What was the Role of Australia's Engagement with Asia in the Slow Demise of British Australia?

“The decision we will make for our country on 2 December is a choice between the past and the future, between the habits and fears of the past, and the demands and opportunities of the future.” (Gough Whitlam, November 1972)[1]

The idea that Australia needed to engage with Asia returned to elite debate in the postwar era. Australia attempted to engage diplomatically and politically with Asia at a time when the decline of Britain was undeniable. This essay argues that Australia’s engagement with Asia was part of a wider national identity revaluation and a historical debate concerning Australia’s geographical proximity to Asia. Starting with Robert Menzies, this essay looks at how he resisted Asian engagement and attempted to maintain a relationship with ‘powerful friends.’ Thereafter, the essay considers how Australian people engaged with Asia through travel. Attempting to account for change over time, the final section discusses how Asia was embraced as part of a “New Nationalism.” By analysing different levels of engagement, this paper attempts to demonstrate that agency in international relations is not centralised at an elite level.

Robert Menzies led Australia through a time of national uncertainty concerning its position in the postwar international order. Britain’s bid for membership in the European Economic Community in 1961 signified Britain’s shift in priorities.[2] Cartoonists perceived Britain as an “unfaithful mistress” or “uncaring mother”.[3] The bitter sentiment towards Britain’s shift in priority reflected an unsettling revelation for Australia — it would need to think about a future without Britain. For Menzies, this was a bitter task.

The tension that came with this sense of abandonment resurfaced a historical debate on Asian engagement. As David Walker illuminates, Alfred Deakin recognised that Australia’s future would be influenced by its proximity to Asia.[4] As the world became more interconnected, Australia would be brought closer to Asia.[5] Menzies was not convinced by this debate. Rather than engaging with Asia, he relied on support from the USA. David McClean unveils how Menzies was attacked for moving from one subordinate relationship to another.[6]

According to a radical nationalist interpretation McClean unveils, dependence on the USA “thwarted” Australian independence. Australia had become an American Satellite.[7] There is some credibility in this interpretation. After all, General Douglas MacArthur’s domination of Australian Pacific planning in WW2 culminated in an anti-climactic role for Australians – it was no ANZAC moment.[8] However the alternative interpretation, which claims that this alliance was necessary, is more convincing. Menzies was not uncritically subservient, instead he was aware of international changes. The USA was the eminent Pacific power that would be far more effective in protecting Australia compared to Britain.[9]

This reliance eschewed Asian engagement. Christopher Waters rightly suggests Menzies’s decline to attend the Bandung Conference was a missed opportunity, for this was an opportunity for Australia to engage with decolonial states and perhaps assert itself as a regional power.[10] By rejecting the invitation to the conference, the White Australia Policy was reinforced, and it stained Australia’s international image as a distinctly white nation. To claim that this dismissal was simply racism is not sufficient. It is crucial to understand that Menzies led Australia during Japan’s rapid advance south and witnessed the expansion of Communism in East Asia. The conference was perceived as an attempt by China to expand Communism.[11] Menzies’s dismissal was not entirely irrational. Though, as Frank Bongiorno notes, “racial considerations were never far from the surface.”[12] Menzies should not be viewed as uncritical. His lack of engagement with Asia is derived from his memory of WW2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that he was a rational actor.

Notwithstanding Menzies’s sceptical approach towards Asia, Agnieszka Sobocinska elucidates the attitudes of ordinary Australians. For example, the story of William Wade demonstrates his change from an Oriental perception to an embrace of “marvellous” Asia.[13] It was one thing to hear about the “yellow peril”, but to visit Asia was an illuminating experience.[14] If in 1955 only 3,000 Australians travelled to Singapore compared to 125,000 in 1975, this indicates an attraction to Asia.[15] The number of Australians travelling to Asia says much about the importance of lived experience. Reflections offered by Australian cartoonist Bruce Petty illustrate a similar experience. Following his four-month visit to Laos, he drew sketches of his impressions of Asia. He noted:

For Bruce, Asians were no “yellow peril”. They were normal people, victims of colonialisation and therefore miles behind the West in terms of development. Bruce and Wade developed an empathetic connection to Asia. However, these two cases should not be treated as representative of general Australian attitudes. White Australia was still a powerful force in Australia despite a sense of attraction to Asia. How Australia engaged with Asia was also bound up in a political process.

