What Were the Most Important Sources of Stability of the Mobutu Regime in the Congo?

Introduction:

Mobutu Sese Seko’s Congo presents an interesting case of authoritarian control. Lasting over thirty years as an almost unopposed ruler, Mobutu deployed multiple aspects of the authoritarian toolkit, namely divide-and-rule, decentralisation of the military, and extensive patrimonialism. However, there is a disconnect between the failure of Mobutu’s policies and the length of his regime’s survival. How did he manage to maintain control of the state even as all his major strategies to manufacture legitimacy and repression should have failed? This essay argues that the root cause of Mobutu’s longevity was the high level of foreign support he enjoyed.

In fully exploring and explaining the nature of Mobutu’s stability, this essay will address four main areas: the kleptocratic tendencies of his regime, ethnic divide-and-rule, military repression, and foreign involvement. When discussing foreign involvement, the essay will emphasise the importance of Belgian and American intervention and support in maintaining Mobutu’s control, as well as the significance of Congo’s position in the wider Cold War. In order to highlight the disconnect between Mobutu’s approach to ruling and normal authoritarian regimes, this essay will compare his actions to a theoretical framework drawing from works by Christian von Soest, Alexander Dukalskis, and others.[[1]][[2]] The goal here is to emphasise the role of foreign support in compensating for the ‘weaknesses’ of Mobutu’s governance style, and ultimately ensuring his longevity.

Kleptocracy:

Dukalskis defines a ‘rentier state’ as an entity that satisfies the needs of the people and renders them passive, relying on rents “mostly from oil and other minerals.”.[[3]] The rentier state deploys what Dukalskis calls a ‘passivity mechanism’, whereby an autocratic regime maintains stability by encouraging apathy amongst the civilian population, in contrast to more politically active authoritarian states.[[4]] Dukalskis’s ‘rentier state’ aligns closely with what Daron Acemoglu calls ‘patrimonial kleptocracy’. In this system, the kleptocrat seeks to reward loyalty with resource wealth, whilst punishing politically active individuals. Acemoglu identifies the kleptocrat’s goal of producing apathy through the exploitation of unstable institutions and weak social cohesion.[[5]] If Mobutu used kleptocracy as a source of stability, we should expect to see him leveraging the resource wealth of the Congo to generate apathy among the population.

Indeed, of all the mechanisms for creating stability, this is a constant, visible facet of Mobutu’s rule. In 1973, Mobutu targeted Belgian-owned assets, redistributing the rights from “small enterprises” into the hands of what he hoped would form a new “petty bourgeoise which would strongly support the regime”.[[6]] Redistribution of wealth to cultivate support was a constant of Mobutu’s regime. As the Harvard International Review reported in 1991, “When government funds arrive in small […] towns, they are rarely transferred to appropriate programs and usually pad the pockets of members of the local bourgeoise”.[[7]] Through the immense resource wealth of the Congo, especially rare earth metals and oil in the Katanga region,[[8]] Mobutu was able to establish a system of bribery that would generate apathy in the nation’s elites. Mobutu himself would divert around 15-20% of the state’s budget, using it for personal expenses and supporting his bribery system.[[9]] It was this kleptocratic environment that created much of the stability of Mobutu’s rule.

Yet, even in one of the most straightforward explanation’s for Mobutu’s stability, foreign aid was still instrumental in ensuring the system’s survival. Acemoglu repeatedly references the importance of foreign aid in propping up kleptocratic regimes. Aid acts as a financial stopgap, allowing economic survival even in a state so corrupt that it would otherwise collapse.[[10]] Belgian actions support this argument; in 1987, the Paris Club rescheduled Zaire’s $884m loan repayment with a six-year grace period, forgiving an estimated $109m of previous debts.[[11]] Therefore, foreign willingness to forgive debt and send fiscal aid was crucial in facilitating persistent economic mismanagement in the Congo, mismanagement that was central to the patrimonial system that secured Mobutu’s regime.

Whilst Mobutu’s kleptocratic system did produce apathy amongst the nation’s elites, stabilising the country against internal threats, the consistent economic mismanagement that resulted from this corruption should have seen the Congo collapse far sooner than it ultimately did. Thus, it was foreign economic support that helped maintain such a system, working in the background to ensure Mobutu’s longevity.

