Is The Putin Regime's Foreign Policy Informed More by Pragmatism or by Ideology?

Introduction

Before one can delve into whether or not the Putin’s Regime’s foreign policy decisions are more informed by ideology or informed by pragmatism, one must first define what “ideological” and what “pragmatism” mean. In this context, one can define ideological actions as actions based around “a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community.”[1] As seen, ideology isn’t concrete and can be characterized as quite loose, uncodified, and immaterial. Meanwhile, one could define “pragmatism” through a realist lens. As Festenstein notes, within the realist thinking, “material self-interest and power [are] all that matter for politics”, and where “moral, legal, ethical, and so on, considerations can, or should, be excluded from properly political thinking”.[2] 

Hence, when trying to understand whether or not the Putin regime’s foreign policy is motivated more by pragmatism or ideology, we must first understand how a state makes a foreign policy decision. Here, it is imperative to understand it through a “first image reversed approach” and a “second image reversed approach”. Essentially, for international relations theorists, the “first image” is the individual or as expanded upon by Gries and Yam, communities. The second is the state apparatus and the third image is the international system in which global forces of capital and global institutions act as part of the third image.[3] Through these defined images, one can see how decisions are formed. For example, in the “first image reversed approach”, we can see how international relations and events shape (third image) can affect the way the individual (first image) perceives the world around them which in turn, even in authoritarian states can lead to changes in foreign policy which once again impacts the international.[4] Meanwhile, the “second image reversed” framework analyses how international relations impact the domestic politics of the state and in turn, affect the individual.[5] As seen, foreign policy is formed by a looped interaction between three key actors, this being the individual/community, the state apparatus and the state of international politics.

As seen with these theoretical frameworks in mind, the “first image reversed” framework would argue that the Putin Regime’s foreign policy decisions are informed by the pragmatic considerations where “material self-interest and power [are] all that matter for politics”.[6] Meanwhile, a “second image reversed” approach would emphasize the importance of the regime’s response to external pressures and its internal stability and the legitimacy of the Putin regime. Putin's foreign policy, in this view, can be seen as a reaction to the international system, were global structures and external threats shape Russia’s internal policies and priorities. Here, ideology plays a much stronger role in determining Russian Foreign policy. Through these two frameworks, one can see the “first image reversed” framework representing the pragmatic aspects of Putin’s foreign policy while the “second image reversed” framework as being the ideological aspects of Putin’s foreign policy. To further explore these two aspects of the Putin Regime’s foreign policy, this essay will focus on two examples where both ideological and pragmatic reasons play a role in Putin’s foreign policy. The first being the Russian-Ukraine War and the second being The Russo-Sino relationship.

Chapter 1: The Russo-Ukrainian War and the “pragmatic” explanation for the Invasion

On the 24^th of February 2022, Vladimir Putin announced that there would be a “special military operation” in Ukraine. By midafternoon, the Russian state had declared that it had neutralized “Ukraine’s airbases and air defences, destroying 74 military ground facilities, including 11 airfields, three command posts and 18 radar stations for anti-aircraft missile systems.”[7]  For many, this foreign policy decision was a shock, and as Nitoiu notes, “Few observers of Russian foreign policy would have claimed before 24 February 2022 that the Kremlin would have the audacity to mount a large-scale offensive on Ukraine and its capital.”[8] In this section, this paper will explore the “pragmatic” or “first image reversed” framework to explain this decision. Couching the “pragmatic” reason behind this foreign policy decision through a realist framework, one must first understand some of the key assumptions of the realist framework.

1)     “The state-centric assumption: states are the most important actors in world politics.”[9]

2)     “The international system is anarchic.”[10]

3)     “States inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other.”[11]

4)     “No state can ever be certain another state will not use its offense military capability.”[12]

5)     “The most basic motive driving states is survival.”[13]

6)     “Realists hold power and its pursuit by individuals and states as ubiquitous and inescapable.”[14]

7)     “Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”[15]

As seen above, realism or the pragmatic reasons behind foreign policy presumes that human nature is composed entirely of egotistical, selfish, and protective motives. Hence, states tend to be distrustful of each other and are generally against the idea of cooperation and peace. As seen, pragmatism trumps ideas such as shared norms and values and the idea of the international community. Moreover, international politics through this idea is a zero-sum game where the state which possesses the strongest army, most territory and the strongest economy is seen as the winner. This was further developed by the neo-realist school of thought which emphasized two main schools of thought. This being the defensive and offensive schools of realism. Defensive realism in this case states that “conflict is  sometimes necessary such as in the case of aggressor states, when their security is threatened, when they are insecure, or when differences are irreconcilable.”[16] While offensive realists instead argue that states while expansionist in nature, make calculated and rational decisions as to not risk their industrial and economic base as that “the basis for military power.”[17]

