The Art of Silence: How India and the US Weaponise Uncertainty in Asia

Introduction

From the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the early 21^st century, Britain maintained a ‘Splendid Isolation’ stance, deliberately avoiding formal alliances with other significant European powers of that time.[1] Preferring to act as a balancer, this was done to preserve diplomatic flexibility and deter aggression arising from being bound to alliances. First coined by Eric Eisenberg in the 1980s, ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ is a tool for states to navigate complex geopolitical events without being bound to rigid alliances by maintaining a vague approach to their foreign policies.[2] The above example is an early instance of this maintenance of deliberate diplomatic vagueness. Clarity in foreign policy is frequently regarded as necessary in an era characterised by multipolar uncertainty and escalating geopolitical conflict. When used calculatedly, this ambiguity may be a useful tool for statecraft. Indian Foreign policy has also been long characterised by the policy of strategic ambiguity to balance partnerships with rival powers, avoid rigid alignment with a particular bloc of power and preserve autonomous decision-making for itself. This has been evident often in history, under Prime Ministers ranging from Jawaharlal Nehru to Atal Bihari Vajpayee and even today, in its ambiguous nuclear doctrine of the “No First Use” policy and the Non-Aligned Movement in 1951, where India has been able to focus on state interests without compromising its sovereignty and autonomy. Juxtaposing with the notion of non-alignment, this essay will aim to comprehensively compare and conceptualise the policy of Strategic Ambiguity in Indian Foreign Policy regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, with that of the United States, and the China-Taiwan conflict. First, the essay will provide a brief context of Indian Foreign Policy post-independence with a historical lens before a concise engagement with the idea of Strategic Ambiguity and how it differs from non-alignment, theoretically, with examples. Third, a comprehensive case study analysing Indian FP’s strategic ambiguity with the Russia-Ukraine conflict will be discussed. Fourth, a second case study investigating the US’s strategic ambiguity with the China-Taiwan issue will be elaborated upon. Finally, a comparative analysis of both countries’ cases of strategic ambiguity, with similarities and differences, will be illustrated before providing a conclusion.  

The Foundations of Indian Foreign Policy

Occupying 70% of South Asia's land area, 75% of its population, and 80% of its GDP, India is the region's largest state and enjoys strategic significance.[3] Since its independence, India's FP has been dynamic. Rooted in the ideals of peaceful coexistence, democracy, and sovereignty, India spearheaded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 under her first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, amid the Cold War to promote self-reliance and idealism.[4] India's dedication to peace and security was further strengthened during this time by its active involvement in the United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations across regions like Congo and Cyprus.[5]India took a more proactive security posture after 1962 due to the Sino-Indian War, than its idealist notions like Nehru’s “hindi-chini bhai bhai” slogan in the 1950s, and growing partition tensions with Pakistan, realising the limitations of idealism in a hostile geopolitical environment, and understanding the need to replace the idealist strategy with a realist one.[6] This transition from idealism to realism was represented by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, which grew from strained relations with the US and the repercussions of the Sino-Indian War.[7]

From 1971 onwards, a desire arose for regional assertion in India’s FP, particularly focusing on using Hard Power. This was evident in India’s intervention in Bangladesh’s liberation war with Pakistan and her increasing concerns about the role of the US, China, and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean, generating military constraints on India.[8] 

This was further exacerbated when the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union caught up to India and her internal politico-economic crises, including a balance of payment (BOP) crisis in 1991.[9] All this led to India reconsidering her economic and foreign policy ideals and introducing its New Economic Policy of Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG), which incorporated modernisation, global integration and increased competition to aid its BOP crisis.[10]

The following years, till 1998 and 2013, saw priorities for FP shifting to partnerships in commerce, investment, and technology, especially through a revived "Look East" strategy and nuclear developments, transforming India into a balancing power highlighted by its nuclear deal with the US.[11] Since 2013, India has adopted an engaging strategy, prioritising multi-alignment over non-alignment, inserting itself strategically as an economic actor in the global landscape. India's strategic engagement with Russia for oil purchases despite Western sanctions, its intentions to empower BRICS, and its recent positive negotiations with Trump's trade tariff plans feed the long-term strategic benefits India foresees with US bilateral relations, displaying its FP's ambiguity and pragmatism. The Indian FP has primarily been India-centric, being strategically ambiguous rather than binding to rigid alliances/doctrine, choosing flexibility and sovereignty. This also demonstrates how strategic ambiguity has been adopted as a calculated tool to assert regional leadership and expand global influence independently. Rhetorically idealistic, India’s FP has become realist in execution.