Thinking about ordinary Australians as “people’s diplomats” is an interesting way of conceptualising ordinary engagement.[17] The lived experience of travellers was key to shifting depictions of Asia towards a notion of a “neighbour.” This was a political project; notwithstanding its exposure to Cold War logics, it was part of Australia’s attempt to change its international image. By way of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and South East Asia, Asian students were invited to study in Australia, to then return home and improve standards of living.[18] In doing so, Australia would not only be contributing to containing communism, but it would also aid in presenting a friendly neighbourly image. Sociability and mutual relations among Asians and Australians in colleges were instrumental in this process. As Brown underlines, this was a cosmopolitan project that advanced the idea of a human community and toleration.[19]

Considering ordinary Australians as ‘People’s diplomats’ generates an alternative way of thinking about agency in international relations. Power and international relations are not conducted solely at an elite level; ordinary people conduct diplomacy, in this case through lived travel experience. Menzies may have been opposed to engaging with Asia, but the people had an attraction. We must recognise these different levels of Asian engagement.

By the 1970s, Australia had moved on from Britain’s abandonment and White Australia was repealed. What Australian nationalism should be was a principal debate. Harold Holt reflected on this in 1967, looking at art and culture for a new national foundation.[20] The arts were the medium through which Australia could project its “New Nationalism” to the world. Holt’s successor, John Gorton, was keen on filling the cultural void with homegrown Australian art and culture.[21] Notwithstanding this need to fill a cultural void, the implicit purpose of such initiatives served a political purpose — that is to say, Australia was more concerned with its international image rather than creating a culture Australians wanted.[22]

Reconciliation with the Aboriginal Australians was part of this debate. Perhaps by reconciling with the Aborigines, Australia could move past its dark history. For the Australian people, the 90% vote in favour of the repeal of section 127 demonstrated the willingness of the Australian people to include the Aborigines in citizenship.[23] Certainly for Paul Keating, reconciliation was the way forward for Australia. In his words:

“We non-Aboriginal Australians should perhaps remind ourselves that Australia once reached out for us. Isn’t it reasonable to say that if we can build a prosperous harmonious multicultural society in Australia, surely we can find just solutions to the problems which beset the first Australians.”[24]

As such, Keating embraced multiculturalism. Keating’s enthusiasm resembles the jubilation Gough Whitlam generated with his “It’s time” campaign.[25] Indeed, the embrace of multiculturalism confirmed Australia’s embrace of Asia. The increase of Australia’s overseas population from less than 1 million before 1945 to 4 million in 1992 buttressed this embrace.[26] The “New Nationalism” was not universally accepted. Right-wing elites and intellectuals, who asserted that Australia should not be ashamed of its history, and reconciliation with the Aborigines, specifically an apology, suggested the present generation’s responsibility for the mistakes of a previous generation. This was the right-wing camp of the History Wars.[27] Among the fiercest of sentiments came from Pauline Hanson. For Hanson:

“Immigration and Multiculturalism are issues that this government is trying to address, but for too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of any debate by the major parties. I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians.”[28]

Her speech represents a fiery resistance to multiculturalism and an attempt to appeal to the “ordinary” Australians now robbed of benefits they deserved. For those who had been so accustomed to White Australia, Hanson gained traction. While her impact was perhaps only short-term, it was a crucial stage in the contest for what Australia should be. Hanson affirms that those on the right were not willing to accept this new nationalism. Australia’s engagement with Asia was not universally accepted by the ordinary and elite.