In the case of Putin’s regime to invade Ukraine, one could argue that a defensive realist position was employed. Fearing America’s withdrawal from several key treaties such as the ABM treaty in 2002, the INF treaty in 2019 and the withdrawal from the Open Skies treaty in 2020 followed by a further stockpile of M41 missiles in Poland and Romania by NATO, one could argue that Russia was starting to feel threatened as its neighbouring countries were starting to pursue a policy of armament against Russia.[18] As dictated by realist theories, “No state can ever be certain another state will not use its offense military capability” and since “The state-centric assumption: [assumes] that states are the most important actors in world politics”, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could be argued to be an act of defensive realist strategic thinking.[19] As seen, if one was to use the “first image reversed” framework, we can see how these events in the international system (third image) could influence the first image this being Putin and his community of the political elite in Russia to feel like they were forced to act against Ukraine in order to preserve its territorial integrity.

Meanwhile, an offensive realist may argue that Russia views itself as a revisionist state in which the legacy of the collapse of the Soviet Union is not only seen by the Russian State as a “relative reduction of power in relation to the West”, it has become a core part of the identity of modern Russian foreign policy.[20] By this logic, one could argue that after the Soviet collapse, the continuous expansion of the NATO alliance in former soviet territories was seen as a way for the Americans to continue to establish ideological dominance near Russia’s borders and to push for neo-containment strategies to prevent Russia from ever regaining its power.[21] Hence, when Russia invaded Ukraine, it was simply trying to reassert its dominance as a great power. As seen, one can see again how international events (third image) impact the first (individuals). However, of particular interest in this offensive realist case is an ideological underpinning to these neo-realist offensive actions. While Russia certainly does perceive the West and NATO expansionism as a threat to its sovereignty, it is also driven by the history of its perceived humiliation.

Chapter 2: The Russo-Ukrainian War and the “ideological” explanation for the Invasion

While realist explanations may appear to provide a “pragmatic” explanation as to why Russia invaded Ukraine, there are some issues with the arguments put forth by realists. For one, the concept of NATO expansionism is one that does not stand up to scrutiny. As per the NATO constitution, Article five states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations”.[22] As seen, this organization is purely defensive in nature and can only act if a member of NATO is attacked. Hence, the realist arguments do not stand up to scrutiny as the claim that Russia invaded Ukraine out of security concerns or an attempt to push back American military buildup simply does not reflect the reality of the situation as NATO simply cannot attack a state unless attacked first.

Hence, this section argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was largely not pragmatic but ideological. As discussed by Roberts, following the collapse of the Soviet Union this “left a conceptual void in the foreign policy of the newly independent Russian Federation that raised to the forefront the question of Russia’s national identity.”[23] Hence, without an identity outside of the former Soviet Union, the foundations of a new Russian ideology had to be traced back to both pre-Soviet and Soviet times.[24] Here, Tolz places an emphasis on five specific traditions of Russian nationalism that had emerged out of the collapse of the USSR. The first being Union identity where the Russian people was to be bound by an “imperial identity” and to create a supranational multi-ethnic state whose geographical region is the former USSR.[25] 