Strategic Ambiguity VS Non-Alignment

Scott Adams states, “’ Strategic Ambiguity’ is an important lever of persuasion that may not only help you be more persuasive, but actually improve your own decision-making.”[12] This policy possesses vagueness where states intentionally avoid making clear intentions of maximising diplomatic flexibility, balancing conflicting interests, and deterring rivals. As opposed to declarative strategies that explicate a state’s alignment or decisions, strategic ambiguity carries a certain calculated uncertainty. However, Strategic Ambiguity is not to be confused with the ideology of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which was evident in India’s foreign policy under Nehru during the Cold War, where it maintained a balanced stance against the power blocs. The Non-Aligned Movement was an organisation of states that avoided formal alignment with either the US or the Soviet Union during a bipolar world, and sought to either remain neutral or independent.[13] Strategic Ambiguity, in comparison to Non-alignment, is ingrained in the deterrence theory, expressed by Thomas Schelling, who mentions vagueness in indication can improve deterrence by introducing risk into the enemy’s decision, and is tactical and adaptive.[14] To illustrate, the “No First Use” policy by India has been perceived as efficient regarding situations where nuclear weapons have the potential to be employed, which sustains deterrence which avoiding strict thresholds. A similar example is the US’s long-standing policy towards Israel’s nuclear weapons, highlighting strategic ambiguity in a way that the US has avoided confirming or denying Israel’s nuclear capabilities, making way for deterrence without increasing tensions in the region or violating non-proliferation norms.[15] Their differences lie in the fact that Strategic Ambiguity is less about neutrality but about managing vagueness in the pursuit of strategic leverage. NAM also carries with it an element of clarity on its ideological detachment, while Strategic Ambiguity thrives on deliberate uncertainty. For example, NAM conveys publicly a neutral stance as India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Ghana took, while Strategic Ambiguity entails silent alignments and diplomacy, evident in India’s defence partnership balancing ties with Russia and the US.[16] There also lies an ideological difference between the two, where NAM is value-focused and driven, while strategic ambiguity is driven by state interest and uncertainty.[17] In a more multipolar world where Strategic Ambiguity often serves better-suited than NAM for state interests and development, this essay focuses on the former aspect regarding India and the US.

Case Study 1: India’s Strategic Ambiguity in the Russia-Ukraine War

India has taken a calculatedly neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine war. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, 92% of Ukrainians voted for independence.[18] Ukraine’s desire for independence, which Russia perceived as a threat to its existence. Numerous political tensions in both nations, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and further outbreaks in Eastern Ukraine paved the way for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Putin justified this invasion under the claim that Ukraine was a part of Russia, calling Kyiv’s government a foreign-run “fascist ‘puppet regime’” that needed to “demilitarise” and “de-nazify” to protect the Russian-speaking persons in the country.[19] This intervention has since then invited mass condemnation by the US, EU, United Nations, including the imposition of sanctions on Russia. However, India relates to this bilateral conflict due to its historic technology and trade connections with Russia, dedication to peace, while simultaneously maintaining healthy relations with the West, and cultivating benefits from Russia.

A contemporary example of strategic ambiguity includes India’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, where its diplomatic positioning entails intentionally avoiding alignment with either party to strategically defend national interests. India possessed a significant historical relationship with Russia even before the Soviet Union collapsed. During the Cold War, although India formally sought non-alignment, the Soviet Union secretly remained a strategically dependable partner, well demonstrated in its UN vetoes and backing for India's stance on Kashmir between 1957 and 1971.[20] Moreover, the Soviet Union aided and supported India’s first nuclear tests in 1974, unlike the US.[21] 

Contemporarily, pragmatic economic and military considerations also influence India's strategic ambiguity. An example is India increasing its imports of discounted Russian crude oil, which grew from less than 1% prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to over 40% in 2024, in response to Western sanctions and a global energy crisis.[22] Indo-Russian relations also improved post-Cold War, when Russia provided around 72% of military hardware and technologies to India in 2010, than its western allies.[23] Transforming the focus from geopolitics to energy, this depicts India utilising this argument to justify its neutrality, terming its actions as economically necessary, ensuring the protection of its interests while minding principles. Additionally, India, which is known to be aligned with Russia as far as defence purchases were concerned, has now strategically diversified its options by engaging in the form of its recent agreements over C-17, Apache and MQ-9-B Drones purchase from the US and Rafale fighter aircraft from France.[24]

Indo-Russian relations have developed from political and energy cooperation to even nuclear spaces, evident in the 2024 Indo-Russian reformed agreement of building civil nuclear power plants in Tamil Nadu, India.[25] Furthermore, when Russian defence research and development (R&D) was struggling after the USSR’s collapse, India collaborated with Russia to create the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.[26]

