Echoes of the Hammer and Sickle: Soviet Legacies in Modern Russian Intelligence

When the Soviet Union’s hammer and sickle flag was lowered for the last time off the Kremlin and was superseded by the Russian white, blue, and red tricolour, though epitomising transformation, it was clear that the severing of ties with the past was not complete. After all, while the flags changed, the Kremlin remained. In terms of intelligence, there are significant parallels between Soviet and Russian intelligence. However, while some fundamentals from Soviet times could be labelled as “old wine in a new bottle”, there are also notable differences in contemporary Russian intelligence operations. The main driving force for the changes in Russian intelligence is technology. As such, this essay argues that the picture of Russian intelligence activities is complex – it is neither fully “old wine”, nor a completely novel way of intelligence, alien to the Soviet heritage.

To prove its case, this essay will explore the nuance between the old and new Russian intelligence activities by incorporating case studies and discussions on Russian intelligence developments. It will begin with examining the overarching continuities from the KGB to contemporary Russian HUMINT and the new challenges through the case of the 2010 Russian illegal spy scandal. This essay will then progress to exploring Russian covert action by focusing on the phenomenon of targeted assassinations. By comparing the Soviet Union’s assassinations of Leon Trotsky and Georgi Markov with the recent poisonings of Sergei Skripal and Alexey Navalny, this essay will outline the continuities and discontinuities of Russian covert operations. Finally, this essay will explore the drastic developments in Russian disinformation campaigns vis-à-vis the case of Ukraine since 2014, which highlights most aptly the paramount role of technology in contemporary intelligence.

HUMINT

Russia builds upon Voltaire’s well-known remark about the Prussian Army possessing a state, as it could be observed that the Russian intelligence services have a state of their own with a former intelligence officer as its head.[1] Furthermore, Julie Anderson argues that under the leadership of President Putin ‘old Soviet intelligence contacts and methods ... have been reestablished, revived, and strengthened’.[2] Thus, the contemporary Russian intelligence framework is not only reminiscent of the Soviet model, but through Putin’s leadership, the capabilities and activities of the Russian intelligence services are growing to a level similar to or above the KGB’s heights in the Cold War.[3]  This demonstrates the continuing parallels in intelligence work between the USSR and modern-day Russia.

In terms of the priority of intelligence activities, HUMINT has always been the predominant feature in the long history of Russian intelligence. An excellent case study to explore the change and continuities in Russian HUMINT is the recent case, known as the “2010 Illegals Program”.[4] Operation “Ghost Stories”, the FBI’s investigation of the program, culminated with the arrest of 10 “illegals” working for Russian foreign intelligence (SVR) in the United States.[5] Kevin Riehle asserts that the use of illegals, undercover intelligence officers conducting clandestine operations on foreign soil, is an enduring century-long asset of Russian intelligence and is arguably as pertinent as ever.[6] The long-term historic illegals utilisation as part of Russian HUMINT displays the ongoing consistency in activities between Soviet and Russian intelligence. This is a question of utility and not dogmatism. The conscious choice to employ tried and tested HUMINT activities, if perceived to yield effective results, gives little incentive to implement groundbreaking changes. While many perhaps considered illegal spies as a KGB Cold War antique, the SVR did not cease to utilise illegals in the post-Cold War period.[7] The 2010 illegals scandal was an alarm bell only because of the scale of the network operating in the US, not because of a sudden or new move by Russia.[8] Thus, the overarching philosophy that could be observed to persevere from Soviet to Russian intelligence is that is little justification for modifying a process that is already operating efficiently.

And while unwarranted alterations could be counterproductive, contemporary HUMINT operations most definitely needed adjusting from the Cold War setting to successfully operate in the current digital cyber age. David Gioe argues that in the cyber age, simultaneously new capabilities and challenges will be introduced to HUMINT activities.[9] This suggests that emerging technological innovations concurrently influence HUMINT operational tradecraft, yet also enhance the counterintelligence capacity of a set adversary. Thus, the historical relationship between HUMINT operations and technological developments infers that HUMINT does not remain stagnant. Though the core pillars of this intelligence collection method remain very similar, the technological domain through its augmenting of HUMINT capabilities necessitates change.[10] Relating these theoretical observations to the examined case study of Russian illegals in the US, the Russian spies used new technological means, such as stenography software, which utilised images on webpages to conceal electronic messages, as well as wireless network communications.[11] These technological innovations in tradecraft distinguish contemporary Russian foreign intelligence HUMINT operations from their Soviet counterpart. Yet, it is also to a great extent the digital age that enabled US counterintelligence to apprehend the Russian operatives, hence demonstrating the complexity of modern-day HUMINT. 