The second strain of nationalism which had become popular was the idea of a nation of “all eastern Slavs, united by common origin and culture”. [26]The third strain of nationalism that emerged was the idea of a “community of Russian speakers”.[27] The fourth strain was one where the new form of nationalism would be based on ethnic ties and the idea of the “ethnic Russian”.[28] Lastly, a “civic rossiiskaya” who regardless of cultural or ethnic background had to be loyal to the new state.[29] As seen, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there existed a variety of often contradictory strains of nationalism. However, of particular interest of all of these strains of nationalism, there exists two commonalities. This is the idea that there is no set geographical boundary for this new state and, secondly, a nationalism which was built along authoritarian lines. This is further highlighted by Nation when he writes, “Russian political culture rests on a long tradition of authoritarian governance. Democratic transition in the Post-Soviet period had very little to build on.”[30] As seen, following the collapse of the USSR, Russia had lost a sense of identity and had started to draw upon its fractured history to develop a new national identity. Since Russia never had underwent the same liberal reforms and state-building that other western nations went through, its conception of identity and ideology became rooted in a syncretic combination of liberal conservative state reforms, ethnic identity, fascism and post-Soviet nostalgia. Of particular interest is also the construction of the state under Putin. In Lewis’s book Russia’s new authoritarianism, Carl Schmidt’s theories of the state had started to take shape in the legal structures of the state and foreign policy. For Putin, one can look to his speech to the United Nations where he declared that “It is above all a question of freedom, freedom of choice for every person, every people, every state [to decide] their own fate”.[31] Here, one can see that Putin sees Russia outside of the international order and outside of the shared values and norms. Instead, as Lewis points out, Putin operates in a Schmidttian “friend-enemy” binary.[32] Hence, Putin’s opposition to NATO isn’t necessarily just driven entirely by security concerns, there is an ideological dimension to this as well. As mentioned above, following the collapse of the USSR a syncretism of nationalist ideologies emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However, what united them all was a desire to regain both a sense of community be it bound by language, ethnicity or culture and the power of both imperial and Soviet Russia.[33] As Kuzio writes “Russia invaded Ukraine because Putin has [an] obsession with Ukraine as a Little Russian part of the pan-Russian nation (obshcherusskij narod), together with Great Russians and White Russians (Belarusians). This stagnation in Russian attitudes to Ukrainians came about as a consequence of the rehabilitation of White Russian emigres, which took place from the mid-2000s. White Russian emigres believed the Bolsheviks had created an “artificial” Ukrainian nation, a view upheld by Putin who is an arch critic of Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin.”[34] As seen, the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 wasn’t simply just about NATO expansionism as is often claimed by Vladmir Putin, rather it reflects also a deep desire of the newly formed Russian state to reintegrate and unite the Slavic people. If we are to use the “second image reversed approach”, where the third image (the state of the international) affects the second image (the domestic political structure), one can see that Putin’s actions are not just about ensuring safety and security in the realist sense, rather, there is an existential threat where Putin must ensure that Ukraine is brought back into Russia to maintain his regime and fulfil his duty as the “sovereign”. As Lewis puts it, if Putin is to embody his role of the sovereign, he must have “A willingness and a capacity to break the rules, to decide to step outside the law, not on a whim, but with the aim of restoring or maintaining a form of order.”[35]

In conclusion, one can note that while the regime may use pragmatism/realist justifications by pointing at “NATO expansionism” as a cause when pushing for the invasion of Ukraine, the above has demonstrated that there is a greater ideological reason that underpins these decisions when it comes to the invasion of Ukraine.

Chapter 3: Pragmatism: The Russo-Israeli Relationship

As demonstrated above, one can argue that Russian foreign policy can be guided by ideology while using pragmatic language to justify its actions. However, the opposite can be true as well. In this section, I will use Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism to explain how Russia’s relationship with Israel is largely pragmatic. However, before I delve into the nature of their relationship, it is first important to explain defensive realism within the context of the Russo-Israeli relationship. Of particular interest in defensive realism is Waltz’s contention that states should prioritize security and balance threats rather than pursue expansionist or ideological missions.[36] Here, we can see Russia embody this ideal. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin had to contend with three factions in Russian domestic politics. This being a group of pro-western and pro privatization faction, a Eurasianist faction which wanted to maintain closer relations with the “near abroad” and lastly, the old-communists who wished to once again project their power abroad.[37] 

In order to please these groups, Yeltsin pledged to fully normalize relations with Israel. This led to increased technological cooperation and a greater role in foreign policy. Russia even went as far as having “extended a series of invitations for Middle Eastern leaders to visit Moscow, including Arafat, Netanyahu, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shara'a. In February, Yeltsin met Arafat and promised support for the realization of Palestinian national rights, "including their right to self-determination [which] does not harm Israel's legitimate interests."[38] As seen, this level of success escalated further. As mentioned before, Putin pushes for a defensive realist position with its relationship with Israel. For example, when Putin crushed Chechen rebels, he faced widespread condemnation from Western states. However, Israel instead, supported his policy of “not negotiating with terrorists”.[39]  This favour was later paid back in 2004 when Russia refused to vote on a bill which would have made  the building of an Israeli security barrier illegal.[40] As seen, Russia embodies this defensive realist thinking by building a pragmatic relationship with Israel despite Israel being a close ally of the United States. Through this, they have been able to leverage each other’s position in international bodies to pursue their own foreign policies effectively.  Recently however, Russia has been using the Israeli Russian relationship for further political gain.

