Was the End of Apartheid in 1994 Inevitable?

When South Africa held its first democratic elections on the 27^th April 1994 and Nelson Mandela was voted in as president, it signalled the end of Apartheid. It began in 1948 and involved a system of racial segregation and discrimination which gave all social, political and economic power to the white minority in the country. Post-WW2 the National party promised to ‘protect’ Afrikaner culture, expanding segregation laws which had been in place since European colonisation in the mid-17^th century, centralising the white minority within the state apparatus. From the introduction of Apartheid, further acts were introduced, such as the Population Registration Act (1950), Group Areas Act (1950) and Pass Laws, all designed to further restrict the rights of black South Africans and perpetuate segregation. When protest followed against these malfeasances, they were met with brutal police violence, highlighted by the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 which saw the deaths of 69 peaceful protesters, leading in turn to resistance groups like the ANC and PAC being banned and their leaders imprisoned, including Nelson Mandela in 1962. This trend of repression would continue into the next decade, with the 1976 Soweto uprising another climax of violence as 175 people were massacred and thousands injured after student protests against Apartheid. With the brutality of the state in constant limelight, by the 1980s public pressure aboard intensified, alongside the backdrop of the end of the Cold War and process of decolonisation within Southern Africa. A complex blend of key factors, this essay will evaluate them in relation to the inevitability of the fall of Apartheid by 1994. While Apartheid was ultimately unsustainable, its end by 1994 was inevitable, only due to the convergence of internal resistance, international pressure, and individual leadership.

One factor that had a drastic effect on the fall of Apartheid were external pressures; Apartheid existed during the Cold War which allowed its continuation, as the US looked for regional stalwarts against communism. Thus, the US turned to the white minority government in South Africa, turning a blind eye to the discrimination occurring internally in South Africa; this helped to prolong Apartheid as the National party used the fear cultivated by the apparent threat of communism to retain political support. However, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s signalled a change; for one, the collapse of the USSR under Gorbachev removed the National party’s primary justification for minority rule, outlined as defending Southern Africa from the ‘total onslaught’ of Soviet-backed communism[[1]]. Alongside this, with the communist threat diminished, de Klerk could justify reform as a safer course of action; this ‘eased Pretoria’s phobia’ that the Black-South African struggle was a Moscow-directed conspiracy[[2]]. The end of the Cold War ultimately acted as a major catalyst for undermining Apartheid from the outside, as South Africa could no longer justify its continuation on the grounds of anti-communism. This disintegration was further seen with Pretoria’s relationship with the Bush administration; with the US now operating as the global hegemonic power, de Klerk was given an ‘unwritten understanding’ that he had until early 1990 to unban the ANC and release political prisoners or face more veto-proof sanctions from US congress[[3]]. Alongside other fiscal measures imposed by the World Bank and IMF which had banned borrowing until an interim government was established[[4]], South Africa was becoming increasingly economically isolated, helped in part by the loss of other white minority allies in Southern Africa like Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique. This was further lambasted by regional military setbacks, such as the 1988 defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola, as well as the loss of Namibia with the New York Accords, further eroding the tenability of Apartheid. This dissuaded hard-line securocrats that military power projection would be successful in Southern Africa and pushed power within the cabinet more towards diplomatists who were willing to negotiate with black-led political entities[[5]]. However, it is arguable that external pressures alone would not have collapsed Apartheid by 1994; Guelke posits that while external factors were important, democratic breakthroughs were not guaranteed[[6]]; even with setbacks, South Africa’s military capability remained steadfast at home, allowing the state to potentially continue a path of ‘defiance and repression.[[7]]’ Therefore, while external pressures made Apartheid increasingly untenable, they did not make its collapse in 1994 inevitable without complementary internal and political factors.

The role of political leaders is another extremely pertinent factor that can be evaluated regarding whether the collapse of Apartheid was inevitable in 1994. Firstly, the role of F.W. de Klerk is indispensable; originally a hardliner in the National party, he soon realised Apartheid was at a ‘dead end[[8]]’ due to the political unrest in South Africa during the 1980s. Seeing the risk of mass uprising growing day by day, de Klerk chose to initiate change before he was forced to, in order to allow the government to retain some control over the transition. Thus, his great gamble with the negotiated settlement in February 1990 to unban the ANC and release Mandela would be momentous in ending Apartheid, as it signalled a new willingness to cooperate[[9]]. Although this risked hardliner Afrikaner backlash, de Klerk had a strategic realisation that the system was a ‘doomed road[[10]].’ The inevitability of Apartheid ending in 1994 was thus amplified by de Klerk, especially via his proposed whites-only referendum in 1992 which resulted in 2/3 of the white minority in South Africa approving the reform process and creation of frameworks for democracy[[11]]. However, the role of de Klerk here did not necessarily mean the sudden end of Apartheid; for one, he viewed the reforms as pragmatism rather than a moral manoeuvre, and whilst president struggled to control the ‘securocrats’ in the police and military who continued to stoke political violence[[12]].  Although he did see change as the only option, Sparks further argues that the 1994 outcome was more a result of miscalculation by de Klerk, as it led to the ANC negotiating from a position of dominance which accelerated the process[[13]]. On the other side of the negotiating table, the role of Nelson Mandela is also of paramount importance to whether ending Apartheid was inevitable in 1994. A key figure within the ANC, the largest anti-Apartheid insurgent group, his release from prison signalled a pivotal moment, as Mandela was the most skilled negotiator within the anti-Apartheid movement and soon became its de facto leader. As a voice of moderation, he was able to transform the expressions of protest into a unified political entity, strengthening the legitimacy of the cause, even as he was continually labelled as a sell-out by radical factions of the ANC and SACP during the transition[[14]]. Alongside this, Mandela’s ability to keep self-control and restraint when negotiating over Apartheid was crucial in gaining a settlement, as South Africa remained on the precipice of civil war which any un-measured statement could have thrown the country into. Thus, both leaders’ cooperative transformational leadership was crucial for ending Apartheid; without them South Africa likely would have spiralled into a deeper hole of violence. Nevertheless, 20,000 people would die between 1985 and 1995 during the transition[[15]], including the assassination of Chris Hani and the Boipatong massacre, but de Klerk and Mandela were still able to deter all-out war; without the role of the leaders alongside other intrinsic factors, Apartheid would not have ended by 1994, or at least in the same fashion.