Ethnic Divide-and-Rule:

Postcolonial academics like Pierre Englebert highlight the importance of legitimacy in fledgling states. Englebert argues that legitimacy is directly tied to similarities between pre-colonial and post-colonial makeup (both ethnic and territorial), stating that the action of redrawing borders split apart “long-integrated political cultures.”.[[12]] This fragmentation, he argues, creates enduring structural weaknesses in postcolonial governance, lending itself to central state control under a dictator.[[13]] Thus, the ethnic argument claims that due to the inherent instability of a postcolonial state, a strong authoritarian regime will find it easier to dominate a fractured political landscape.

This domination can take many forms, but in the case of Mobutu it took contradictory paths: the creation of a ‘Zairian’ identity, whilst presiding over an extensive ethnic divide-and-rule state structure. Indeed, the Congo stands on its own as an especially ethnically fragmented state. Englebert calls it a “highly artificial creation,” as the Congo itself is made up of more than 200 different ethnic groups.[[14]][[15]] Due to the extreme ethnic division, there was no single group that could offset the power of Mobutu, leading to greater centralised power.[[16]] Further, Mobutu deployed tactics to ensure division, deliberately hindering the emergence of regional authority bases. He would shuffle officials from region to region, preventing “autonomous power centres from developing”.[[17]] The concentrated effort by Mobutu to ensure divide-and-rule was then supplemented by stacking his closest central governmental positions with members of his “ethnic kin” of the Ngbandi tribe.[[18]] The effect was that, due to previous ethnic division and Mobutu’s constant reshuffling, no true ethnic-based opposition to Mobutu’s regime could appear. Whilst the movements were de-stabilising to the country as a whole, it stabilised Mobutu’s personal control over the Congo.

Thus, divide-and-rule along ethnic grounds was another major way in which Mobutu managed to maintain stability whilst in control of the Congo state. Whilst ensuring immediate support through his own ethnic group in close governmental roles, and keeping a continual rotation of wider offices, Mobutu could be fairly certain that no single group would be able to amass enough power to overthrow him. This was also reinforced by the underlying instability of the Congo, due in part to the ethnic diversity of the country.

Military control:

Mobutu’s display of military control stands as a unique example of authoritarian stability procurement. The regime specifically sought to weaken the armed forces in order to ensure that it would not become a rogue actor. This was achieved through intentional corruption, purges, and another display of divide-and-rule. Once again, the role of foreign military support was crucial to Mobutu’s stability, as he was only able to weaken his own army in this way due to assistance from foreign forces.

The military represents a potential major adversary to the stability of authoritarian regimes. From 1946 to 2008, 68% of all authoritarian leaders lost power via a coup, the majority of which were facilitated by armed forces.[[19]] Control of the military is essential for the stability of a regime. Sheena Greitens hypothesises that nations which experience internal volatility, as the Congo did, gives actors a greater incentives to perpetrate violence.[[20]] This means that, especially in the Congo, Mobutu faced an unpredictable military force that could undermine his rule significantly.

In order to guarantee his own stability, Mobutu pursued a programme of purposeful corruption and bribery in the military. This system ensured that key actors in the military would remain both placated and also systematically incapable of providing a threat to the regime. Promotions were one way to keep actors on-side, by 1997, the armed forces of the Congo boasted some fifty generals and over six hundred colonels.[[21]] This was then supplemented with divide-and-rule tactics being applied to the military higher-ups. He would give commanders similar assignments and let them confusingly interact with one another; in this way, Mobutu would ensure that he was the only man who could “grasp the whole picture”.[[22]] Additionally, pittance pay to the FAZ also meant that corruption and extortion became a necessity for soldiers and commanders of the regular army to earn a decent wage.[[23]] Through poor pay and divide-and-rule, turning commanders against one another, Mobutu was able to keep the armed forces incredibly weak, not a functional force at all, which meant the genuine threat of a coup was minimal.

However, this purposeful weakening of the army was only possible due to extensive foreign military support. From 1960 to 1968, Mobutu would receive $90-$150 million in US military aid, not counting the aircraft, weapons, and transportation aid that the US further sent.[[24]] Belgium and France also repeatedly intervened in the Congo throughout the late ‘80s and early ‘90s.[[25]] The FAZ was barely able to hold itself together, let alone fight insurgency movements within the country, internal stability was held together predominantly by the presence of foreign troops in the country. Such a presence allowed Mobutu to weaken his own troops to the point that they were no longer a threat to his regime.  