In the wake of the October 7^th attack committed by Hamas and in the face of Israel’s retaliatory measures, Russia was quick to condemn Israeli actions with Russia going as far as to meet Mahmoud Abbas the head of the PLO.[41] This move could serve several purposes. As highlighted by Marten, there are three possible explanations behind this move. Firstly, the regime used this as an opportunity to distract from its actions in Ukraine by trying to paint Israel an aggressor that’s being funded by the Americans. Secondly, concerned about security issues in the caucuses, he used this opportunity to support the Palestinian cause to temper radical Islamist elements in the region. Lastly, by using the balance of power theory, Putin feels that by supporting Iran, the Putin Regime may be able to bolster its standing in the Ukraine.[42] This is because as the Ukraine War went on, where previously the Russian-Iranian relationship balanced in favour of Russia due to its investments in nuclear technology in Iran, as the war went on, Russia had started to rely on Iranian manufactured Shahed-136 drones and short range Fateh-100 ballistic missiles.[43] As seen, the balance of power in the relationship between Russia and Iran had started to tip in Iran’s favour as now Russia relied on Iran for military equipment for the Ukraine War. Moreover, Israel had started to supply defensive equipment to Zelensky further complicating Russia’s relationship with Israel.[44] By using the logic of defensive realists, where  “states should prioritize security and balance threats rather than pursue expansionist or ideological missions”, it appears that Russia made a pragmatic move by condemning Israel for the Hamas attack as to essentially balance its declining power in the Middle East and to retain its allies while also bolstering its overseas image as an anti-imperialist power while placating radical Islamists elements in the Chechen regions. Through this gambit, the regime has appeared to have fulfilled the defensive realist gambit of prioritizing security without pursuing necessarily expansionist missions.  However, one could argue that the Putin Regime wouldn’t have had to make this choice had they not been involved in the Ukraine War in the first place. Hence, once again, one could argue that it is once again ideological concerns that underpin the pragmatic decisions made by the Putin Regime.

In conclusion, while the Putin Regime’s foreign policy decisions in the past appear to have largely been driven by pragmatic decisions emphasizing defensive realist policies, in the last three years, due to the Putin regime’s invasion of Ukraine, it has been driven largely by ideological concerns to the point where it’s had to re-tool its middle-eastern policy and to condemn a former ally in order to maintain a balance of power in both regions. Hence, one could argue that the Putin Regime’s foreign policy decisions are now driven by Russia’s ideological commitment to Anti-NATO and anti american ideology as it seeks to position itself as a counterbalance to what the Putin Regime perceives as anti-Russian action. Due to the events of the Russian Ukraine War, one could argue that the Putin regime’s foreign policy decisions are now driven as much by ideology as it is by pragmatic considerations, marking a substantial withdrawal from its previous foreign policy, which emphasized a defter, pragmatic and realist approach.

Footnotes

[1] John Plamenatz, Ideology (London: Pall Mall Press), 15.

[2] Matthew Festenstein, “Pragmatism, Realism and Moralism” Political Studies Review 14 (2016): 40, https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929915607890

[3] Peter Gries and Paton Pak Chun Yam, “Ideology and international relations” ScienceDirect 34 (2020): 138, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.03.006,

[4] Gries and Yam, Ideology, 138.

[5] Joshua D. Kertzer and Dustin Tingley, “Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms” Annual Review of Political Science 21 (2018): 329.

[6] Festenstein, “Pragmatism”, 40.

[7] Peter Beaumont and Sam Jones, "Russia has invaded Ukraine: what we know so far" The Guardian, February  24, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/russia-has-invaded-ukraine-what-we-know-so-far.

[8] Gail Edwards and Gary Thomas, " The path to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine: Moscow’s framing of conflict and cooperation with the West under Putin’s rule?" Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2024): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2024.2324559

[9]  Jack Donelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7. 

[10] Donelly, Realism,7.

[11] Donelly, Realism,7.

[12] Donelly, Realism,7.

[13] Donelly, Realism,7.

[14] Donelly, Realism,7.

[15] Donelly, Realism,7.

[16] Steven E. Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (2017):9, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.304.

[17] Steven E. Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (2017):6, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.304.

[18] Christopher McCallion, " Assessing realist and liberal explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian war" Defense Priorities, June 7, 2023, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/assessing-realist-and-liberal-explanations-for-the-russo-ukrainian-war/.

[19] Jack Donelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7. 

