Warrior Society: Military Function in the Formation of Social Hierarchies Using Japan and Europe as Case Study

-Edited & reviewed by Declan Browne

The military and its function is inseparable from the shaping of social hierarchies in the majority of societies, historian Otto Hintze went as to argue in 1906 that ‘All state organisation was originally military organisation’ (Hintze, 1975, p.181). Military success or failure have often been key determining factors in one’s status in society, what a class provided to the military also factored into one’s status, and the mere act of military service has also been considered a noble act that elevates one’s status in many societies. The most interesting, however, is the ability to perform military function as it, paradoxically, has been both a means of maintaining social hierarchies and breaking them down. It is difficult to compare how such a function affected the social hierarchies across the world as each region had its own complex circumstances that brought about such hierarchies, complex circumstances this essay will be unable to go into fully due to its limited scope, nonetheless, this essay will explore how military function has shaped social hierarchies between the 17th century to the late-19th century by comparing its effects in Japan and across Europe, from France to Russia.

One’s allegiance in state defining conflicts have often defined one’s status within that state, victorious factions naturally benefited from their success while the defeated found themselves held in lower status. In the case of Japan, following unification at the end of the 16th century, vassal clans of Tokugawa Ieyasu found themselves rewarded with productive lands in central Japan surrounding Edo, meanwhile clans which fought against Ieyasu were moved to less productive lands at the edges of Japan (Jensen, 2000). In total 6,221,690 koku of assessed land changed hands following Ieyasu’s victory, resulting in the reduction of three samurai clans and the complete extinguishment of eighty-seven, including that of Kobayakawa Hideaki who had betrayed Ieyasu during the Sengoku War (Jensen, 2000). In effect, this drastic reshuffle of land created two groups within the samurai class: the fudai, Tokugawa vassals, and the tozama, ‘outside lords’. The former controlled 11,931,845 koku, including those of sub-daiyo vassals, and the latter controlled 9,834,700 (Jensen, 2000). Such a dynamic continued to exist up until the late-Tokugawa as the Meiji Intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi later pointed out the existence of ‘lower’ and ‘upper’ samurai in the final years of the shogunate. Such distinctions brought about differences in life-style, range of intermarriage, and education (Sonodo, 1990). Most significantly, however, was the difference in what official post one could hold; the top positions with the Bakufu, such as Roju or senior councillor, was exclusive to fudai. Such a position gave the fudai a monopoly over both domestic and foreign relations, major construction projects, and stipends for samurai who had surrendered their land (Jensen, 2000). Such a pattern continued into the Meiji Era, but this time with the forces against the shogunate reaping the reward. The tozama clans of Satsuma and Choshu, the primary clans in restoring the emperor, were given dominant positions within the army and government, so dominant that some historians have controversially called the Meiji government a Satsuma-Choshu hanbatsu, or ‘domain clique’ (Jensen, 2000).

Europe also experienced such a phenomenon with Prussia which, through a series of wars, unified Germany in 1871. Prussia aristocrats and especially those that performed military function, being from the leading state of unification, were given more influence over the German government through its strong control of the Bundesrat (Kreuzer, 2003). Prussian aristocrats also had the ability to gain honours that increased their status independent from the state, in effect allowing them to undermine the social hierarchy the state wished to impose; this was thanks to the expansion of the honour systems of individual states following unification (Thompson, 1994). In other parts of Europe more generally, throughout the 16th century, mercenaries were rewarded for the service with privileges in the case that the state they fought for had won (Parrott, 2010). Overall, by examining both Japan and Europe, it is clear that one’s military success or failure played a role in determining the social hierarchies of nations in general.

What social groups provided to military function also determined their position in the social hierarchy of the state as being able to, or expected to, provide for the state also brought one favour from the state. In Japan, samurais were expected to maintain a standard of living in accordance with his status and this usually took the form of retainers or military men; despite being in a time of peace the shogun still wished to maintain military preparedness. For example, in accordance with the regulations of 1649, a daimyo with a domain of 100,000 koku was to have ‘2,155 men under arms; of these 170 were to be mounted, 350 armed with guns, 30 with bows, and 150 with spears, while 20 were to be trained in signal flags.’ and a smaller samurai of 200 koku was expected to maintain 5 men, himself and his horse, a horse leader, a spear bearer, armour bearer, and a porter (Jensen, 2000). Samurai were also expected to maintain a staff of service corps and samurai attendants in Edo, the shogunate capital, alongside their personal family as part of the ‘hostage system’ the shogun used to keep his vassals in check (Jensen, 2000). As demonstrated, in Japan, the top branches of society were expected to provide military function by providing themselves and other men for military service.