Despite Western pressure, India has not publicly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has abstained on multiple resolutions in the UN Security Council (UNSC), the General Assembly (UNGA), and the Human Rights Council.[27] In 2022, at a UNGA session, Indian representatives emphasised the significance of ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘sovereignty’, urging for the immediate termination of hostilities, regarding Ukraine’s position, but avoiding blaming Russia.[28] This reflected India’s diplomatic strategic ambiguity in avoiding condemning Russia’s actions while arguing for ceasing violence by advocating for peace and dialogue. Another example is India’s continued connection with both Ukraine and Russia, in Modi’s telephonic suggestion of diplomatic dialogue to Putin and India providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine and supporting its G20 arguments.[29] When Europeans criticised India for importing oil from Russia, India’s Foreign Minister Jaishankar defended India by highlighting Europe’s double standards and that, since the war, the EU has imported six times the fossil fuel energy from Russia than India.[30] He underlined that India, like all other countries, prioritises its national interests, balancing reasonable energy demands with a realist FP approach.

This demonstrates a killing of two birds with one stone act, where India employs strategic ambiguity by staying neutral while utilising pragmatic benefits from both nations. Moreover, a calculated language has been adopted by Indian leaders like Modi at the G20 summit, often mentioned in Western communiqués, “This is not an era of war”, to assert their strategic ambiguity peacefully.[31] 

These arguments demonstrate two aspects of Indo-Russian relations. Firstly, the long-standing cooperation and support that both nations have been receiving from each other indicate a dependable, growing relationship. Secondly, a transformative shift of India’s ideological stance from non-alignment to strategic ambiguity, serving self-interests while maintaining relations without alienating either bloc.

Case Study 2: The United States’ Strategic Ambiguity in the      China-Taiwan Dispute

To warn and contain ‘Taiwan’s independence’ separatist forces’, the Chinese Military conducted military drills in the Taiwan Strait at the beginning of April 2025.[32] Taiwan’s presidential office has condemned these exercises, observing their routine occurrences and understanding that these ‘provocations’ arise from Beijing’s long-running claim that the democratic island of Taiwan is under its territory. Some scholars like McDonell perceive the consistent drills by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a practice attempt to overthrow Taipei’s government soon.[33] When the Chinese Civil War concluded in 1949, the defeated Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government were forced to flee to Taiwan, and the Communist Party established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland.[34] Although Taiwan has never formally declared its independence, it has since functioned as a self-governing democracy with its constitution, government, and military, while the Chinese Communist Party, via the One China Policy, see one China with Taiwan as a part of it and is committed to pursuing reunification.[35] Peacefully, if possible, violently if necessary.

The US plays a major but calibrated role in this conflict: simply to maintain its regional status quo, deter Chinese attacks and support the self-governed island – Taiwan, according to Kuo.[36] In today’s realist world, where countries are hungry for power and influence, the US’s ‘interference’ in this conflict is understandable, due to Taiwan being a significant economic manufacturing partner for the US’s defence and technology industries.[37]. Another major reason is a fear of a tilt in the axis of balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, which has the potential to threaten the US’s strategic partnerships and trade alliances. This maintenance of power is crucial for the US to avoid China from increasing regional influence and going to challenging the US’s interests globally.

The US, being a key ally for Taiwan, supports it militarily under the Taiwan Relations Act, 1979, yet does not officially recognise its sovereignty.[38] On the other hand, under the One China Policy, the US recognises PRC as China and doesn’t support Taiwan’s urge for independence explicitly, terming the issue as unsettled.[39] Therefore, to maintain regional influence and deter Chinese attacks, Washington’s current foreign policy is of ‘Strategic Ambiguity’, a deliberate avoidance of a clear stance, where an air of dual deterrence emerges, with uncertainty in China and Taiwan about US intervention in a war.[40] Consequently, this avoids China from invading Taiwan and maintains the fear of abandonment in Taiwan if it declares independence.

Additionally, this policy aligns with the US’s strategy of ‘offshore balancing’, aiming to maintain balance in strategically significant areas without becoming militarily over-involved.[41] Instead of official security assurances, it presents itself as a flexible power that can intervene if needed. The US also demonstrates its uncertainty by no formal defence commitments but promotion of peaceful resolutions, bilateral diplomacy, and maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait without direct conflict.[42] However, given China's increasing aggressiveness, academics like Chen et al have questioned strategic ambiguity, arguing that despite SA’s peace, rising tensions could call for the US to opt for Strategic Clarity.[43] However, excessive transparency might backfire and force China to take more swift or forceful action. In the words of Kuo, China considers this a casus belli, and many see SA as successful in preventing US entrapment and deterring a potential war.[44] 

An Analytical Comparison:

India's strategically ambiguous approach towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the US’s similar position in the China-Taiwan issue provide intriguing contrasts, though they both aim to safeguard national interests without becoming strictly bound with commitments or escalating military matters. Although their regional backgrounds and intentions in their foreign policies manifest in different ways, SA demonstrates certain similarities with both India and the US.