The FBI uncovered the Russian illegals through a combination of past knowledge of Russian HUMINT tradecraft, as well as the imperfect use of the new technological innovations.[12] Former CIA case officer Robert Greiner asserts that espionage in the digital age is much more difficult, requiring intelligence officers to use their real identities.[13] Furthermore, Greiner reflects that: ‘if you have to be who you say you are, you can’t do the sorts of things that I did with impunity back in the mid-1980s’.[14] Greiner’s insight demonstrates the complexities that modern counterintelligence introduces to covert and clandestine HUMINT operations. As the case of the 2010 illegals displays, a lot of the Soviet tradecraft has remained, however, the digital age has prompted change and adjustment in today’s Russian HUMINT operations. Contemporary Russian HUMINT is not just the same Cold War Soviet “old wine”.

Covert Action 

Active measures, the Russian term for covert action, are another crucial area of Russian intelligence where the old and new could be observed. The former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin defines active measures as a foreign policy tool exerting influence on the domestic and foreign policy of a target country, while also utilising subversion to undermine, mislead, and weaken an adversary[15]. Much like HUMINT, covert action presents a good opportunity to explore the debate on the change in intelligence between the USSR and Russia. Reginald Brope argues that the anxieties of a Soviet-style secret police framework returning to Russia would be hyperbolic and that ‘today’s FSB and other services perform very different functions to the KGB’.[16] On the other hand, Robert Pringle argues that much has remained the same between Soviet and Russian intelligence.[17] Pringle asserts that both the Soviet and post-Soviet agencies unequivocally serve the political leaders, conduct operations domestically and abroad against “enemies”, and are trusted by the political elite to play a pivotal role in Russian policy-making.[18] Indeed during Soviet times, the political or “party” element in the intelligence and security services was much more overt and prevalent.[19] However, the contemporary FSB and SVR continue to serve and report directly to the Russian president, hence executing Putin’s increasingly aggressive and ideologically fueled anti-Western foreign policy.[20] Thus, while some perceive current Russian intelligence as incredibly different to Soviet intelligence, there are processes and events, which directly hint at a nuance between the two. Targeted assassinations are one of the aspects of covert action that prove that Russian intelligence still operates very similarly to its Soviet counterpart.

The state-sponsored murder of dissidents has been a constant throughout the history of Russian intelligence. The most prominent examples of Soviet targeted killings are the assassinations of the former Communist leading figure Leon Trotsky in 1940 and the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in 1978.[21] These cases demonstrate the lust for vengeance against traitors and enemies. Additionally, Trotsky’s murder in Mexico reveals not only the unbelievable desire for revenge but also indicates that he was still perceived as a threat by Stalin.[22]  This sheds light on the underlying paranoia that could play a role in Moscow’s targeted killings. If the cases of Trotsky and Markov are compared with recent Russian intelligence assassinations, significant parallels could be drawn.

The 2018 poisoning of the former intelligence officer Sergei Skripal resembles the case of Georgi Markov, as both had lived in the United Kingdom after defecting and poison was the weapon of choice.[23] This showcases the continuity in Soviet/Russian target-killing methods from 1978 to 2018 between the poisonings of Markov and Skripal. Furthermore, they represent the severe importance of loyalty for both the USSR and Russia, and presently, to Putin, as his past in intelligence potentially further fuels the desire to punish betrayal.[24] Thus, the targeted killings of “traitors”, who “betrayed the state” and fled to the West, demonstrates a continuity between Soviet and Russian intelligence activities.

Besides the betrayal aspect of Russian targeting killings, the paranoia/fear element is evident as well. By comparing Trotsky’s fate, with the case of the longstanding political opposition figure – Alexey Navalny - an underlying similarity could be observed. Most scholars agree that the 2020 poisoning of Navalny and his subsequent imprisonment clearly express the Kremlin’s attitude: ‘Navalny should be gone for good’.[25] Navalny’s poisoning and death in 2024, weeks before the Russian presidential election, convey fear from the political leadership. Much like how Trotsky could be a “threat” to Stalin in Mexico decades after his exile, it is evident that Navalny continued to occupy the Kremlin’s concerns even in a remote Siberian prison. Therefore, the consistencies that remain presently between Soviet and Russian covert action in the form of targeted assassinations are the desire to punish disloyalty and the fear of dissidents’ power.