This paper argued that Australia’s engagement with Asia was part of a debate on Australian national identity and a historical debate on Australia’s geographic proximity to Asia. The paper looked at how Menzies was reluctant to engage with Asia, preferring to rely on Britain and the USA. The paper posited that Menzies should not be considered as uncritically subservient. Thereafter, the paper engaged in a discussion on ordinary Australians’ attraction towards Asia, and how this elucidates diplomacy conducted by the people. Finally, the paper engaged with contemporary debates on New Nationalism. How it was embraced by Paul Keating and attacked by Pauline Hanson demonstrates the contest for what Australia should be.

Footnotes:

1. 1For a recording of the speech see; ‘Gough Whitlam’s 1972 “Its time speech”’ (Australian Broadcasting Cooperation), first shown November 1972 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-16/gough-whitlam-its time/11118720

2. James Curran and Stuart Ward, ‘A Salutary Shock’ in The Unknown Nation (Melbourne, 2010), 34

3. Ibid, 35

4. David Walker, ‘Australia’s Asian Futures’ in M. Lyons and P. Russell (eds), Australia’s history: themes and debates (Sydney, 2005), 64

5. Ibid, 65

6. David McClean, ‘From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the Cold War’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51 (2005), 66

7. Ibid, 67

8. See; Joan Beaumont, ‘Australia’s War: Asia and the Pacific’ in Joan Beaumont (ed), Australia’s War, 1939-45 (Sydney, 1996), 45-49

9. McClean, American Satellite?, 68'

10. Christopher Waters, ‘Lost Opportunity: Australia and the Bandung Conference’ in Antonia Finnance and Derek McDougall (eds), Bandung 1955: Little Histories (Monash University Press, 2010), 75

11. Ibid, 78

12.  Frank Bongiorno, ‘The Price of Nostalgia: Menzies, the “Liberal” Tradition and Australian Foreign Policy, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 51 (2005), 409

13. Agnieszka Sobocinska, ‘Visiting the Neighbours: The Political Meanings of Australian Travel to Cold War Asia’, Australian Historical Studies, 44 (2013), 382-383

14. Walker, ‘Australia’s Asian Futures’, 66

15. Ibid 387; original graph found in Australian Bureau of Statistics

16. The Australian Women’s Weekly, 27 June. 1962, 7

17.  Sobocinska, Neighbours, 393

18. Nicholas Brown, ‘Student, Expert, Peacekeeper: Three Versions of International Engagement’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 57 (2011), 39

19. Ibid, 41

20. Stuard Ward, ‘”Culture up to our Arseholes”: Projecting Post-Imperial Australia’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 51 (2005), 54

21. Ibid, 57

22. Ibid, 60

23. Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus, ‘(The) 1967 (Referendum) and All That: Narratives and Myth, Aborigines and Australia’, Australian Historical Studies 111 (1998), 267

24. Paul Keating, ‘Speech at Redfern Park’ in S Warhaft (ed), Well may we say: the speeches that made Australia (Melbourne, 2004), 353

25.  Australian Labor Party, ‘It’s Time’ in the National Film and Sound Archive of Australia (1972), https://www.nfsa.gov.au/collection/curated/asset/97727-alp-its-time, accessed 30 March 2025

26.  ‘Australia’s Population by Country of Birth’, from Australian Bureau of Statistics, (https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/australias-population-country-birth/jun-2023, accessed 30 March 2025

27. See; Stuart Macintyre, ‘History under fire’ from The History Wars (Melbourne, 2004), 1-1

28. Pauline Hanson, ‘Maiden speech to the House of Representatives’ in The Speeches that Made Australia, 294

Bibliography

Primary Sources Australian Broadcasting Corporation, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-16/gough whitlam-its-time/11118720

Australian Bureau of Statistics https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/australias population-country-birth/jun-2023

National Film and Sound Archive of Australia https://www.nfsa.gov.au/collection/curated/asset/97727-alp-its-time

The Australian Women’s Weekly

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Hanson P., ‘Maiden speech to the House of Representatives’ in S Warhaft (ed), Well may we say: the speeches that made Australia (Melbourne, 2004), 290-297

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