Interview with Dr Natasha Kuhrt

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*The transcript has been edited for readability and clarity by Declan Browne & Gus Acuna.

*Square brackets [ ] have been used for added readability.

Hosted by Samuel Lee.

Special thanks to Dr Natasha Kuhrt.

Samuel Lee:  

Introduce yourself, for our listeners.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Hi, I'm doctor Natasha, Kurt and I'm a senior lecturer in international peace and security in the Department of War Studies.

Samuel Lee:

You know, as we discussed-  you did your MA in Soviet studies at the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies and you've clearly got quite a lot of interest in that area - in Russian foreign policy. In the Soviet Union and the in between. What would you say are the differences in Soviet foreign policy compared to the modern Russian Federation?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well. Obviously they don't have to coach their rhetoric in ideological terms anymore.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:  

And the Soviet Union was a superpower and today's Russian Federation is not a superpower and I mean, I guess the reach of the Soviet Union was somewhat larger than the reach of today's Russia, you can say.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah.

Samuel Lee:

Would you say then that, you know, Marxist Leninist ideology,  which guided the Soviet Union. How does it compare to the like ideal sovereign democracy or traditional values in Russia today?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, it's completely different. You can't really compare.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean Marxism-Leninism the leading authority -  the guiding authority of the Communist Party in all areas of life. I mean, it was in the Constitution. Obviously there's a debate - it's always the same with any ideology: to what extent does it actually drive your actions and policies, and to what extent is it just window dressing or you know some kind of justificatory mechanism. But I mean, I think it did play a significant role and you know -  it's probably somewhere in between. It was an important legitimizing factor and it kind of played a role in continuing to uphold the right of the Soviet Union to be the kind of leader, if you like, of the communist world in, in an international sense.  Obviously we had more communist or socialist countries then than we do now.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm, I see. Would you then say that, despite the massive differences in the ideology, would you say there's still like any correlation between a specific era of Soviet leadership and the current Russian leadership in terms of foreign policy? Are there still any similarities despite there being massive Ideological differences?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, I mean, I think the only thing you can point to is the kind of - Some people talk about a  kind of operational code, you know where you kind of have -  If you go back to Lenin, you had talk of war, which is basically, you know, who will prevail over whom. Kind of 0 sum approach to politics. So you know, someone suggested that that quite kind of Machiavellian approach is still very prevalent in today's Russia.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know, so you know and I guess, you know, mistrust of the West as well.

Samuel Lee:

So do you think this sort of dates back I guess to like before the Soviet Union, it's just a continuation of previous policy or?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, I don't think anything is just a continuation because you know, I think you have, you have different personalities, you have different situations.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know, I mean, when the Bolsheviks came to power, you know, obviously it took a long time before they were even recognized. You know,  being the kind of legitimate leaders of this new country, which initially I think they weren't, you know, they weren't even working along the lines of having a country. because you know, under Communism, the state would wither away, which obviously seems quite strange and quite amusing to think about now if we think about Putin and his emphasis on the state.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

But you know, they didn't even think about constructing any kind of foreign policy when they came to power initially. You know, Trotsky, who was in charge of foreign policy. Well, supposedly just said, we can issue a few decrees and then we can shut up shop.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Because obviously it was all about, you know, the Communist international, the proletariat in each, you know, country around the world. They were all going to rise up and you know, there would be a kind of this horizontal arrangement essentially where one would no longer need foreign policy because there would be no more states - Nation states.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm. But obviously not the case anymore.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah. No, no. But I think it's - I mean, obviously before the Soviets, you had the tsars and you know, there are certain - Kind of, if you like, enduring kind of geopolitical issues. Which, you know, the Bolshevik's inherited to some extent and you know the preoccupation obviously with securing apace, securing territory. You know, the idea of being encircled by enemies and so on. That's - I guess that has persisted, yeah.