Despite the army already being significantly weakened, Mobutu still employed further techniques to safeguard against potential destabilising military actions. From 1975 onwards he used consistent purges to remove high and middle-ranking officers who may undermine the regime.[[26]] These purges were combined with a “perceived threat” amongst older officers that younger officers were undermining them, leading to greater scrutiny of young officers.[[27]] This perception was something Mobutu actively sought to cultivate. Finally, Mobutu used both mercenaries and foreign-trained armed guards for personal bodyguards, who were paid at far higher rates than the FAZ.[[28]] The usage of purges and personal bodyguards acted as a final layer of protection against coups that helped maintain Mobutu’s control.

The regime’s approach to military control pursued stability through a weakening of the FAZ’s ability to function as an effective fighting force. Whilst this certainly lessened the chance of them being able to launch a coup against Mobutu, it was also only possible due to wide-ranging foreign military support, both financial and physical. Again, this highlights the key importance of foreign aid in maintaining Mobutu’s stability and longevity.

Foreign Support:

To truly understand the nature of the stability of Mobutu’s regime, it has to be viewed in the wider context of the Cold War. The Congo was regarded by the US as an essential resource-producing base, with its plentiful oil and uranium deposits; as such they invested significant resources in stabilising Mobutu’s rule. Whilst this has been somewhat explored throughout the essay, this section seeks to identify the extent of foreign support for Mobutu, covering both economic and military aid. By examining Belgian and American support for Mobutu, it can be ascertained that the high level of foreign backing was the key driver in the regime’s stability.

Financially, the CIA provided Mobutu with essential funding that went straight into paying off key officials and tribal chiefs; giving the leader a “carte blanche” to spend however he saw fit.[[29]] Funding wasn’t just limited to bribe money, the Belgians lobbied the US to provide extra subsidies via the European Recovery Program, granting around $16 million that was directly invested into Congolese infrastructure projects.[[30]] Whilst these infrastructure projects were focused entirely on resource extraction and provided little to improve Congolese livelihoods, they did pad the pockets of elites in the Congo with resource wealth, money that would also be used to fund Mobutu’s personal security forces, thereby insulating his regime from internal risks.[[31]] In this way, foreign economic support was essential not only in providing money used to bribe political elites, but also in helping to construct public works that improved Mobutu’s personal economic prospects, enabling him to invest in his security forces and placate political elites.

Politically, the US saw the Congo as a crucial zone of interest due to its uranium deposits. America perceived a Soviet threat to their most important uranium reserve and as such sought to secure Mobutu as a friendly regime that would ensure their continued access to the resource.[[32]] Fears of a Soviet takeover can be seen in the Western efforts to oust Lumumba, who was portrayed as a Soviet-backed asset.[[33]] In safeguarding Mobutu’s control, the CIA undertook their largest ever covert operation (in terms of expenditure) during the Cold War.[[34]] In fact, so great was the US support, that Mobutu “felt no pressure to develop even a minimally capable military.”.[[35]] This insulation from military risk further demonstrates how deeply foreign backing shaped the regimes internal dynamics, all with the goal of stabilising Mobutu.

Perhaps the most obvious marker of the importance of foreign support in Mobutu’s regime was the fact that his control of the Congo fractured almost immediately after the withdrawal of US support at the end of the Cold War.[[36]] Whilst overreliance on foreign aid undoubtedly led to the fall of Mobutu after the end of the Cold War, the argument that foreign backing was the main stabilising force behind his rule is convincing. Due to a mixture of Belgian post-colonial ties and American resource interests, Mobutu enjoyed some of the highest levels of foreign support in the world, let alone Africa, contributing significantly to his longevity.

Conclusion:

Mobutu Sese Seko came to power in a CIA-supported coup and lost control of the nation in 1997, shortly after the US pulled support.[[37]] In explaining how Mobutu maintained control for over thirty years, patrimonialism, divide-and-rule, and his weakening of the military all play large component parts. Through an extensive network of bribery and ethnic divide-and-rule, Mobutu was able to generate Dukalskis’s ‘passivity mechanism’, creating a sense of political apathy that ensured his continued control of the Congo.[[38]] Further, Mobutu crippled the FAZ so that it could not undermine his rule; offering promotions to officers to placate them, whilst tacitly permitting nation-wide looting as a stand-in for missing salaries.[[39]] This succeeded in reducing the FAZ’s organisational capabilities to the point that it could not weaken his political influence, or do much of anything at all. 