While, as illustrated, much has remained the same, there are two important aspects of these recent cases of Russian targeting of individuals, which indicate change and hence deserve attention. Firstly, the prominent role of technology in the current age is conspicuous. Technology allowed for much more evidence collection in assessing the actions and identities of the assassins of Skripal, while almost 50 years after Markov’s murder, his assassin is still unknown.[26] Thus, this showcases how technological developments could further complicate Russian intelligence in a way that was less plausible in Soviet times. The second aspect is demonstrated through the relatively new collective argument of David Gioe, Michael Goodman, and David Frey who argue that besides the punishing of betrayal, the political violence, committed by the intelligence services, demonstrates the Kremlin’s signalling domestically and abroad.[27] This outlook suggests a minor paradigm shift from purely targeted killings to potentially non-lethal targeting, which could just as effectively convey the Kremlin’s political messages.

Disinformation and propaganda

 Covert action is an encompassing concept, which includes a plethora of activities besides the explored aspect of targeted assassination in Soviet and Russian active measures. Disinformation and propaganda deserve specific attention because they display the biggest change between old and contemporary Russian intelligence activities. Recent technological developments have given new impetus to Russian disinformation efforts, as the advent of the Internet and social media, have increased the effectiveness of Russian active measures.[28] In terms of continuities and discontinuities between Soviet and post-Soviet disinformation operations, Roman Horbyk, Yana Prymachenko, and Dariya Orlova argue that the core components of ‘centralised organisation, strategic character, and quest for impact’ have remained in current Russian intelligence practices.[29] Therefore, while the underpinnings of Russian intelligence disinformation have remained, the tradecraft has experienced substantial transformation from the technologically analogue Cold War period to the contemporary digital and online age. An infamous example of Soviet active measure disinformation operations was the propagation of the fabricated claim that the US had developed the AIDS virus.[30] This story received heavy media ‘coverage in some 40 Third World countries in 1987’, aiming for long-term erosion of perceptions of the US.[31] While this is a significant Soviet disinformation operation, its reach and proliferation cannot compare with contemporary Russian propaganda. 

The case of Ukraine since 2014 vis-à-vis Russian propaganda and disinformation dissemination represents the all-time peak of this kind of active measures. In the backdrop of the Crimean annexation and the war in Donbas, Russian hybrid warfare ramped up with the establishment of the “Novorossiya” movement.[32] The movement sought to undermine the Ukrainian government by inciting separatism in the form of “people’s republics”, such as the cases of Luhansk and Donetsk.[33] The active measures, manifested in the Novorossiya project, featured Russian-organised anti-Ukrainian government protesters and funded journalists and media outlets for specific propaganda “news coverage”.[34] Furthermore, there were ‘social media campaigns (often featuring non-existing individuals), all to create the impression of a wide movement with broad popular support’.[35] The use of news outlets, journalists, or puppet political figures is not new, in that sense a continuation of Soviet disinformation tradecraft. However, the Internet and social media demonstrate the evolution of Russian active measures.

Focusing once again on Ukraine, the evolution of propaganda from the development of the Novorossiya movement until the current 2024 is very significant. Russian disinformation activities are much more encompassing by directing efforts not only against Ukraine but against the US, NATO, EU, and Eastern Europe.[36] The use of social media, online channels, and mass media has consequently allowed Russia to exert influence on domestic and external perceptions to legitimise its case for war and discredit the West.[37] Thus, the uncontrolled dissemination of Russian propaganda messages online, though chaotic, grants a much quicker spread of information with more subtle connections to the Russian state or intelligence services. Additionally, some scholars used to argue that Soviet/Russian active measures were a form of “soft power”, however, that could no longer completely be the case.[38] The Russo-Ukrainian War displays that disinformation and propaganda could be utilised by Russia to artificially build a case for a major war. This change of active measures from non-coercive efforts to crafting a “casus belli” is hence very significant. Therefore, to argue that Russian intelligence activities are “old wine in a new bottle” is to infer that the tradecraft has remained the same as from Soviet times, which as the case of Ukraine since 2014 illuminates, is most definitely not the case. Perhaps, quite fittingly, one of the contemporary backbones of the Russian winemaking industry is in the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula, a result of the explored case of Ukraine, which exemplifies change in modern Russian intelligence.