[20] Kotoulas Ioannis E, “The Russian-Ukranian War (2014–2022): Historical, Political, Cultural-Educational, Religous, Economic, and Legal Aspects” Center for Ukrainian and European Scientific Cooperation (2022): 551, DOI: 10.30525/978-9934-26-223-4-66.

[21] Richard Sawka, “Crisis of the International System and International Politics” Russia in Global Affairs no.1 (2023):75, DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2023-21-1-70-91.

[22] The North Atlantic Treaty [April 1949] (The North Atlantic Treaty), Offical Texts, Washington, DC, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

[23]Kari Roberts, " Understanding Putin: The politics of identity and geopolitics in Russian foreign policy discourse?" International Journal 72, no. 1 (2017): 33, DOI: 10.1177/0020702017692609

[24] Vera Tolz, “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia” Europe-Asia Studies 50, no.6 (1998): 1017.

[25] Tolz, “Forging the Nation”, 995.

[26] Tolz, “Forging the Nation”, 995.

[27] Tolz, “Forging the Nation”, 995-6.

[28] Tolz, “Forging the Nation”, 996.

[29] Tolz, “Forging the Nation”, 996.

[30] R Craig Nation, “Reset or rerun? Sources of discord in Russian–American relations” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 45 no3/4 (2012): 380.

[31] David G Lewis, Russia’s New Authoritarianism Putin and the Politics of Order (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press Ltd) 53.

[32] Lewis, Russia’s New Authoritarianism, 100.

[33] Vera Tolz, “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia” Europe-Asia Studies 50, no.6 (1998): 1017.

[34] Taras Kuzio “Why Russia Invaded Ukraine” Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, no. 21 (2022): 40.

[35] David G Lewis, Russia’s New Authoritarianism Putin and the Politics of Order (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press Ltd) 50.

[36] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 126.

[37] Robert O. Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin” Israel Studies 3 no.1 (1998) 142.

[38] Robert Freedman,“Russia and Israel, 159.

[39] Mark N Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy” Middle East Forum 12 no. 1 (2005)

[40] Katz “Putin’s Pro Israel”

[41] Niko Vorobyov, "What’s behind Russia’s ‘soft power’ moves on Israel-Palestine?" Al Jazeera, August 13, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/13/whats-behind-russias-soft-power-moves-on-israel-palestine.

[42] Kimberly Marten, “Upsetting the Balance: Why Russia Chose Hamas over Israel” The Washington Quaterly 47 no.3 (2024) 80.

[43]  Marten, Upsetting the Balance, 92.

[44] Marten, Upsetting the Balance, 92.

References

Beaumont, Peter, and Sam Jones. "Russia Has Invaded Ukraine: What We Know So Far." The Guardian, February 24, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/russia-has-invaded-ukraine-what-we-know-so-far.

Donelly, Jack. Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Edwards, Gail, and Gary Thomas. "The Path to Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Moscow’s Framing of Conflict and Cooperation with the West under Putin’s Rule?" Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2024.2324559.

Festernstein, Matthew. "Pragmatism, Realism and Moralism." Political Studies Review 14 (2016): 40. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929915607890.

Freedman, Robert O. "Russia and Israel under Yeltsin." Israel Studies 3, no. 1 (1998): 142. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30246799.

Freedman, Robert. "Russia and Israel." Israel Studies 3, no. 1 (1998): 159.

Gries, Peter, and Paton Pak Chun Yam. "Ideology and International Relations." ScienceDirect 34 (2020): 138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.03.006.

Katz, Mark N. "Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy." Middle East Forum 12, no. 1 (2005): 55.

Kertzer, Joshua D., and Dustin Tingley. "Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms." Annual Review of Political Science 21 (2018): 329.

Kuzio, Taras. "Why Russia Invaded Ukraine." Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, no. 21 (2022): 40.

Lewis, David G. Russia’s New Authoritarianism: Putin and the Politics of Order. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.

Marten, Kimberly. "Upsetting the Balance: Why Russia Chose Hamas over Israel." The Washington Quarterly 47, no. 3 (2024): 79–102.https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2024.2398320.

Nation, R. Craig. "Reset or Rerun? Sources of Discord in Russian–American Relations." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45, no. 3/4 (2012): 380.

Plamenatz, John. Ideology. London: Pall Mall Press, 1965.

Tolz, Vera. "Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia." Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 6 (1998): 1017.

Vorobyov, N. "What's behind Russia's 'soft power' moves on Israel-Palestine?" Al Jazeera, August 13, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/13/whats-behind-russias-soft-power-moves-on-israel-palestine.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.