Samuel Lee:

I see. What do you say are like the primary tools utilized by both the former Soviet Union and today's Russian Federation in order to further their foreign policy aims, and how effective are they? And you know, what's changed, I guess in terms of the tools they've used?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yes, I just think. We shouldn't really see Russia as a continuation of the Soviet Union, because, I mean, first of all, you know, it's just the borders of the Russian Federation.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean, OK. It's got Crimea in theory, but I mean the primary tools. Umm, I mean - you know, in terms of the Soviet Union, I guess the primary tools were, you know, ideological to some extent. Obviously they played the anti colonial card with regard to the so-called Third World.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know, again, that was actually inimical, really, to Marxist-Leninist ideology because according to Marxist-Leninism, you wouldn't have nation states. So you know nationalism and National Liberation struggles wouldn't really fit into that. But obviously Khrushchev decided that, you know, using these National Liberation struggles would be a way of essentially getting one over on the capitalist countries. Yeah. So I mean, I don't think it's necessarily, I mean, I don't want to put the Soviet Union and Russia in the same box. I mean, they're not necessarily using exactly the same kind of tools here.

Samuel Lee:

Of course.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know with Russia, now we're talking about much more crude or raw military power. Obviously, the Soviet Union had military power, but I think there was, you know, because they were part of a, like I said, Communist international -  despite the fact obviously some you know in the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe were not there willingly -  Nevertheless, that was something that bounded them together. You know, I mean in terms of tools, obviously, yeah, the military was always a big tool and it's a big tool today. But you know the Soviet army was far, far larger than the Russian army is today.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know, I mean other tools, obviously active measures were used in Soviet times and you know, today we have disinformation being used very widely. Obviously it's a different media landscape today.

Samuel Lee:

It's like digitized and what not, I guess, yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah. I mean, obviously there was no social media then, but, you know, they could put out fake news articles for example. You know, they also, of course, had their fellow travellers, campaign for nuclear disarmament and all those kind of things which you know, they would kind of not necessarily directly fund, but you know they would kind of leverage, quite often, those movements for their own interests.

Samuel Lee:

See, I remember reading about how you did research into Russian activism in Africa. You mentioned, just now, information campaigns. Do you see Russia increasing these strategies in, you know, African State, and how do you think it would, you know, tear away the influence of China or America today?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, my research wasn't really on disinformation. It was on peacekeeping.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:  

But you know [they] are other people who've carried out research on Russian disinformation in Africa.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean, you know, yes, it was a big issue in Mali, for example, where Russia was very kind of antagonistic towards the kind of French presence and used again - played the kind of anti-colonial card against France there. And, yeah, I mean it basically mounted quite a pernicious campaign which seemed to have some success, although I assume there was already discontent there. So I mean you have to be careful, you know, not to kind of overestimate Russia's ability to sway people and influence people because, you know, there has to already obviously be some kind of negative stance or feeling there to latch on to.

Samuel Lee:

I see, what about the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces in Africa. You know, you said you did research on that just now, is that right? What do you say?

Natasha Kuhrt:

I'm not. I mean, there aren't any Russian peacekeeping forces in Africa. What I was looking at was Russian discourse around Western peacekeeping. That was what I was looking at and obviously to Russia, you know, the primacy of the P3, as in the UK, France, and the US, in terms of peacekeeping.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:  

And being the pen holder on writing, peacekeeping mandates and so on, you know, pushing back against that within the UN Security Council, you know, essentially, China can kind of, you know, use Russia as a sort of proxy, if you like, because that saves China from actually having to do the legwork, if you like in terms of you know, being very vocal and oppositional towards the other members of the P5. But I was - so I was looking at Western peacekeeping forces. As in UN peacekeeping forces, sorry, not Western peacekeeping forces, but UN peacekeeping missions and the role of the West in writing the mandates and in constructing these mandates.

Samuel Lee:

I see. What do we say is Russia's primary objective is in Africa then? Is it more economic security, such as access to valuable rare earth minerals? Was it more about gathering support and, you know, constructing a security alliance in that area?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah. Well, it could be both, I mean.

Samuel Lee:  

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Russia, obviously, you know, Russia has become like a niche security provider to a number of, you know, somewhat unpleasant regimes in Africa and you know, China, of course, has a presence in most of those in many of those countries as well. But China has a  far bigger economic footprint there. If you compare Russia's footprint there to China's, it's actually fairly small. But you know what all Russia does is to kind of, you know, find a gap or a niche and then insert itself.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So you know, they've become quite adept at providing security for various regimes there and in exchange, you know, they get access to valuable minerals which help to continue to bankroll their invasion of Ukraine.