Conclusion

            The main takeaway of this comparison between the modus operandi of Soviet and Russian intelligence is that Russian intelligence has not remained static. The experience of Soviet intelligence has been crucial for the services’ cultural backbone and the operational tradecraft principles. As the explored case studies of Soviet HUMINT and covert actions demonstrate, much of the motivations and tradecraft staples have remained the same. The poisonings of Skripal and Markov, as well as the targeting of Navalny and Trotsky, manifest the continuities in rationale and manner of execution of covert assassinations. Additionally, the 2010 case of the illegal Russian spies also demonstrates the persistence of HUMINT principal foundations and tradecraft consistencies between the KGB and the SVR.

The employment of Soviet intelligence pillars, however, does not intrinsically suggest that contemporary Russian intelligence is a rebranded KGB. This essay’s case about the nuance between the old and new concludes that the change in intelligence activities revolves around the role of technology. Innovative technological advancements, the Internet, and social media have been impulses for Russian intelligence adjustment. These developments, as showcased in the investigation of Russian HUMINT and covert action operational changes, indicate that technology simultaneously enhances Russian capabilities and adversarial counterintelligence. Furthermore, through exploring the recent case of Russian active measures against Ukraine, this essay illustrates the new domains of intelligence activities, introduced through the Internet and social media, which are notably different from Soviet active measures. Thus, returning to the initial idiomatic “old wine” expression, Russian intelligence is a complicated “winery” with mixtures of old and new. The Soviet heritage captures the cultural principles and fundamental tradecraft, in essence, the underpinnings of Russian intelligence. However, because of the technological element, the current digital age has prompted significant operational changes which prevented Russian intelligence from being a stagnant Cold War relic.

Bibliography:

Anderson, Julie, ‘The HUMINT Offensive from Putin's Chekist State’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 20 (2007), 258-316.

Briefing Paper to the House of Commons, Russian Intelligence and Special Forces, by Ben Smith (2018).

Brope, Reginald, ‘Russia’, in Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies (New York, 2014), 227-234.

Dollbaum, Jan Matti, Lallouet, Morvan and Noble, Ben, Navalny: Putin's Nemesis, Russia's Future? (Oxford, 2021).

DRUGĂ, Dana Ionela, ‘War in Ukraine: Russian Propaganda Themes’, Strategic impact, 84 (2023), 80–93.

Gioe, David V., ‘“The More Things Change”: HUMINT in the Cyber Age’, in Robert Dover, Huw Dylan, and Michael S. Goodman (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence (London, 2017), 213-227.

Gioe, David V., Goodman, Michael S., and Frey, David S., ‘Unforgiven: Russian intelligence vengeance as political theater and strategic messaging’, Intelligence and National Security, 34 (2019), 561-575.

Gioe, David V., Lovering, Richard and Pachesny, Tyler, ‘The Soviet Legacy of Russian Active Measures: New Vodka from Old Stills?, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 33 (2020), 514-539.

Horbyk, Roman, Prymachenko, Yana, and Orlova, Dariya, ‘The Transformation of Propaganda: The Continuities and Discontinuities of Information Operations, from Soviet to Russian Active Measures’, Nordic Journal of Media Studies, 5 (2023), 68–94.

Lefebvre, Stéphane and Porteous, Holly, ‘The Russian 10 … 11: An Inconsequential Adventure?’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 24 (2011), 447-466.

Mitrokhin, Vasili, KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officers Handbook (Abingdon, 2002).

Morehouse, Matthew A., ‘The Claws of the Bear: Russia’s Targeted Killing Program’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 28 (2015), 269-298.

Nilsson, Niklas, ‘De-hybridization and conflict narration, Ukraine’s defense against Russian hybrid warfare’, in Mikael Weissmann, Niklas Nilsson, Björn Palmertz, and Per Thunholm, (eds.), Hybrid Warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations (London, 2021), 214-231.

Pringle, Robert W., ‘The heritage and future of the Russian intelligence community’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 11 (1998), 175-184.

Pringle, Robert W., 'The Intelligence Services of Russia', in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford, 2010), 774-789.

Riehle, Kevin P., ‘Russia’s intelligence illegals program: an enduring asset’, Intelligence and National Security, 35 (2020), 385-402.

