Between East and West, Al Sharaa's Dangerous Diplomatic Game of Equilibrium over the Dust of Damascus
- Gabriel Breil (Staff Writer)
- Dec 1
- 11 min read
On the morning of December 8, 2024, the world woke up in shock and disbelief as the latest news from Damascus arrived. In only eleven days, the rebel jihadist forces of Hayat Tayir al Sham (HTS) successfully concluded their assault on Damascus, forcing Assad to flee towards Moscow. What would become a new international figure, an Islamist under the fighting name of Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, marched on the empty presidential palace as the allied forces were liberating the prisons across the region.
The HTS leader was declared the interim president of Syria, formed a coalition government and dissolved his own movement. In March, they finalized the nomination of a formal government. They declared a new republic in an effort to break away from its painful past, re-adopting the previous flag before the Ba’ath regime and a new emblem: a fourteen-feathered golden eagle representing each of Syria’s provinces.
The now-renamed Ahmed Al-Sharaa assumes the role of interim president of the newborn Republic of Syria and has already done his best to reassure the West, starting with his own image.
Looking westward:
The changes occurred both internally and externally, starting on January 29th, when Hayat Tayir Al Sham was officially dissolved and was integrated into the Syrian forces. It underlines the new leadership's willingness to fully express the end of the conflict while still maintaining control, forging new institutions, creating new ministries, and writing a new constitution. The Syrian leadership perfectly managed to instrumentalize this restart through efficient communication.
Helped by the NGO Inter Mediate, founded by Jonathan Powell ( now the national security advisor of the United Kingdom), the former Jihadist operated an impressive rebranding: from military jackets to donning tailored suits, a shorter beard, and a new presence on social media platforms, everything was done to create a likable image and bring to oblivion its former connection to Al Qaeda.
Some may argue that this rebranding is anecdotal, that it does not change anything about Al-Sharaa’s past. I beg to differ; it was crucial as Syria’s main challenge as it exited its revolutionary war is its need for international recognition after two decades of drastic diplomatic isolation.
It is fair to say that so far, Al-Sharaa has been remarkably efficient in restoring Syria’s status. International recognition came surprisingly quickly; less than a month after his ascent to power, the French and German representatives were formally received in Damascus, still bearing the scars of fourteen years of civil war. Furthermore, to this day, Al-Sharaa has flown to Riyadh and Ankara three times to consolidate new partnerships with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Ankara is the silent winner of Al-Sharaa's ascent to power, after having indirectly supported HTS through its allies.
In May, the interim Syrian president chose to visit Emmanuel Macron in Paris[1] while Assad Hassan Al-Shaibani, his minister of foreign affairs and expatriates (estimated at 6.7 million Syrian citizens)[2], also HTS’s former chief of the department of political affairs, was shaking hands with Yvette Cooper. The two Western democracies and members of the UN Security Council are absolutely resolute to give the new Syrian leadership a chance after their failure 13 years ago to keep Bashar al-Assad from assaulting his own population, even crossing the red lines set by Obama with the use of chemical weapons.
Last May, on the sidelines of the Gulf Cooperation Council summit, Al Sharaa, with the presence of the Saudi Crown Prince, first met Donald Trump; it was the first time in 25 years that the Syrian head of state had met with the President of the United States. From that meeting, Al Sharaa obtained from the POTUS the cessation of sanctions:
"I will be ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance at greatness. The sanctions were brutal and crippling and served as an important — really an important function — nevertheless, at the time. But now it’s their time to shine … So, I say, 'Good luck, Syria.' Show us something very special."[3]
In October, Ahmed Al Sharaa returned to Riyadh, desperately seeking further foreign investments to kickstart the Syrian economy during the Future Investment Initiative, Saudi Arabia’s annual flagship conference. Promoting the new Syria policy designed to attract investments from bankers and foreign funds, seducing skeptics with his economic pragmatism and leaving with the announcement of a total of 28 billion USD investment (a quarter of it being provided by Saudi companies, $2.93 billion for real estate and infrastructure projects and about $1.07 billion for the telecommunications and information technology sector). He left the forum by assuring his intention to "rebuild every stone that has been destroyed” themselves without any international aid.[4] In his speech, he hailed Saudi Arabia as "a supporter of stability, prosperity, and development in Syria”. The shift toward Riyadh is simply spectacular and completely redefines the system of alliances in the Middle East, as Syria drifts away from Iran’s influence to turn its hopes toward its endemic rival in the Middle East.