Samuel Lee:

Would you - Can you give any examples specifically in Africa where you could think they have a presence?

Natasha Kuhrt:  

Yeah. Yeah. Mali, Central African Republic.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm, is it for like Wagner, like those paramilitary organizations?

Natasha Kuhrt:  

Yes, it's not Wagner anymore because it's been incorporated into the Africa Corp.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt: It's now under the supervision of the GRU, the military intelligence.

Samuel Lee:

Oh, OK.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah, since Prigozhin and the mutiny, Wagner isn't operating in that way anymore.

Samuel Lee:

Got shot down. Mm hmm, I see.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah.

Samuel Lee:

You know, as we can see an increase in Russian presence in Africa and in some parts of Central Asia, we start to see a huge “De-Russification”  sort of movement. How successful would you say that is? And is it done the same way across Central Asia, or is it somewhat different?

Natasha Kuhrt:

I have to say I'm not really an expert on De-Russification in Central Asia.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean, all I can say is that I mean, yes, they've all moved away from the Cyrillic alphabet.

Samuel Lee: Mm.

Natasha Kuhrt: But I'm not sure that that in and of itself is. I mean, obviously symbolically it seems like De-Russification but, you know, A number of them still rely quite heavily on Russia for remittances because of immigration or not immigration. But you know, because of migrant workers who work in Russia, mainly in Moscow and other big cities, they send the money back to their families and they really.

Samuel Lee:

So sort of like remittances and whatnot. 

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah, they depend on that very much so. So I think it does vary from one country to another. You know clearly - You know, they're not as dependent on Russia as they were and China, of course, is also, you know, a new player in the region. But I would say that since the invasion, you know, obviously they're trying to look at kind of diversifying somewhat away from Russia, but in fact a number of them are finding that, you know, they're being used as a kind of conduit for sanctions evasion and that kind of thing.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

And also you know, I don't think that there's really been, apart from China. I don't think there's really been much opportunity for them to diversify because you know, the West quite frankly has done very little in terms of engaging economically with Central Asia.

Samuel Lee:

I see. Would you then say that China's rise in Central Asia challenges the idea that Russia has a right to be within the Central Asian countries? And how do you think they’re sort of managing that like this idea that China is sort of moving in?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah. Well, I mean, I think Russia's largely been accommodating China and Central Asia. I mean, it doesn't really - They would rather have China there than you know Western countries.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So you know, and for now, China doesn't show any signs of wanting to do more than, you know, economic development. But in the past, there have been tensions, you know, for example, Russia accused China of using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a kind of cover for economic activity. But of course at that point then China essentially rolled out the Belt and Road initiative and then you know, obviously that's all about economics. So there wasn't really much that Russia could do about that.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

But, yeah. So I mean, you know, China seems to still be quite happy to essentially kind of carry out economic activity in Central Asia with Russia as a kind of security provider for the time being. Obviously you know in the future one can't rule out China wanting to take a bigger role in security or that Russia perhaps won't be able to take on a bigger role, you know, because we don't know, of course, what will happen. You know whether Russia will lose the war. You know whether it will be a sort of shrunken military power.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know whether it will kind of have to draw in its horns, so to speak, and kind of, you know, if you like, retreat from some of these areas that it's been active in previously. So it really is hard to tell at the moment.

Samuel Lee:

You know, if I - if I recall correctly, you did mention before this interview that you did work with the British state. Did you ever meet anyone interesting in the Russian Foreign Service and do you have any interesting anecdotes from that time from when you've worked with the British state and, you know, been to Russia during that time period.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah, I mean, I've met Russian diplomats and Russians in the foreign ministry. But it wasn't anything to do with working for the British state. It was just going out to Moscow when I was doing my PHD on Russia - China relations, but also like in between over the years, every few years I would probably go to Moscow and then, you know, talk to people in the Foreign Ministry.

Samuel Lee: Ah, sorry. Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So, well, I mean one anecdote is that was after I did my PHD maybe about 10 years ago. I managed to - I mean, it's not easy to arrange these meetings, by the way - I had to spend several days on the phone because they have.