Such a phenomenon was also present in Europe; for this case, this essay will look at France. Louis XIV’s army reform in 1661 brought the French army directly under state control and this brought about the issue of funding and providing for said army. The solution to this was in the ‘military enterprise’ that was run primarily by the grandee elite which provided officers, but more crucially monetary investment and supply of resources. ‘Financial investors, manufacturers, and merchants… characterised an army dominated by military enterprisers’ (Parrott, 2010, p.86). Such a structure was also present in other ‘reformed’ European armies of the 17th century (Parrott, 2010). Such a role naturally made these marchant business oriented class the elite with France’s social hierarchy, and this stands in complete contrast to Japan which viewed merchants as the lowest within society excluding those considered ‘outcast’. In Japan social hierarchies were often determined by what one produced: the samurai who produced peace and morality through the practice of Bushido ranked as elites; farmers who produced food ranked below them; artisans who produced tools below farmers; and marchant who produced nothing at the bottom of society. Adding to this low status was the belief that merchants risk contributing to materialism and selfishness through their job of exchanging goods (Jensen, 2000). That is not to say Japanese merchants did not contribute to military function at all, during the 16th century some merchants frequently functioned as a form quartermaster and this pushed them into the samurai class; so was the case with the Harima merchant clan which moved to Kochi to serve the Yamauchi daimyo of Tosa (Jensen, 2000). Overall it is clear that what one provided to the state military function played a factor in determining their status within society. In Japan the samurai elite were expected to provide warriors to the state as a means of maintaining military preparedness, while in France the merchant elites gained their status through private investment and providing goods.

In many societies the mere act of serving a military function placed one above those of even the same class due to belief that such acts were noble and moral, this was especially the case in both Japan and Russia. In Tokugawa Japan, the samurai elite viewed themselves as above court nobles who did not serve military function viewing them ‘as “long sleeves” (nagasode) to indicate that they were impractical, inexperienced in the real world, jealous, and petty, and no doubt they often were’ (Jensen, 2000, p.100). The foundation of the samurai’s status in the first place was their practice of Bushido or Warrior Way and they ‘served as ideal ethical types, theoretically committed to service and indifferent to personal danger and gain… The samurai was suppose to have a fatalistic preparedness to redeem his name and honour by the excruciatingly painful self-immolation of seppuku’ (Jensen, 2000, p.101), the effect the samurai were held in high status due to their adherence to and enforcement of a code many saw as noble and moral. As Yamaga Soko stated when asked why the samurai held such high status despite producing nothing, ‘the samurai summarily punishes him [transgressors] and thus upholds proper moral principles in the land’ (Jensen, 2000, p.103).

Similar sentiment also existed in 18th century Russia as the removal of conscription in 1762 placed the meaning of ‘nobility’ into question as ‘if nobility no longer served sovereign and fatherland, on what grounds could their privilege be justified’ (Wirtschafter, 2002, p.225). Such questioning clearly indicate that within Russian society the act of military service was highly valued and therefore could elevate their status, such sentiment arguable originated through Tsar Peter I’s legislation that introduced conscription among nobles; this ‘made clear that henceforth service would take precedent over heredity in legal definitions of nobility… Service to the tsar, not the mere acquisition of noble lands or serfs, constituted the only legitimate source of noble status’ (Wirtschafter, 2002, p.224). As historian Elise K. Wirtschafter pointed out, the lingering existence of such sentiment even after the removal of conscription can be seen in the themes and characters of 18th century Russian theatre as those written after 1762 depict service as a ‘moral obligation that was indicative of nobility, enlightenment, and virtue’ (Wirtschafter, 2002, p.231). She points to the work of playwright Dmitry V. Volkov who, through his character Dobromysl, distinguishes ‘genuine nobility, which represents a moral principle, from mere nobel status in the legal sense.’ as in the play Dobromysl ‘seeks to provide his family with eternal evidence of the ancestral service and merits that elevate the family to its present degree and wealth’ (Wirtschafter, 2002, p.226). As demonstrated by the cases in Japan and Russia, the mere act of military service could elevate one’s status within society, even within elite social groups, due to its association with morality and honour.

That is not to say, however, that high morality was always attributed to military service. In 17th century Dutch society the act of military service was seen as the work of the lower classes, if not outsiders. Following the Calvinist views of the elite merchant class who looked down on military careers, Dutch society was divided and pluralised into two separate groups: a Civil group and a Military group. This effectively separated those in military service from any form of political power (Feld, 1975). This is already in stark contrast to Japan which integrated the samurai into its political system. Adding to this was the fact most of the Dutch military was made up of mercenaries, usually foreigners, or the lower-class, evident during the 1566 revolt where the soon-to-be elite urban merchant class and lower-classes revolt against the aristocrats with the majority of fighting done by the lower-class (Feld, 1975). Such views were common throughout Europe when it came to the use of mercenaries in the 17th century as, usually being foreigners, they were given no political role in the state they served as they were never integrated into said state (Hintze,1975). Evidently there are since societies which viewed military function as a task of the lower-class, if not outsiders, and did not attribute the ideals of morality and virtue to the act of military service.