However, this gross economic and military mismanagement was facilitated by foreign support. Mobutu was provided with economic support, freeing up funds that went directly into the pockets of local elites. The very poor record of the FAZ was only possible due to multiple cases of Belgian, French, and American military interventions to maintain Mobutu’s control.[[40]] Therefore, the essay argues that foreign support was the most important source of stability for Mobutu’s regime, functioning as a facilitating force operating behind all his programmes.

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Acemoglu, Daron. “Alfred Marshal Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-And-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule.” Journal of European Economic Association 2, no. 2/3 (2004): 162–92.

Adelman, Kenneth. “Zaïre’s Year of Crisis.” African Affairs 77, no. 306 (January 1978): 36–44.

Christopher, A J. “Divide and Rule: The Impress of British Separation Policies.” Royal Geographic Society 20, no. 3 (1988): 233–40.

Dukalskis, Alexander, and Johannes Gerschewski. “What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation.” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 251–68.

Englebert, Pierre. “Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa.” Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2000): 7–36.

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Iandolo, Alessandro. “Imbalance of Power.” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 2 (2014): 32–55.

Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi. “Zaire’s Ties to Belgium: Persistence and Future Prospects in Political Economy.” Africa Today 39, no. 3 (1992): 23–48.

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Soest, Christian von. “Identity, Procedures and Performance: How Authoritarian Regimes Legitimize Their Rule.” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 287–305.

Weissman, Stephen. “What Really Happened in the Congo.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (2014): 14–24.

Willame, Jean-Claude. “Political Succession in Zaïre, or back to Machiavelli.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 26, no. 1 (1988): 37–49.

Wrong, Michela. “The Emperor Mobutu.” Transition 1, no. 81/82 (2000): 92–112.

Footnotes:

[1] Soest, Christian von. “Identity, Procedures and Performance: How Authoritarian Regimes Legitimize Their Rule.” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 287–305.

[2] Dukalskis, Alexander, and Johannes Gerschewski. “What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation.” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 251–68.

[3] Dukalskis. “What Autocracies Say”. p.256.

[4] Ibid. p.259.

[5] Acemoglu, Daron. “Alfred Marshal Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-And-Rule.” Journal of European Economic Association 2, no. 2/3 (2004). p.164.

[6] Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, “Zaire’s Ties to Belgium,” Africa Today 39, no. 3 (1992): p.41.

[7] Jacob Hacker, “Zaire: The Political Economy of Despotism, Debt, and Decline,” Harvard International Review, 1991. p.53.

[8] Ibid. p.52.

[9] Acemoglu, Daron. “Alfred Marshal Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-And-Rule.”. p.171

[10] Ibid. p.166

[11] Lumumba-Kasongo, “Zaire’s Ties to Belgium,”. p.44

[12] Pierre Englebert, “Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development,” Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2000): p.11-2.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid. p.13.

[15] Ntsomo Payanzo and Bernd Michael Wiese, “Democratic Republic of the Congo - People,” in Encyclopædia Britannica, January 24, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/People.

[16] Acemoglu. “Alfred Marshal Lecture.” p.171.

[17] David J Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire (Pergamon Press, 1980). p.83.

[18] Michela Wrong, “The Emperor Mobutu,” Transition 1, no. 81/82 (2000): p.99.

[19] Sheena Greitens, Dictators and Their Secret Police (Cambridge University Press, 2016). p.23.

[20] Ibid. p.5.

[21] Wrong, “The Emperor Mobutu,”. p.100.

[22] Ibid. p.99-100.

[23] Ibid. p.100.

[24] Stephen Weissman, “What Really Happened in the Congo,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (2014): p.15.

[25] Wrong, “The Emperor Mobutu,”. p.104.

[26] Jean-Claude Willame, “Political Succession in Zaïre, or back to Machiavelli,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 26, no. 1 (1988): p.44.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Wrong, “The Emperor Mobutu,”. p.100.

[29] Weissman, “What Really Happened in the Congo,”. p20.

[30] Anne-Sophie Gijs, “Fighting the Red Peril in the Congo,” Cold War History 16, no. 3 (2016): p.278.

[31] Ibid. p276-7.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Alessandro Iandolo, “Imbalance of Power,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 2 (2014): p36-40.

[34] Weissman. p15.

[35] Ibid. p21.

[36] Ibid. p22.

[37] Weissman. p16.

[38] Dukalskis. p.259.

[39] Wrong, p.101.

[40] Weissman. p15-6.