Samuel Lee:

Oh my God.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, it would probably be the same here. You don't - You know, then don't want to just, you know, meet any old person who turns up. I mean, they're busy people, so you know, you can't just kind of go there and ring in the bell and then they let you in.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know you have - You know you have to have a good reason for wanting to talk to them and they don't need to talk to you. I mean, you know the way to get in is basically, you know, to name drop. I knew this person who was the deputy director of the diplomatic Academy.

So I was able to use his name in order to, you know, ask them to grant me an interview. Otherwise, I doubt if I would have got in, I mean, they don't just talk to ordinary academics, you know. So I managed to get in after several days of ringing them up and you know kind of having to deal with this very kind of fierce PA woman or receptionist and then when I got there, I actually managed to talk to somebody on the China desk who is now a deputy Foreign Minister.

Samuel Lee:

Oh my God.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Igor Morgulov. And yeah, so he was very kind of upbeat because he worked on Russia-China relations and I guess, you know, it was all going very well. But I had also arranged to talk to the person who is in charge of Russia-Japan relations, you know, it's quite interesting to see the difference because the guy working in Russia-China relations was really upbeat and kind of energetic and you know, wearing quite an expensive looking suit and then the guy working on Russia and Japan relations looked almost kind of depressed and he had quite a shabby kind of suit. So I just felt as though that kind of encapsulated really, you know, the state of Russia-Japan relations versus the state of Russia-China relations and in fact Morgulov -  He was the guy on the China desk -  said to me, I feel sorry for my colleagues working on Russia-Japan relations because you know, there's not really much to write home about. You know, there's no 'cause for celebration or you know, it's a fairly thankless task, essentially.

Samuel Lee:

What would you say was the personality of the guy [Morgulov] working? Sorry I can't remember his name now. The guy working the China desk. What- "Morgulov?"

Natasha Kuhrt:

Personally, he was still very friendly, you know, easy to talk to, you know, like quite a suave kind of diplomat, you know? I mean, they do, you know, they have always had actually quite.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Quite good diplomats, you know, quite professional.

Samuel Lee:

See, I mean, I guess a lot of that's changed now, the Russia, Ukraine war.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Mm hmm.

Samuel Lee:

It's they're - they've taken a much more hardline stance, I guess.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, of course, yeah. I mean, you know, we're living in extraordinary times, you know, in those days, you could still, I mean, obviously now if I tried to go to Russia, I wouldn't get a visa anyway.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean, but you know, even if you were to talk to them, I mean, well, you just wouldn't get to talk to them about Russia-China relations. And in fact, the last time I went, I kind of gave up on trying to go to the foreign ministry. That was in 2016, It was already-

Samuel Lee:

Oh yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

It was already difficult to talk to people then, like even to talk to academics in their own home it would be OK, but if you went to Moscow State University of International Relations. You know, people were very wary looking over their shoulder, they wanted to meet, maybe in a cafe and not in their office. You know, people were already worried about being watched and so on, because obviously it was two years after Crimea. Mm.

Samuel Lee:

So do you think that the state of Russian academia has become sort of muted, I guess in a way like they used to have a lot more freedom after the collapse of the Soviet Union and then now with the war, like people are just getting-

Natasha Kuhrt: Yeah, yeah, yeah, definitely.

Samuel Lee:

Way too scared to talk about anything.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah, it's very difficult now. Yeah, I mean, a lot of Russian academics have, if they can have, have left, you know, or they just have to keep their head down. You know, you have to stay in  line because there was an incident of, I can't remember the name, but there was a Russian historian who, I think was questioning the new Russian narrative about the Second World War and the causes and that kind of thing and he was sacked. Yeah.

Samuel Lee:

See, I mean, I mean obviously that's not great, but I feel like with Russia a lot of worse could happen. You know, I guess you know.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Quite a lot worse could happen, yeah.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah, but that's quite tragic. Simply voicing an opinion on a certain issue and getting sacked. Yeah, especially the whole Ukraine-Russia thing at the moment.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Mm hmm.