The ability to perform military function has had the most interesting effect on social hierarchies as it has been used in both strengthening social hierarchies and breaking them down. In Japan military function was a privilege exclusive to the samurai given to the by Toyotomi Hideyoshi through the 1580s and 1590s and in effect ‘the countryside was disarmed, and samurai, with a monopoly on violence, became full-time specialists in keeping the peace’ (Jensen, 2000, p.104). The monopoly on violence naturally elevated the samurai above the commoner as they were the only class able to participate in physical military functions. This privilege, however, was slowly dissolved through late-Tokugawa reforms and in turn also slowly dissolved the social hierarchy that held the samurai as elites. The Bakufu’s military reforms in the late-Tokugawa era, undertaken due to perceived threats from the outside world, took away the samurai families’ monopolies over civil and military offices in hopes of allowing more qualified ‘outsiders’ to take over and as historian Hidehiro Sonodo argued, this ‘fundamental reformation of the Bakufu’s military organisation could not be realised without a radical transformation of the hierarchical estate system in samurai society’ (Sonodo,1990, p.86). In taking away the samurai’s privilege of military function, the Bakufu in effect allowed for greater social mobility as now lower samurais were able to enter positions of power that boosted their status. An interesting aspect Sonodo points out is that it was in fact deepening of militaristic values that brought about this loss in privilege and not the neglecting (Sonodo,1990). This deepening of militarist values continued into the Meiji Restoration as it was a group for a new form of nationalist that defined the state.

This opening up of military function continued exponentially in following the Meiji Restoration with the opening up to commoners and in the introduction of universal conscription. In effect universal conscription, combined with the ethics of bushido connected to it that persisted, turned the act of military function and service from a phenomenon that propped up Japanese social hierarchy to one that helped break it down, somewhat equalising society. The first conscription laws, introduced in 1872 and supported by the former samurai Yamagata Aritomo, allowed commoners to join the military and in turn appreciate the Warrior Way or bushido for themselves, as historian William R. Patterson argued ‘Bushido became a moral code for all Japanese, not just the elite samurai class,’ and in turn ‘served to break down class barriers’ (Patterson, 2008, p.20). Now all had access to the status boosting effects of the bushido code and former samurai who made up the majority of military leadership found a new respect for conscripts viewing them as ‘true soldiers’ ((Patterson, 2008). Considering the emperor himself was restyled as a military man in the 1880s and barracks and military academies being themed around loyalty to him (Jensen, 2000), It can be easily argued that the military was close to, if not the servants of the emperor and therefore elevated those in it close to the emperor who was at the top of the social hierarchy.

The phenomenon of conscription as a means of equalising social hierarchies by elevating the lower classes is almost universal with the exception appearing when conscription is not universal and instead limited to one class. In the first German Reich, universal conscription also allowed the lower ranks of society to access status given to those in military service due to its association to chivalry and virtue. Furthermore, the introduction of the Iron Cross, a medal open to all, further strengthened the idea of military service to values of virtue and also had real-world effects with recipients of the reward given special treatment within court. Meanwhile, in France where conscription was not universal, those conscripted were seen associated with being poor and lower due to the fact the wealthy were exempted from mandatory military service, not too dissimilar to how Dutch society viewed it in the 17th century. Overall, by looking at the examples of Meiji Japan and Imperial Germany, it is clear that opening up and removal of military function as a privilege of a class, usually through the introduction of universal conscription, can help break down social hierarchies within a society. Meanwhile, if military function is limited to one class, it can help reinforce social hierarchies. If it is limited to a ‘privilege’ of the elite, as it was in the early Tokugawa era in Japan then it can help elevate them above commoners, and the same goes for if it is limited to a ‘obligation’ of the commoner, as it was in 19th century France, then it can keep commoners at the lower ends of society.

As demonstrated by the phenomenon mentioned in this essay, social hierarchies have been heavily shaped by military function and service with respective societies. The first phenomenon is in regards to military success and failure, generally those who sided with victors tend to be placed higher in the social hierarchy and give better rewards and privileges compared to those who were neutral or defeated. The best example of this can be seen in the distinction between fudai samurai and tozama samurai who were defined by their allegiance at the end of the Segonku era. What one provided the military function also played a hand in shaping social hierarchies as those who provided were often placed as elites, in Japan it was the samurai who provided troops placing them as the elites while in France it was the merchant elite who provided investment and funding. The mere act of serving a military function also often helped boost one’s status within society due to the common association the military had with codes of virtue and morality such as the idea of chivalry in Europe and bushido in Japan. The opening up of military service in the late 18th century and throughout the 19th century in both Japan and Europe acted as an equalising force and helped break down their respective hierarchies as now all could practise the virtues and morals attributed to military service.

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