Siam and Vietnam, 1925-1946 (PhD, Cornell University, 1990), 312.

[12] The Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam (1932) [รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรสยาม], Art. 1, Sect. 10

[13] Ibid, Art. 4, Sect. 55

[14] Ibid, Art. 4, Sect. 53

[15] Ibid, Art. 1, Sect. 3

[16] Mérieau, ‘The 1932 Compromise Constitution’, 309; 312.

[17] Ibid, 312

[18] Ibid, 313

[19] Pridi Banomyong, ‘Establishment of the Anti-Japanese Resistance Movement and Seri Thai’ in Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, (eds.) Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit (PBF, 2000), 198. [Trans. Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit]

[20] Peera Chareonvattananukul, ‘Feigned resignation as political strategy: cracking the mysterious case of Phibunsongkram’s reversal of resignation in 1943’, South East Asia Research 29, 3 (2021), 329.

[21] Pridi Banomyong, ‘What Happened in the Regency’ in Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, (eds.) Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit (PBF, 2000), 220.

[22] Ibid, 221.

[23] Quoted from Lockhart, Monarchy in Siam and Vietnam, 455.

[24] Conservative scholars, namely Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, have argued that Pridi also supported this act. See Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, ‘Thai Wartime Leadership Reconsidered: Phibun and Pridi’, Jounral of Southeast Asian Studies 27, 1 (1996), 167.

[25] Lockhart, Monarchy in Siam and Vietnam, 548.

[26] The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (1946) [รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย], Preamble. [Trans. Author]

[27] Ibid. [Trans. Author]

[28] Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Kings, Country and Constitutions: Thailand’s Political Development 1932-2000 (Routledge, 2003), 120.

[29] Pridi Banomyong, ‘Excerpts From: My Chequered Life and My Twenty-One Years of Exile in People’s China’ in Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, (eds.) Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit (PBF, 2000), 263.

[30] Lockhart, Monarchy in Siam and Vietnam, 550-1.

[31] Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Love and Death of King Ananda Mahidol of Thailand (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 57

Bibliography

Primary:

Banomyong, Pridi, ‘Announcement of the People’s Party No.1’ in Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, (eds.) Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit (The Pridi Banomyong Foundation, 2000), 70-72

Banomyong, Pridi, ‘Establishment of the Anti-Japanese Resistance Movement and Seri Thai’ in Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, (eds.) Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit (The Pridi Banomyong Foundation, 2000), 197-209

Banomyong, Pridi, ‘Excerpts From: My Chequered Life and My Twenty-One Years of Exile in People’s China’ in Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, (eds.) Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit (The Pridi Banomyong Foundation, 2000), 262-276

Banomyong, Pridi, ‘What Happened in the Regency’ in Pridi by Pridi: Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, (eds.) Chris Baker & Pasuk Phongpaichit (The Pridi Banomyong Foundation, 2000), 210-230

Banomyong, Pridi, ‘What should the future of Thailand be like?’ [‘อนาคตของประเทศไทยควรดำเนินไปรูปใด’], in Pridi Banomyong and Thai Society [ปรีดี พนมยงด์ กับสังคมไทย] (The Pridi Banomyong Foundation, 1983), 71-79

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam (1932) [รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรสยาม]

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (1946) [รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย]

The Provisional Constitution of Siam (1932) [พระราชบัญญัติธรรมนูญการปกครองแผ่นดินสยามชั่วคราว พุทธศักราช ๒๔๗๕]

Secondary:

Chachavalpongpun, Pavin, Love and Death of King Ananda Mahidol of Thailand (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021)

Chareonvattananukul, Peera, ‘Feigned resignation as political strategy: cracking the mysterious case of Phibunsongkram’s reversal of resignation in 1943’, South East Asia Research 29, 3 (2021), 315-331

Lockhart, Bruce M., Monarchy in Siam and Vietnam, 1925-1946 (PhD, Cornell University, 1990)

Mektrairat, Nakharin, The Siamese Revolution 1932 [การปฏิวัติสยาม พ.ศ. ๒๔๗๕] (Social Science and Humanities Textbook Project, 1992)

Mérieau, Eugenie, ‘The 1932 Compromise Constitution: Matrix of Thailand’s Permanent Constitutional Instability’, in Constitutional Foundings in Southeast Asia, (eds) Kevin Y.L. Tan & Ngoc Son Bui (Bloomsbury, 2020), 297-318

Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua, ‘Thai Wartime Leadership Reconsidered: Phibun and Pridi’, Jounral of Southeast Asian Studies 27, 1 (1996), 166-178

Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua, Kings, Country and Constitutions: Thailand’s Political Development 1932-2000 (Routledge, 2003)