Salisbury, Daniel and Dewey, Karl, ‘Murder on Waterloo Bridge: placing the assassination of Georgi Markov in past and present context, 1970 – 2018’, Contemporary British History, 37 (2023), 128-156.

Strokan, Mikhail A. and Taylor, Brian D., ‘Intelligence’, in Andrei Tsygankov (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy (Abingdon, 2018), 153-167.

Footnotes:

[1] David V. Gioe, Richard Lovering and Tyler Pachesny, ‘The Soviet Legacy of Russian Active Measures: New Vodka from Old Stills?, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 33 (2020), 516.

[2] Julie Anderson, ‘The HUMINT Offensive from Putin's Chekist State’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 20 (2007), 269.

[3] Briefing Paper to the House of Commons, Russian Intelligence and Special Forces, by Ben Smith (2018), 4-5.

[4] Stéphane Lefebvre and Holly Porteous, ‘The Russian 10 … 11: An Inconsequential Adventure?’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 24 (2011), 448-489.

[5] Kevin P. Riehle, ‘Russia’s intelligence illegals program: an enduring asset’, Intelligence and National Security, 35 (2020), 389.

[6] Riehle, ‘Russia’s intelligence’, 396.

[7] Lefebvre and Porteous, ‘The Russian 10’, 447-448.

[8] Ibid.

[9] David V. Gioe, ‘“The More Things Change”: HUMINT in the Cyber Age’, in Robert Dover, Huw Dylan, and Michael S. Goodman (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence (London, 2017), 224-225.

[10] Gioe, ‘“The More Things Change”’, 213.

[11] Lefebvre and Porteous, ‘The Russian 10’, 456-457.

[12] Lefebvre and Porteous, ‘The Russian 10’, 455.

[13] Cited in Riehle, ‘Russia’s intelligence’, 386.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Vasili Mitrokhin, KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officers Handbook (Abingdon, 2002), 13.

[16] Reginald Brope, ‘Russia’, in Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies (New York, 2014), 234.

[17] Robert W. Pringle, 'The Intelligence Services of Russia', in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford, 2010), 787-788.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Pringle, 'The Intelligence Services of Russia', 782.

[20] Mikhail A. Strokan and Brian D. Taylor, ‘Intelligence’, in Andrei Tsygankov (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy (Abingdon, 2018), 164.

[21] Matthew A. Morehouse, ‘The Claws of the Bear: Russia’s Targeted Killing Program’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 28 (2015), 272.

[22] David V. Gioe, Michael S. Goodman and David S. Frey, ‘Unforgiven: Russian intelligence vengeance as political theater and strategic messaging’, Intelligence and National Security, 34 (2019), 563.

[23] Gioe, Goodman, Frey, ‘Unforgiven’, 566.

[24] Gioe, Goodman, Frey, ‘Unforgiven’, 570.

[25] Jan Matti Dollbaum, Morvan Lallouet and Ben Noble, Navalny: Putin's Nemesis, Russia's Future? (Oxford, 2021), 172.

[26] Daniel Salisbury and Karl Dewey, ‘Murder on Waterloo Bridge: placing the assassination of Georgi Markov in past and present context, 1970 – 2018’, Contemporary British History, 37 (2023), 149.

[27] Gioe, Goodman, Frey, ‘Unforgiven’, 569.

[28] Gioe, Lovering and Pachesny, ‘The Soviet Legacy’, 533-534.

[29] Roman Horbyk, Yana Prymachenko, and Dariya Orlova, ‘The Transformation of Propaganda: The Continuities and Discontinuities of Information Operations, from Soviet to Russian Active Measures’, Nordic Journal of Media Studies, 5 (2023), 92.

[30] Robert W. Pringle, ‘The heritage and future of the Russian intelligence community’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 11 (1998), 179.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Niklas Nilsson, ‘De-hybridization and conflict narration, Ukraine’s defense against Russian hybrid warfare’, in Mikael Weissmann, Niklas Nilsson, Björn Palmertz, and Per Thunholm, (eds.), Hybrid Warfare: Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations (London, 2021), 216-217.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Dana Ionela DRUGĂ, ‘War in Ukraine: Russian Propaganda Themes’, Strategic impact, 84 (2023), 92.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Pringle, 'The Intelligence Services of Russia', 783.