To begin with, both India and the US employ SA to preserve their foreign policy flexibility without entering binding commitments that would entrap conflictingly.[45] India executed this by the policy of non-alignment, but now changed to a multi-alignment strategy, through trade balancing, abstentions, and diplomatic jargon, allowing it to maintain strategic autonomy with increased global south appeal. The US, conversely, tries to uphold its realist containment and great power status through uncertainty in its policies, like in the case of Taiwan, supporting its right to self-defence under the Taiwan Relations Act, but at the same time, acknowledging Beijing’s “One China” policy, enabling it to avoid bloc entrapment, maintain regional balance of power, and its status quo. Similarly, SA allows both actors to deter without provocation, the US deterring an attack from China and deterring Taiwan from declaring independence, and India avoiding clear alignment with Western blocs to prevent provoking China or Russia.[46] Furthermore, being calculatedly ambiguous has not deviated India and the US from upholding the primacy of economic considerations[47]. For example, the US still has a significant amount of trade with China despite tensions, and India, likewise, is energy-dependent on Russian oil and gas despite supporting peace efforts for Ukraine and urging an end to the war.

Despite these similarities, there remain differences in how this uncertainty has shaped their policies. Firstly, there are differences in the domestic support for the policy in both the US and India. The US experiences rising pressure to transform to ‘strategic clarity’ than SA, and defend Taiwan openly, to ward off Chinese threats.[48] In India, SA sees positivity with India’s role as a regional peacemaker capable of achieving great power status, facilitated. Secondly, the US operates in a security alliance framework, in comparison to India, which emphasises non-alignment and multilateral collaboration.[49] Thirdly, while the US provides military support to Taiwan covertly, India has major defence alliances with Russia, which is its largest supplier of military hardware.[50] This implies that their methods are moulded by essentially different geopolitical positionings and strategic national demands. It can be understood that SA as a foreign policy tool can be effective, however, its manifestation can differ based on power politics, regional threats, and state interests.

Conclusion

To conclude, this essay first provides a concise background of Indian foreign policy historically, before engaging with the difference between strategic ambiguity and non-alignment, with examples. This essay then consults two case studies, one on Indian Foreign Policy’s strategic ambiguity with Russia-Ukraine, and the other on the US’s strategic ambiguity with China-Taiwan. Finally, a comparative analysis of both cases with similarities and differences was discussed. The essay compares the concept of Strategic Ambiguity in Indian Foreign Policy with that of the US using two case studies, and argues that while both India and the US use strategic ambiguity for state interests, avoiding military escalation, India employs this policy for strategic autonomy and maintaining defense ties with Russia, simultaneously avoiding alienating the West, while the US uses it for deterrence and to sustain regional balance. Strategic ambiguity serves as a versatile tool of statecraft, but can manifest and yield differing outcomes contingent on geopolitical environments, state power position, and national interests.

 Footnotes:

1.  John Charmley, “Splendid Isolation? : Britain and the Balance of Power 1874-1914 : Charmley, John, 1955- : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive,” Internet Archive, 2022, https://archive.org/details/splendidisolatio0000char.

2. Eric M. Eisenberg, “Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication,” Communication Monographs 51, no. 3 (September 1984): 227–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758409390197.

3. Kainat Raza and Kainat Raza, “South Asia: The Fastest Growing Region in the World - Historica,” Historica - Exploring human achievements, experiences, and understanding by sharing our common history and, May 13, 2023, https://historica.world/south-asia-the-fastest-growing-region-in-the-world/.

4. Prashant Prabhakar, “A Critical Review of Foreign Policy of India since 1947 till Date: Part – I,” Times of India Blog (Times of India, July 27, 2022), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/truth-lies-and-politics/a-critical-review-of-foreign-policy-of-india-since-1947-till-date-part-i/?utm_.

5. Permanent Mission of India to the UN, “INDIA and UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING and PEACEBUILDING,” n.d., https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/menu/submenu__1260383365.pdf.

6. Pritish Nandy, “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” Times of India Blog (Times of India, October 9, 2013), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/extraordinaryissue/hindi-chini-bhai-bhai/.

7. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia Indopakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Foundation Books, 2006), https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-Of-War-In-South-Asia-Indopakistani-Conflicts-Since-1947/Ganguly/p/book/9780367310080.

8. Yashasvi Raghav, “Evolution of Indian Foreign Policy,” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) 29, no. 8 (2024), https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2908080103.

9. Ibid.

10. ET Online, “Manmohan Singh’s 1991 Economic Reforms: The Masterstroke in Budget That Reshaped India’s Economic Destiny,” The Economic Times (Economic Times, December 27, 2024), https://m.economictimes.com/news/economy/policy/manmohan-singhs-1991-economic-reforms-the-masterstroke-in-budget-that-reshaped-indias-economic-destiny-forever/articleshow/116705267.cms.