Perhaps the most important factor in whether the end of Apartheid was inevitable in 1994 was the internal situation in South Africa during the 1980s and early 90s. With the introduction of a racial-capitalist system, the white minority relied on the labour of the black majority to prop up the economy, especially in large sectors of mining and agriculture. However, although the existence of the dual state had helped to strengthen Apartheid, it was undermined through this dependence on the black majority who had turned to civil disobedience after anti-Apartheid groups had been banned and their leaders arrested in the 1960s. Real GDP growth dropped from 4.9% (1946-74) to just 1.5% in the 1980s[[16]], due to a labour crisis caused directly by the Apartheid structures, as not enough workers were given access to education and training needed for a post-war industrialised economy. By the late 1980s, even the white business elite were becoming disillusioned by Apartheid, recognising the need for universal suffrage and black-led trade unions to stop the economy from grinding to a halt[[17]]. However, although economic problems represented a grave danger to the white minority government, that alone would have been unlikely to topple the Apartheid regime, who had been used to operating as an economic pariah on the global stage for many years, due to international sanctions. Thus, it was the crisis of governability instead that explains why Apartheid collapsed in 1994, sparked in 1976 with the Soweto uprising which saw 176 school children killed by South African police[[18]]. Seeing no other alternative and facing a climax of brutality, black South Africans turned to civic associations and street committees, such as the UDF in 1983, to replace the white administrative grip over local townships. Alongside the creation of black trade unions such as COSATU in 1985 which provided further political resistance, as well as rent and consumer boycotts, massive political pressure was put on the national government. For the white minority government, with the cost of internal security rising exponentially, they soon reached a ‘dead end,’ and P.W. Botha’s ‘total strategy’ to combine limited political reform with high levels of political repression was too little, too late[[19]]. By the late 1980s, the white minority government was in a nationwide state of emergency, with the only pragmatic solution to negotiate. Although Apartheid may have lingered if the military bloc of the National party remained in control, the sheer weight of resistance, industrial walk-outs and strikes sealed its fate by the end by the early 1990s, in tandem with the introduction of the negotiated settlement under de Klerk. However, whilst the internal crisis of governability brought both sides of Apartheid to the negotiating table, the peaceful resolution of 1994 was not predetermined as a standalone factor and required tact negotiating and international pressure to see it over the line.

Mandela’s ascension to power in 1994 signified the total collapse of Apartheid. Without the multitude of factors that have been explored in this essay, it was unlikely Apartheid would have ended in the early 1990s, or not at least without a bloody civil war. The end of the Cold War dissipated all of Pretoria’s ‘justifications’ for stopping the red wave of communism, and led to the complete loss of western support, even by sympathetic leaders like Reagan and Thatcher. Alongside this, when negotiations finally commenced, the roles of Mandela and de Klerk stopped the precipitation of civil war, as well as ensuing hardliner reaction. However, the most important factor which ended Apartheid by 1994 was the internal situation within South Africa to create a mutual stalemate; through civil unrest, the subsequent crisis of governability forced the white minority government to negotiate, even when groups like the ANC still lacked military capability to take power. Without this sacrifice, Apartheid would not have ended when it did; it needed a social movement. Apartheid’s collapse was inevitable, but its timing and nature were not and depended on a convergence of these factors. It was the combination of mass resistance, international pressure and exceptional leadership that ensured Apartheid ended how, and when it did.

Bibliography

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Footnotes

[1] Onslow, S. (2009). Cold War in Southern Africa. Routledge.

[2] Guelke, A. (1996). The impact of the end of the cold war on the South African transition. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 14(1), p.93

[3] Daniel, John. “A Response to Guelke: The Cold War Factor in South Africa’s Transition.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 14, no. 1 (January 1996): p.103

[4] Harshe, Rajen. “Understanding Transition towards Post-Apartheid South Africa.” Economic and Political Weekly 28, no. 38 (1993): p.1981.

[5] Daniel, p.103

[6] Guelke, p.94

[7] Crocker, Chester A. “South Africa: Strategy for Change.” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 2 (1980): p.330

[8] Daniel, p.101

[9] Glad, Betty, and Robert Blanton. “F. W. De Klerk and Nelson Mandela: A Study in Cooperative Transformational Leadership.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3 (1997): p.567

[10] Kaufman, Stuart J. Nationalist Passions. Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 2015: p.194

[11] Glad, p.570

[12] Callinicos, Alex. “South Africa: End of Apartheid and After.” Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 36 (1994): p.2358

[13] Guelke, p.93

[14] Glad, p.576

[15] Kaufman, p.176

[16] Callinicos, p.2356

[17] Kaufman, p.190

[18] Callinicos, p.2356

[19] Onslow, p.12