Iran, alongside Russia, was the main international support, military supplier, and economic partner of the former Ba’ath regime. The loss of such a devoted ally is a tragic blow for the mollah’s regime, which had to witness the fall of Bashar al-Assad, powerlessly [5], and breaking the so-called “ axis of resistance” set by Teheran [6]. As it escaped Iran’s sphere of influence, the new regime has fastened its path towards international recognition. All members of the Security Council have already recognized the new institutions of Syria, and the government has announced that it has renewed diplomatic relations with more than 90 countries around the globe. Embassies are reopening, such as here in London, where the new Syrian flag began to flap in the wind on 8 Belgrave Square in front of a moved crowd of Syrian Londoners.
The most spectacular achievement occurred in September, though, during the 80th United Nations General Assembly, indeed, Al Sharaa became the first Syrian head of state to ever speak formally at the UN tribune in 58 years, despite still being officially named on the UN sanction list of Al Qaeda and ISIL at that time.[7]
Last week, Al Charaa was invited to the White House, where the new Syrian President announced his intention to become the 90th state to join the diplomatic coalition against ISIS.[]In the same spirit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Al Chabini, after a visit to Beijing, issued a joint declaration with his Chinese counterpart, reassuring their will to fight terrorism on a global scale after a hesitant debut with Beijing[9][10].
To conclude, on this now lengthy list of “coup d’éclats” on the diplomatic scene, we may even add the first-ever participation of a Syrian head of state at a COP, a few weeks ago in Belém.
From Washington’s terrorist black list to Trump’s golden Oval Office, this statement alone seems unreal. The complete rehabilitation of Syria and its interim president, despite his past, could not be described as anything other than triumphant.
Facing Eastward
Since the takeover, Syrian diplomacy has also faced persistent resistance from several international actors. Moscow has recognized the new Syrian power and consequently adopted a posture of pragmatism to limit its losses since the very moment it realized the Ba’ath regime was doomed. According to Maria Zakharova, speaker for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the former dictator’s resignation and escape were undertaken « following negotiations between Bashar Al-Assad and a certain number of the participants in the armed conflict on the Syrian territory». In other words, this decision was probably taken with the help of Moscow.[11]
However, the Syrian diplomatic corps is also forced into a stalemate; Syria has contracted several billion dollars in debts from Russia and would greatly benefit from alternative sources of hydrocarbons and food. Coming from a diplomatic source in Damascus for L’Orient le Jour, « Syrian diplomats are willing to make peace, even with their former enemies »[12]. Anna Borshchevskaya of the Washington Institute emphasizes Russia's need for a stable government in Syria willing to protect its interests. This new tacit entente explains Al-Sharaa’s visit to the Kremlin on October 15, 2025, where he agreed to renegotiate the maintenance of the military bases of Hmeimim for the air force, and has more reluctance when it comes to the harbour of Tartous, a crucial asset for Russian strategic influence, a vital vector for Moscow's military projection, anxious to preserve its hard-gained rank in the region and access to the Mediterranean Sea. The presence in Moscow of Bashar al-Assad complicates the dialogue: the transitional government publicly demanded his extradition, without success so far.[13]
Last but not least, Al-Sharaa’s attitude on the Israeli issue remains ambiguous: Syria did not condemn the Israeli strikes against Iran in June, while all other regional capitals have done so, including Saudi Arabia[14]. This silence demonstrates Amhed Al-Shara’s desire to maintain a balance between diplomatic openness and the management of sensitive minorities, particularly the Druze in the south, historically supported by Israel. Despite Trump’s lobbying, normalization with Tel Aviv, whose support for the protection of the Druze remains, raises skepticism regarding a pacification with Damascus, even after the meeting in the Oval Office.