11. Raghav, “Evolution of Indian Foreign Policy,” (2024)

12. “Strategic Ambiguity - Levers of Persuasion - Medium,” Medium, March 26, 2019, https://leversofpersuasion.medium.com/strategic-ambiguity-89eadcca04d1.

13. NTI, “Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 28, 2022, https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/.

14. Thomas C. Schelling, “Arms and Influence,” Yale University Press, 2020, https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300246742/arms-and-influence/.

15. Avner Cohen, “Israel and the Bomb,” JSTOR, 1998, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cohe10482.

16. C. Raja Mohan, “Crossing the Rubicon,” Google Books, 2025, https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Crossing_the_Rubicon.html?id=DkphQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y.

17. s gopal, “What Is Nonalignment?,” India International Centre Quarterly 3, no. 3 (1976): 3–7, https://doi.org/10.2307/23001997.

18. Council on Foreign Relations, “Ukraine’s Struggle for Independence in Russia’s Shadow,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/ukraines-struggle-independence-russias-shadow.

19. Council on Foreign Relations, “Ukraine’s Struggle for Independence in Russia’s Shadow,” 2022

20. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia Indopakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Foundation Books, 2006), https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-Of-War-In-South-Asia-Indopakistani-Conflicts-Since-1947/Ganguly/p/book/9780367310080.

21. Petr V. Topychkanov, “US–Soviet/Russian Dialogue on the Nuclear Weapons Programme of India,” Strategic Analysis 42, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 251–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2018.1463958.

22. https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/india-imports-49-billion-worth-of-russian-oil-in-3rd-year-of-ukraine-invasion/article69261150.ece

23. mathew george et al., “SIPRI Fact Sheet,” 2025, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.

24. ANI, “India, France to Sign Their Largest Ever Deal for Rafale-Marine Fighter Jets on April 28,” The Economic Times (Economic Times, April 19, 2025), https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/india-france-to-sign-their-largest-ever-deal-for-rafale-marine-fighter-jets-on-april-28/articleshow/120437284.cms.

25. https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=KPBFklAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao, https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-chietigj-bajpaee-752b359, and https://twitter.com/Chietigj, “India–Russia Relations,” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, October 17, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/india-russia-relations.

26. “BrahMos Aerospace - an India Russia Joint Venture,” Brahmos.com, 2018, https://www.brahmos.com/.

27. United Nations, “UN General Assembly Votes to Suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council,” UN News, April 7, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782.

28. “Ukraine: India Abstains on Vote for Emergency UNGA Session; Calls for Return to Path of Diplomacy | NewsClick,” NewsClick, 2022, https://www.newsclick.in/ukraine-india-abstains-vote-emergency-UNGA-session-calls-return-path-diplomacy.

29. Ibid.

30. India, “‘Europe’s Choices’: S Jaishankar Slams Double Standards over Russian Oil,” www.ndtv.com (NDTV, December 6, 2022), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/german-minister-by-his-side-s-jaishankar-targets-europe-over-russian-oil-3581139.

31. Shubhajit Roy, “‘Not an Era of War’: In US, Modi Calls for Peaceful Resolution of Ukraine Conflict,” The Indian Express, June 23, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/narendra-war-speech-us-modi-peaceful-resolution-ukraine-conflict-8681176/.

32. Stephen McDonell and Koh Ewe, “China Military Says It Held Live-Fire Drill in Taiwan Strait,” BBC News, April 2, 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c24q5pg8m07o.

33. Ibid.

34. Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are so Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump.

35. Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are so Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump.

36. Raymond Kuo, “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped,” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

37. William Alan Reinsch and Jack Whitney, “Silicon Island: Assessing Taiwan’s Importance to U.S. Economic Growth and Security,” Csis.org, January 10, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/silicon-island-assessing-taiwans-importance-us-economic-growth-and-security.

38. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Taiwan,” United States Department of State (United States Department of State, February 13, 2025), https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/.

39. Ibid.

40. Raymond Kuo, “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped,” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

41. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing,” July 2016, https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Offshore-Balancing.pdf.

42. Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are so Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump.

43. Austin Horng-En Wang et al., “Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity,” Foreign Policy Analysis 20, no. 3 (April 27, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orae010.

44. Raymond Kuo, “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped,” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

45. “Diplomacy and Ambiguity: Constructing Interests in Cooperation | the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR),” n.d., https://www.nbr.org/publication/diplomacy-and-ambiguity-constructing-interests-in-cooperation/.