Samuel Lee:

Given, you know, Ukraine's, you know, geographical and  trade proximity. How do you think EU Member States reconcile their trade relations with Russia, [regarding] the nation’s expulsion from ECHR membership in 2022. What are some of the consequences of this expulsion?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, I mean. Obviously, EU Member States don't really have any trade relations with Russia now. So I don't think they need to reconcile anything.

Samuel Lee:

I mean, I was - I was thinking along the lines of, you know, Germany with the oil, you know, pipelines and whatnot.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You mean the gas? It's gas.

Samuel Lee:

Sure, the gas, right. The gas pipeline is there, yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah. Nord stream, yeah.

Samuel Lee:

How are they managing that? Like, what do you think they're doing? Like right and wrong I guess.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean, obviously Nord Stream isn't in operation.

Samuel Lee :

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So I mean. Well, obviously there's been a complete turn around in German foreign policy and they no longer receive gas from Russia, so.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Unless you're talking about before that, I'm not a bit confused by the question.

Samuel Lee:

Sorry, yeah, I guess, sort of - How is the EU sort of trying to manage the fact they no longer have trade ties with Russia. How are all the European states managing the inflation and whatnot, do you think they can maintain this long term or do you think Russia has a fair enough, fair enough...

Natasha Kuhrt:

don't know. I can't really speak - I mean, it varies from 1 country to another, right? I mean.

Samuel Lee

Of Germany, for example.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Obviously, if you talk about Hungary, it's a problem.

Samuel Lee:

Do you think they could?

Natasha Kuhrt:

It's a big problem for Hungary, you know. It's much more difficult for them to find alternative sources of energy and so on.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean in Germany - I mean, I'm not a big expert on German energy, but I mean, you know, they're obviously restarting nuclear power and so on, which is quite incredible to me, really, because, you know, obviously in the 1980s, you know, the Greens were, you know, very much completely against nuclear power. That was one of their campaign platforms.

Samuel Lee:

How do you think Hungary, you mentioned Hungary just now. How are they managing?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Mm hmm. And I don't know really, it's quite hard, I guess, for them, but I'm afraid I'm not really an expert on Hungary, sorry.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah. Do you think the invasion of Ukraine you know signifies the start of the domino theory in Europe. Like once Ukraine falls, Russia will continue expanding. How realistic do you think this sort of idea is? Do you think Russia has more expansionist plans into Western Europe or do you think it'll stop at a certain point? Or like, where do you think the line is drawn?

Natasha Kuhrt:

I'm not sure that it wants to expand into Western Europe. Obviously, people worry about the Baltic States. If you want to call that Western Europe but, you know, I think - I think it's more the kind of the threat of expansion or the kind of you know. The uncertainty around what Russia will do, I think, is in a way, the problem. You know, we don't actually know.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

It seems to me unlikely that they would go further than they have done, and obviously the Baltic States are NATO members and NATO has increased its forward presence [and] forward deployment there and so on. But you know I think Russia is more likely to just continue to kind of test NATO's resolve, but I don't think I don't really see there being a kind of another big invasion, you know of Poland or the Baltic states. But, but you know, they can do enough to kind of keep the threat there in the background, so to speak and to keep everybody on their toes and to keep everybody worried about what they might do, you know, but also they can, you know, they can do a lot in the Baltic, you know they can just sort of test NATO's readiness and preparedness and so on.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Test our defences essentially with, you know, kind of gray zone activities, for example.

Samuel Lee:

So I guess you know, as we were discussing the whole Russia-Ukraine situation with America today, under Donald Trump, essentially saying that Europe is no longer first order priority and a second order priority, do you think that European military integration or rearmament is sort of on the table more so now than it was in the past.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, it certainly is on the table, yeah. And you know, we've got Poland talking about potentially acquiring nuclear weapons and even - I  can't remember exactly who it was, but - Could have been the new German Chancellor - but you know, talking about Germany, not acquiring nuclear weapons per se, but acquiring a kind of latent capability, you know, so that if they do then need nuclear weapons, they could easily move to the next stage. That's pretty significant. I mean, obviously everyone, you know, pretty much everyone probably not Hungary in Europe is talking about, you know, increasing their spending. You know the proportion of GDP that they spend and so on. Obviously Poland is very much at the forefront. I think they are spending up to 7% of their GDP.