The Dust of Damascus
Each diplomatic success of the new Syria in no way masks the seriousness of the internal situation. The scale of the task remains titanic: in May 2025, the World Bank estimated that the reconstruction needs amount to 216 billion dollars, specifying that this is a conservative estimate.[15] According to Médecins sans frontières, 90% of the population now lives below the poverty line. The conflict has claimed from 500,000 to 618,000 lives, to which we must add thousands of missing persons. Syria is still experiencing one of the largest displacement crises in modern history: more than 14 million people have had to leave their homes, of which 7 million are internally displaced, while about 4 million live as refugees in neighbouring states or have been resettled abroad [16].
The material damage is considerable: one third of the Syrian gross product has vanished, and the cost of destroyed infrastructure and buildings is estimated at 108 billion USD. We can measure the scale of the disaster in the southern and eastern boroughs of Damascus, such as Jobar, Ghouta, or certain industrial suburbs, which have been reduced to a state of rubble. The priorities of reconstruction are mainly focused on clearing, water, electricity and transport networks rehabilitation. Since September 2025, Saudi Arabia and other partners have launched pilot projects, and the clearing has allowed 75,000 m3 of rubble to be removed[17], but daily life in the capital remains extremely degraded. Damascus and its immediate suburbs are among the areas that require the most significant investments for rehabilitation.
The Syrian legitimacy also needs to be re-established on its own territory, the Islamic State continues to confront government forces, with around 2500 ISIS fighters still operating in Iraq or Syria and presents a remaining threat. In January, the Syrian Intelligence claimed to have thwarted an ISIS bombing attack on the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus.[18] The danger is also external; Israel has bombed several times in Syrian territory, including the Ministry of Defence. So it is an euphemism to say that the new Syrian government is currently under threat and already faces a major security crisis.
The cycle of violence is not broken, exactions were commited was by the government’s allies, such as the ANS or several Islamist groups, and left minorities exposed in a climate of interconfessional conflict and where the victors can strike in complete impunity: in March, the Alawites were victims of targeted abuses by Islamist groups and militias affiliated with the government in response to an aggression led by some remaining supporters of the Ba’ath regime. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 1400 were killed across 30 alawi-majority towns, boroughs and villages only eight months ago.[19]
The Druze community also suffered a massacre in the south of Syria, which led to an Israeli response (thus the strikes on government official buildings). Israel is the self-claimed protector of the Druze community in the Levant (which in Syria represents approximately 700,000 people or 3% of the population). In September, Amnesty International collected the evidence for 46 targeted executions of members of the Druze community in the Soueïda province.[20]
The insecurity in which those minorities are currently living has already been denounced abroad; the new regime must not trade its lack of control for systemic bloodshed. The population is still traumatized, and the post-conflict phase, past the euphoria of liberation, must not become the seed of further violence. Al Sharaa’s strategy to secure and reaffirm Syria’s status on the International scene first has its merits and gains, though it hardly, and I insist, must not disguise the country’s actual division.
I personally believe that the most eloquent lack of control over the entire territory is expressed through the transition assembly; 3 provinces are still not represented as elections could not have been held, and 32 seats out of 210 remain vacant in this regard.[21]
As a consequence, voices like that of Fabrice Balance and Tanya Mehra, Senior Research Fellow and Programme Lead at the ICCT, underline the fragility of the current transition, and the government’s ability to resolve the crisis is already being questioned internally and on the international scene, especially about the sincerity of the ongoing democratic process.
There are many key issues that this article fails to address. We have not even discussed the Kurdish question or the remaining gangrenous traffic of captagon that is currently poisoning the Middle East.
But overall and to conclude, Al Sharaa’s diplomatic marathon was fundamentally a success despite several accommodations with great powers that shade the whole picture.
The struggle for recognition has been overcome, thanks to Al Sharaa’s prowess or simply due to the lassitude of the European powers in the Syrian case. The challenge of reconstruction over the dust of Damascus, both material and social, is monumental, has only just begun and is already threatened.
Bibliography
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[2]United Nations News. (2025) 'Syria: Thousands of displaced head home, but many refugees still in need of international aid,' 12 February. Available at:
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