46. Raymond Kuo, “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped,” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

47. Ashley J. Tellis, “‘What Is in Our Interest’: India and the Ukraine War,” carnegieendowment.org, April 25, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/04/what-is-in-our-interest-india-and-the-ukraine-war?lang=en.

48. Austin Horng-En Wang et al., “Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity,” Foreign Policy Analysis 20, no. 3 (April 27, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orae010.

49. Ashley. J Tellis, “Non-Allied Forever: India’s Grand Strategy according to Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,” Carnegieendowment.org, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2021/03/non-allied-forever-indias-grand-strategy-according-to-subrahmanyam-jaishankar?lang=en.

50. Dr Chietigj Bajpaee, Lisa Toremark, and https://twitter.com/Chietigj, “India–Russia Relations,” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, October 17, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/india-russia-relations.

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“Diplomacy and Ambiguity: Constructing Interests in Cooperation | the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR),” n.d. https://www.nbr.org/publication/diplomacy-and-ambiguity-constructing-interests-in-cooperation/.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee, Lisa Toremark, and https://twitter.com/Chietigj. “India–Russia Relations.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, October 17, 2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/india-russia-relations.

Eisenberg, Eric M. “Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication.” Communication Monographs 51, no. 3 (September 1984): 227–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758409390197.

ET Online. “Manmohan Singh’s 1991 Economic Reforms: The Masterstroke in Budget That Reshaped India’s Economic Destiny.” The Economic Times. Economic Times, December 27, 2024. https://m.economictimes.com/news/economy/policy/manmohan-singhs-1991-economic-reforms-the-masterstroke-in-budget-that-reshaped-indias-economic-destiny-forever/articleshow/116705267.cms.

Ganguly, Sumit . The Origins of War in South Asia Indopakistani Conflicts since 1947. Foundation Books, 2006. https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-Of-War-In-South-Asia-Indopakistani-Conflicts-Since-1947/Ganguly/p/book/9780367310080.

george, mathew , katarina djokic, zain hussain, pieter d. wezeman , and siemon t. wezeman. “SIPRI Fact Sheet,” 2025. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.

gopal, s. “What Is Nonalignment?” India International Centre Quarterly 3, no. 3 (1976): 3–7. https://doi.org/10.2307/23001997.

Hook, Steven. W. “Comparative Foreign Policy : Adaptation Strategies of the Great and Emerging Powers : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive.” Internet Archive, 2023. https://archive.org/details/comparativeforei0000unse_x7d0.

India. “‘Europe’s Choices’: S Jaishankar Slams Double Standards over Russian Oil.” www.ndtv.com. NDTV, December 6, 2022. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/german-minister-by-his-side-s-jaishankar-targets-europe-over-russian-oil-3581139.

Karatnycky, Adrian. “The Stubborn Legend of a Western ‘Coup’ in Ukraine.” Foreign Policy, August 4, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/04/ukraine-maidan-revolution-russia-coup-myth-yanukovych/.

Kuo, Raymond. “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped.” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

Maizland, Lindsay, and Clara Fong. “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are so Tense.” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump.

McDonell, Stephen, and Koh Ewe. “China Military Says It Held Live-Fire Drill in Taiwan Strait.” BBC News, April 2, 2025. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c24q5pg8m07o.

Mearsheimer, John, and Stephen Walt. “The Case for Offshore Balancing,” July 2016. https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Offshore-Balancing.pdf.

Medium. “Strategic Ambiguity - Levers of Persuasion - Medium,” March 26, 2019. https://leversofpersuasion.medium.com/strategic-ambiguity-89eadcca04d1.

Mohan, C. Raja. “Crossing the Rubicon.” Google Books, 2025. https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Crossing_the_Rubicon.html?id=DkphQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y.

Nandy, Pritish. “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai.” Times of India Blog. Times of India, October 9, 2013. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/extraordinaryissue/hindi-chini-bhai-bhai/.

NewsClick. “Ukraine: India Abstains on Vote for Emergency UNGA Session; Calls for Return to Path of Diplomacy | NewsClick,” 2022. https://www.newsclick.in/ukraine-india-abstains-vote-emergency-UNGA-session-calls-return-path-diplomacy.

NTI. “Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 28, 2022. https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/.

Ogden, Chris. “Indian Foreign Policy.” Proquest.com, 2025. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=1708793.

Permanent Mission of India to the UN. “INDIA and UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING and PEACEBUILDING,” n.d. https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/menu/submenu__1260383365.pdf.

Prabhakar, Prashant. “A Critical Review of Foreign Policy of India since 1947 till Date: Part – I.” Times of India Blog. Times of India, July 27, 2022. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/truth-lies-and-politics/a-critical-review-of-foreign-policy-of-india-since-1947-till-date-part-i/?utm_.

Raghav, Yashasvi. “Evolution of Indian Foreign Policy.” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) 29, no. 8 (2024). https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2908080103.