Samuel Lee:

I was wondering, you know a lot of European countries now are essentially preparing for, you know, a possible confrontation with Russia. You know, building arms and whatnot. Do you think that - Let's just say in the future, I mean again, this is all speculation in the future. A president, which has a lot more, a lot more commitment towards Europe and whatnot comes to power in the United States, do you think stuff like this would scale back, or do you think Europe is now “There are no such thing as reliable allies. You know, we have to defend ourselves on our own terms.” Do you think this is a long term foreign policy or do you think this is just a result of the Trump administration basically?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, it is just a result of the Trump administration because you know, I mean, obviously the invasion happened three years ago and Europe has not really done anything until now until the US basically said we're not going to be the backstop anymore.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm, Mm hmm. But do you think it'll this will be the like policy for the future or do you think Europe might just go back to the old ways if America decides, like, you know, another president comes in and starts to recommit to Europe.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah, who knows? I don't know really - I mean, I mean, you know, if they're going to be spending on defense what they say, they're going to be doing, and if they're actually going to ramp up defense production and so on, to the extent that they say they will, then I guess it's not something to kind of quickly retreat from or that you can roll back particularly quickly. I'm sure that Europe would like the US to continue to be enmeshed in European security. I don't think anybody wants the US to take a step back. So whether the US, you know, returns to its senses. Then I'm sure that Europe would be happy to welcome them.

Samuel Lee:

I guess I have one more question on Ukraine. When Ukraine was first invaded all those years ago, before the 2022 invasion, it seemed much less prepared than it is now. Do you see Ukraine with its current capabilities, being able to maintain, you know, a front against Russia, with the ceasefire breaking down and whatnot, do you think they'll be able to maintain that for long enough or do you think Russia, based on your [research], has a chance?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, Russia definitely has a chance, yeah. I mean. Umm, I mean, I guess it's obviously a problem that, you know, Ukraine has a much smaller population than Russia. So it kind of depends really, also how much military assistance Ukraine is going to get from the West, you know, so I think without that, obviously, it won't be able to resist Russia's advances and you know. Obviously they lost Kursk and, you know, Russia's been advancing again. So it's hard to say really, I mean, I would only say obviously you know, if morale stays high because they think that they have enough support from Europe.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

And real support. You know, then they should be able to continue. But you know, Russia seems to be able to reinforce their troops without a problem so far. Obviously they had all the logistical issues at the beginning, but.

Samuel Lee:

Oh yeah, they had the North Koreans over and stuff as well, you know.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah, but I mean, like in the past year of the war, they had, you know, they had all these problems with logistics and supply routes. And, you know, in terms of resupplying their forces and whatnot. But they seem to have kind of resolved those issues now.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm, mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So you know, it's anyone's guess, I suppose, but you know, and I mean Russia can now manufacture its own drones and so on as well.

Samuel Lee:

I see. Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So you know, I mean it's not looking good for Ukraine, but at the same time.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know it, I mean it, you know, Russia doesn't have to, I mean, Russia does to some extent depend on outside help. Obviously it was depending on Iran for the drones and so on, but it's able to manufacture quite a few by itself. Now it's got indigenous capacity. But you know, Ukraine obviously very much has to depend on outside help. So you know, so it depends on us really to a large extent, I think.

Samuel Lee:

See, I guess right now I would like to pivot to some I guess more, more questions about the roles of academics in you know, foreign policy. So one of the questions that we were hoping to ask you was: Do you think the opinions of academics are often under looked in developing foreign policy in the UK specifically?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, it's a bit hard to say really. I mean, I don't know about the entire foreign policy of the UK.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean, they certainly do consult people a lot - Consult academics quite a lot. But whether that actually becomes part of policy is a completely different matter. I mean there is something called impact and you know if you have impact it means you know that something that you've said or written gets incorporated into, you know, a policy, an actual policy, and obviously that doesn't happen very often.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm, mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So, but you know. I mean, I've been consulted quite often, you know, on issues relating to Russia and I know that other people have. But I suppose it's more about the fact that, you know, Russian studies in the UK was kind of decimated. I mean, Margaret Thatcher, a long time ago when I was starting my BA -  in Russian and German language and literature - she'd already, like, cut a number of Departments of Russian language and politics and so on. So you know, and then obviously one when the Soviet Union collapsed, you know, people moved away from studying that area. And then with 9/11 as well, a lot of people you know were much more focused, I mean, understandably, on the Middle East.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean, I remember one of my MA students about well, just after 9/11 saying, well, you know, for us, the Middle East is like the Soviet Union was for you, in terms of academic study.