Raza, Kainat, and Kainat Raza. “South Asia: The Fastest Growing Region in the World - Historica.” Historica - Exploring human achievements, experiences, and understanding by sharing our common history and, May 13, 2023. https://historica.world/south-asia-the-fastest-growing-region-in-the-world/.

Reinsch, William Alan, and Jack Whitney. “Silicon Island: Assessing Taiwan’s Importance to U.S. Economic Growth and Security.” Csis.org, January 10, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/silicon-island-assessing-taiwans-importance-us-economic-growth-and-security.

Roy, Shubhajit. “‘Not an Era of War’: In US, Modi Calls for Peaceful Resolution of Ukraine Conflict.” The Indian Express, June 23, 2023. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/narendra-war-speech-us-modi-peaceful-resolution-ukraine-conflict-8681176/.

Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, Michael T. Snarr. “Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective : Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior.” Proquest.com, 2025. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=5165265.

Tellis, Ashley J. “‘What Is in Our Interest’: India and the Ukraine War.” carnegieendowment.org, April 25, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/04/what-is-in-our-interest-india-and-the-ukraine-war?lang=en.

Tellis, Ashley. J. “Non-Allied Forever: India’s Grand Strategy according to Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.” Carnegieendowment.org, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2021/03/non-allied-forever-indias-grand-strategy-according-to-subrahmanyam-jaishankar?lang=en.

The Hindu. “India Imports €49 Billion Worth of Russian Oil in 3rd Year of Ukraine Invasion.” The Hindu, February 25, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/india-imports-49-billion-worth-of-russian-oil-in-3rd-year-of-ukraine-invasion/article69261150.ece.

Topychkanov, Petr V. “US–Soviet/Russian Dialogue on the Nuclear Weapons Programme of India.” Strategic Analysis 42, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 251–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2018.1463958.

U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Relations with Taiwan.” United States Department of State. United States Department of State, February 13, 2025. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/.

United Nations. “UN General Assembly Votes to Suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council.” UN News, April 7, 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782.

[1] John Charmley, “Splendid Isolation? : Britain and the Balance of Power 1874-1914 : Charmley, John, 1955- : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive,” Internet Archive, 2022, https://archive.org/details/splendidisolatio0000char.

[2] Eric M. Eisenberg, “Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational Communication,” Communication Monographs 51, no. 3 (September 1984): 227–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758409390197.

[3] Kainat Raza and Kainat Raza, “South Asia: The Fastest Growing Region in the World - Historica,” Historica - Exploring human achievements, experiences, and understanding by sharing our common history and, May 13, 2023, https://historica.world/south-asia-the-fastest-growing-region-in-the-world/.

[4] Prashant Prabhakar, “A Critical Review of Foreign Policy of India since 1947 till Date: Part – I,” Times of India Blog (Times of India, July 27, 2022), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/truth-lies-and-politics/a-critical-review-of-foreign-policy-of-india-since-1947-till-date-part-i/?utm_.

[5] Permanent Mission of India to the UN, “INDIA and UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING and PEACEBUILDING,” n.d., https://pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/menu/submenu__1260383365.pdf.

[6] Pritish Nandy, “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” Times of India Blog (Times of India, October 9, 2013), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/extraordinaryissue/hindi-chini-bhai-bhai/.

[7] Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia Indopakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Foundation Books, 2006), https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-Of-War-In-South-Asia-Indopakistani-Conflicts-Since-1947/Ganguly/p/book/9780367310080.

[8] Yashasvi Raghav, “Evolution of Indian Foreign Policy,” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) 29, no. 8 (2024), https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2908080103.

[9] Ibid.

[10] ET Online, “Manmohan Singh’s 1991 Economic Reforms: The Masterstroke in Budget That Reshaped India’s Economic Destiny,” The Economic Times (Economic Times, December 27, 2024), https://m.economictimes.com/news/economy/policy/manmohan-singhs-1991-economic-reforms-the-masterstroke-in-budget-that-reshaped-indias-economic-destiny-forever/articleshow/116705267.cms.

[11] Raghav, “Evolution of Indian Foreign Policy,” (2024)

[12] “Strategic Ambiguity - Levers of Persuasion - Medium,” Medium, March 26, 2019, https://leversofpersuasion.medium.com/strategic-ambiguity-89eadcca04d1.

[13] NTI, “Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 28, 2022, https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/.

[14] Thomas C. Schelling, “Arms and Influence,” Yale University Press, 2020, https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300246742/arms-and-influence/.

[15] Avner Cohen, “Israel and the Bomb,” JSTOR, 1998, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cohe10482.

[16] C. Raja Mohan, “Crossing the Rubicon,” Google Books, 2025, https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Crossing_the_Rubicon.html?id=DkphQgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y.

[17] s gopal, “What Is Nonalignment?,” India International Centre Quarterly 3, no. 3 (1976): 3–7, https://doi.org/10.2307/23001997.

[18] Council on Foreign Relations, “Ukraine’s Struggle for Independence in Russia’s Shadow,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/ukraines-struggle-independence-russias-shadow.

[19] Council on Foreign Relations, “Ukraine’s Struggle for Independence in Russia’s Shadow,” 2022

[20] Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia Indopakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Foundation Books, 2006), https://www.routledge.com/The-Origins-Of-War-In-South-Asia-Indopakistani-Conflicts-Since-1947/Ganguly/p/book/9780367310080.

[21] Petr V. Topychkanov, “US–Soviet/Russian Dialogue on the Nuclear Weapons Programme of India,” Strategic Analysis 42, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 251–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2018.1463958.

[22] https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/india-imports-49-billion-worth-of-russian-oil-in-3rd-year-of-ukraine-invasion/article69261150.ece

[23] mathew george et al., “SIPRI Fact Sheet,” 2025, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.

[24] ANI, “India, France to Sign Their Largest Ever Deal for Rafale-Marine Fighter Jets on April 28,” The Economic Times (Economic Times, April 19, 2025), https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/india-france-to-sign-their-largest-ever-deal-for-rafale-marine-fighter-jets-on-april-28/articleshow/120437284.cms.

[25] https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=KPBFklAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao, https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-chietigj-bajpaee-752b359, and https://twitter.com/Chietigj, “India–Russia Relations,” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, October 17, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/india-russia-relations.

[26] “BrahMos Aerospace - an India Russia Joint Venture,” Brahmos.com, 2018, https://www.brahmos.com/.

[27] United Nations, “UN General Assembly Votes to Suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council,” UN News, April 7, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782.

[28] “Ukraine: India Abstains on Vote for Emergency UNGA Session; Calls for Return to Path of Diplomacy | NewsClick,” NewsClick, 2022, https://www.newsclick.in/ukraine-india-abstains-vote-emergency-UNGA-session-calls-return-path-diplomacy.

[29] Ibid.

[30] India, “‘Europe’s Choices’: S Jaishankar Slams Double Standards over Russian Oil,” www.ndtv.com (NDTV, December 6, 2022), https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/german-minister-by-his-side-s-jaishankar-targets-europe-over-russian-oil-3581139.

[31] Shubhajit Roy, “‘Not an Era of War’: In US, Modi Calls for Peaceful Resolution of Ukraine Conflict,” The Indian Express, June 23, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/narendra-war-speech-us-modi-peaceful-resolution-ukraine-conflict-8681176/.

[32] Stephen McDonell and Koh Ewe, “China Military Says It Held Live-Fire Drill in Taiwan Strait,” BBC News, April 2, 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c24q5pg8m07o.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are so Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump.

[35] Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are so Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump.

[36] Raymond Kuo, “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped,” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

[37] William Alan Reinsch and Jack Whitney, “Silicon Island: Assessing Taiwan’s Importance to U.S. Economic Growth and Security,” Csis.org, January 10, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/silicon-island-assessing-taiwans-importance-us-economic-growth-and-security.

[38] U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Taiwan,” United States Department of State (United States Department of State, February 13, 2025), https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Raymond Kuo, “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped,” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

[41] John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing,” July 2016, https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Offshore-Balancing.pdf.

[42] Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are so Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump.

[43] Austin Horng-En Wang et al., “Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity,” Foreign Policy Analysis 20, no. 3 (April 27, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orae010.

[44] Raymond Kuo, “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped,” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

[45] “Diplomacy and Ambiguity: Constructing Interests in Cooperation | the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR),” n.d., https://www.nbr.org/publication/diplomacy-and-ambiguity-constructing-interests-in-cooperation/.

[46] Raymond Kuo, “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. And Taiwan Trapped,” Foreign Policy, January 18, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-us-china-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/.

[47] Ashley J. Tellis, “‘What Is in Our Interest’: India and the Ukraine War,” carnegieendowment.org, April 25, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/04/what-is-in-our-interest-india-and-the-ukraine-war?lang=en.

[48] Austin Horng-En Wang et al., “Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Clarity, and Dual Clarity,” Foreign Policy Analysis 20, no. 3 (April 27, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orae010.

[49] Ashley. J Tellis, “Non-Allied Forever: India’s Grand Strategy according to Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,” Carnegieendowment.org, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2021/03/non-allied-forever-indias-grand-strategy-according-to-subrahmanyam-jaishankar?lang=en.

[50] Dr Chietigj Bajpaee, Lisa Toremark, and https://twitter.com/Chietigj, “India–Russia Relations,” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, October 17, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/india-russia-relations.