Samuel Lee:

OK, I see.

Natasha Kuhrt:

As in, people want to study the Middle East, although having said that, actually not that many people studied the Soviet Union when I was studying it. Probably more people are studying Russia now than they were studying the Soviet Union then.

Samuel Lee:

Oh, do you know why that's the case? Like, why was it not this? Or was that just something you noticed?

Natasha Kuhrt:

[It was] just seen as a bit of a niche thing, I think.

Samuel Lee:

I see, you know, as a foreign policy expert yourself, with the British Government consulting you quite a bit, what do you think were the shortcomings when it came to Russian foreign policy? If you're allowed to speak about that, where do you think they could have done better with Russian foreign policy?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Do you mean British policy towards Russia? Oh right.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah, yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, I mean, you know, I guess British foreign policy is probably fairly similar to any other to the foreign policy of other European powers. You know, in that - You know, we haven't really, probably haven't devoted enough resources to Russia. I mean, you know, like I said, after 9/11 people were very much focused on the Middle East, terrorism, radicalization obviously that you know we had in July 2005, the bombings and so on in the UK. And then there's a huge focus on, you know preventing terrorism and radicalization. And obviously we were in Iraq and  Afghanistan as well. So you know the threats, the main threats really seem to come from elsewhere. But I guess you know partly because we probably haven't stored up enough expertise on Russia and the former Soviet States and and especially actually, I would say moving away from Russia. I would say one of the problems has probably been seeing everything through the prism of Russia always.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah. Very often looking at the other states in that area through the prism of Moscow, you know, and that was the problem with Ukraine, you know. So they didn't really have their own agency and we didn't have enough expertise on Ukraine. I think we actually had enough expertise on Russia probably, but you know, that's why when Russia invaded Ukraine, So many people expected Russia to prevail and to be victorious because just as Russia did, we had underestimated Ukrainian resilience and the Ukrainian military and not understood what or paid attention to what was going on inside Ukraine.

Samuel Lee:

Is this why you always like to emphasise the fact that we should separate Russia from the former Soviet Union and try to think about it as its own separate entity?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yes, I mean, if you work in the area that I work in.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah, mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know, that's what people are talking about a lot, you know, decolonizing that region, you know, people talk about decolonizing the curriculum, but very often the Soviet Union is not seen as.. and I think that's partly a kind of left wing bias. Radical left wingers, essentially grew up kind of - with a kind of admiration quite often for the Soviet Union and a kind of, you know, antipathy towards the United States.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You know, if you think of people like Noam Chomsky, you know he's a very good example of that.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So then you fail to see any - You find it very difficult to see the Soviet Union and then Russia, the continuator state as you know, in a really negative light because you're always comparing it to the United States and the United States, obviously, in that particular worldview is, you know, in a way, the United States is the evil empire. So that's problematic, because it also means that people are blinded to the fact that the Soviet Union was essentially, you know, a kind of empire and it and you know, the people of the Soviet Union were essentially colonized. I mean, obviously there's also the narrative that the Russians themselves were colonized, if that makes sense, you know that they were also victims of it.

Samuel Lee:

Of like the Soviet sort of ideology?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Of your own coloniser you know because you had fifteen republics. You had the Russian Federation - the Russian Socialist Federative Republic within the Soviet Union. So some Russians argued that they were also victims, you know, because it wasn't necessarily Russians as such driving it. Obviously Russia, it was the biggest Republic of the fifteen but and you know, the kind of centre of the administrative centre of the Soviet Union, it was in Moscow.

Samuel Lee:

Not to mention, like the multi ethnic sort of, you know, aspect of the whole thing as well, I guess you know Russification and whatnot in those Central Asian states or Eastern European States, I guess in a way they are sort of victims I guess of that sort of idea.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah, but I'm talking about people saying that Russians, too, were victims of this colonization. So therefore, it's not as simple as just saying now that today's Russia is the inheritor of all of that, obviously.

Samuel Lee:

Hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

The new Russian state is obviously, legally, the continuator, and the other republics are not continuator states. They are successor states. So they didn't take on all the obligations of the Soviet Union. Russia obviously uniquely inherited the seat at the UN Security Council and it has chosen to essentially, if you like, own a lot of the policies and practices of the Soviet Union in rather than just in it distancing itself from them. Which it could obviously have done, and which is what started to happen in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Samuel Lee:

Yeah.

Natasha Kuhrt:

But there was never any lustration. You know, there was never any, you know, kind of a move to prevent those who'd been members of the Communist Party from taking office, for example. There was never any truth and reconciliation commission or there's never been a kind of reckoning with the past in Russia.

Samuel Lee:

Is that why, like there's such nostalgia as well? Do you think in Russia?

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah, but it's too complex. You know, there are a number of reasons, but there's not been any real attempt to come to terms with the past or to recommit the past. And in fact, you know. NGOs like Memorial, which is a kind of human rights NGO which has now been branded a foreign agent. You know, they've tried to investigate archives and so on to find information about what happened to people who were sent to the Gulag and so on and so forth and they've put up plaques on houses to mark, you know, where people lived, who were victims of the Stalinist purges and so on and so forth. But you know, their work has been stopped and interfered with and you know they can't really carry out their work. And there is a kind of - there's a kind of refusal to, really examine properly what what was done under Stalin. Of course, there's also been a certain amount of kind of glorification of the Stalinist era as well. Yes, so, you know, and Putin has talked about how, you know, when we're talking about the past. We shouldn't really blame people, you know. We should just remember the victims, but the thing is that they remember the victims, you know, he put up this wall of sorrow a few years ago, which was supposed to commemorate the victims of Stalin. But you know, the victims are commemorated.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

But then - the perpetrators have never really, obviously, never been brought to account. So I think that's a problem.

Samuel Lee:

I see. That's gonna give our listeners a lot to think about. I guess the final question then, would you say as an academic, would you recommend students to pursue this career? Do you think it's very important that we keep, I mean, I'm assuming the answer is yes, but I guess I want to hear in your own words how? Why? Why do you think people should continue pursuing this field of international relations or history as a career?

Natasha Kuhrt:

And should they become an academic? As in, do a PHD and [be a] lecturer or do you mean just do an MA or?

Samuel Lee:

Yeah, as a PHD, as a lecturer.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Well, I would say to be frank, that it's a very hard, tough environment these days. It's very difficult to get academic jobs.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So it's becoming more precarious and you have to be prepared to take a lot of very short term jobs and even those jobs are very hard to come by, so I would say have a Plan B if you want to become an academic because it's really not easy at all.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm. OK.

Natasha Kuhrt:  

And also, once you're in the job, it's becoming more difficult because we're given, you know, a lot more administrative tasks than we’ve previously been given.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt

So I mean it's a tough environment at the moment in general for academia in the UK for higher education, you know, there are a number of universities closing or having, you know, departments closed, you know, especially in the humanities. So, So yeah. Money is running out and humanities are not the priority it seems. So I would say, you know if, you know, if it is your dream to go into academia, by all means, try, but you know, be prepared. Don't expect it to be an easy ride.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

And you don't go into it for the money either. So when I did my PHD at the end of my Viva, My examiners asked me what I wanted to do. I said I was thinking of going into academia. And one of them basically said, you know, I wouldn't if I were you.

Samuel Lee:

Oh.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean me personally. He just didn't think it was what it used to be.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

I mean, I think you can still have a very rewarding/interesting time, obviously, but you know, it's definitely much tougher than it used to be.

Samuel Lee:

Mm hmm.

Natasha Kuhrt:

So you need to be quite resilient, you need to be, you know you need to - I would say be prepared to have a Plan B in case you don't make it.

Samuel Lee:

Fair enough.

Natasha Kuhrt:

Yeah.

Samuel Lee:

Thank you so much for doing this interview. I'm sure our listeners would really enjoy hearing your thoughts on Russian foreign policy and I guess the world around us.

Natasha Kuhrt:

You're welcome.